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9’But look’  you might ask, ’why do you care about modules so much?
You’ve got tenure; why don’t you take off and go sailing?’…
The thing is I hate relativism.
I hate relativism more than I hate anything, excepting, maybe, fiberglass powerboats.
Jerry Fodor in 1985.
Introduction
In the history of philosophy, relativism has hardly had any supporters. If anything, relativism
has been considered a view that does not even deserve closer attention. This is because
relativism has been assumed to run immediately into a problem that it cannot overcome. The
objection  that  relativism has  immediately  be  seen  to  face  is  usually  referred  to  as  the  “self-
refutation-argument,”  whose earliest formulations can be found in both Plato and Aristotle.
Their primary opponent was the sophist Protagoras, who claimed man to be the measure of all
things. While Protagoras’  doctrine has lent itself to various interpretations, it has usually been
regarded as the first formulation of relativism.1 Plato and Aristotle rejected it on the grounds
that it is self-refutive. For relativism to be a true doctrine, in fact, requires the existence of one
claim  whose  truth  is  not  relative  at  all,  that  is,  the  truth  of  relativism.  Since  by  its  internal
principles relativism denies the possibility of such a truth, the view may be discarded on the
grounds that it cannot even be formulated coherently. This sort of attitude is typical not only
for historical figures of philosophy, for some contemporary philosophers still rely on the self-
refutation argument when opposing relativism. According to Maria Baghramian, trust in its
decisiveness is so strong particularly in circles of analytic philosophy that it has almost
reached the status of “an article of faith.”2
Recently, a desire has, however, awakened in some philosophers to reopen the case of
relativism,  especially  as  that  question  concerns  the  ultimate  standing  of  the  self-refutation
argument, Joseph Margolis’  “robust relativism”  being a particularly good case in point.
Usually, doubts concerning the decisiveness of this argument emerge from the fact that a
relativistic attitude, that is, an attitude that is seen to embody a respect for other ways of
thinking and that denies the possibility of closure in inquiry, has been agued to be more
appropriate given the current state of the world, populated by frequent cultural and other sorts
of conflicts. Relativism has, in other words, been considered a doctrine of open-mindedness.
These motivations lying behind relativism point to the ways in which the question of
relativism is tied to various social and cultural considerations, the issue, thus, no longer being
“a local skirmish”  between philosophers and sophists as in Ancient Greece, for it has truly
reached “a planetary level,”  as Margolis observes.3 Given its topicality together with the
1 Baghramian (2004, 21-41).
2 Ibid. (136).
3 Margolis (1995a, 28).
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evidence constantly evolving around us that suggest commitment to some kind of relativistic
attitude managing to take hold of the complexities our contemporary condition involves, it is
understandable why many share Robert Nozick’s view that the particular swiftness with
which  the  self-refutation  argument  dispenses  with  relativism  no  longer  seems  a  compelling
way to argue against that doctrine. If anything, it just inspires a feeling of uneasiness.4
Commitment  to  some  kind  of  relativistic  outlook  has  been  especially  popular  within
recent art research, which has received its main methodological inspirations from
contemporary hermeneutic and deconstructivist approaches to interpretation. However, the
issue whether these accounts should be termed relativistic or not is, of course, a matter which
involves various complex questions. What these approaches at least do share with different
variants of relativism is that they are highly critical about the possibility of any kind of
foundationalism and of attaining a privileged viewpoint on the world. A comment made by a
lecturer in a course in art history I once attended serves as a good example of the character of
this attitude, as well as an indication of how widely art research has been absorbed by its
spirit. At the beginning of her lecture about modernist painting she remarked that because
post-impressionist painters did not conceptualize themselves in terms of that concept, that
concept being the product of later art historical research, what she was about the tell us was
only “our”  point of view on the subject she was shortly going to move on to. From the look
she gave us, it became evident that she believed she had just revealed a profound fact of art
historical explanation. For me, however, the stubborn, developing analytic philosopher, she
had just basically fallen into every possible fallacy an analytic philosopher, particularly of the
Davidsonian bent, can think of. One such fallacy was the scheme-content dualism and its
derivative assumption that “our”  reality is constructed from an uninterpreted reality which
“our”  schemes cut into various shapes and sizes.5
Relativism can be connected to another trend recent art research has been dominated by.
This is the tradition which continues in the footsteps of the “the death of the author”-thesis,
primarily associated with the views of Roland Barthes and Michel Foucault. Although
analytic autopsies attempting to show that the author has been declared dead for the wrong
reasons have been made,6 the coroner’s report seems to have reached only a small group of art
researchers.7 That this kind of situation is still widely prevalent puts an observation made by
4 Baghramian (2004, 137).
5 Donald Davidson has presented one of the most famous arguments against the idea of conceptual relativism
according to which reality is relative to a scheme, Davidson denoting with the term “scheme”  such factors as
“ways of organizing experience,”  “individuals,”  “cultures,”  “periods”  (Davidson 1984/1974, 183). One reason
why Davidson finds conceptual relativism problematic is that it is plagued by an inner tension, for “different
points of view make sense, but only if there is a common co-ordinate system on which to plot them; yet the
existence of a common system belies the claim of dramatic incomparability”  (ibid. 184). Davidson’s criticism
against conceptual relativism is highly dependent on his account of charity as the condition of interpretation
which I shall consider in chapter two.
6 Lamarque (1990).
7 My perspective on the contemporary dominance of the ideas springing from “the death of the author”  might
also be highly influenced by the current state of Finnish art research, where those ideas still widely prevail.
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E.D. Hirsch about forty years ago into a peculiar light. As is well known, Hirsch was the most
persistent defender of the idea that the author’s intentions should have an essential role in
interpretation at a time when skepticism concerning that view began to spread rapidly. It
seems that already then, the intentionalist view of interpretation Hirsch’s literary theory as a
whole so eloquently defends gradually became the clear underdog, for Hirsch felt puzzled by
the success that some approaches to interpretation had managed to achieve over “the sensible
belief that a text means what its author meant.”8
Now, if arguing for the close connection between intention and meaning were considered
the mark of sanity, the only possible diagnosis of recent interpretive theory would most
probably be “insane.”  This is because the assault against Hirsch’s sensible belief had not even
properly begun at the time when he wrote the words quoted above. In recent decades, the
intentionalist thesis supported by Hirsch has been questioned from various vantage points;
from new criticism to poststructuralism, from hermeneutics to pragmatism, as well as in such
disparate fields as feminism and analytic philosophy.
The observation that intentionalist accounts of interpretation have been opposed time and
time again in the past decades opens up an interesting connection that issue bears to the way
the issue of relativism has been considered in the history of philosophy. Alasdair MacIntyre,
in fact, draws a different conclusion from the continuous opposition relativism has met in the
history of philosophy from the usual understanding. This particular twirl suggested by
MacIntyre brings out the connection that I believe to obtain between the issues of
intentionalism and that of relativism. In his view:
Nothing is perhaps a surer sign that a doctrine embodies some not-to-be-
neglected  truth  than  that  in  the  course  of  the  history  of  philosophy  it  should
have been refuted again and again. Genuinely refutable doctrines only need to
be refuted once.9
Since this study considers both the question of intentionalism and that of relativism, it
deals with two often-refuted and discarded views. However, it ends up defending only one of
these  views,  that  is,  the  view  that  the  author’s  intentions  have  an  important  role  in
interpretation, and by doing so this study, for its part, tries to steer the course of interpretation
theory back to the path of sanity. In this respect, it takes the analysis provided by MacIntyre
as a sign that perhaps it is not relativism, but intentionalism which embodies some neglected
truths.  In  the  case  of  the  second  question,  this  study  extends  the  list  of  attempts  to  discard
relativism, particularly in the context of interpretation. This study tries to achieve this in a
Mahler once said that when the end of the world comes, he will move to Vienna, for everything arrives there 30
years late. If the end of the world had truly arrived at Mahler’s lifetime, he should have moved to Finland after
having spent those 30 years in Vienna, for by doing so he would have received at least an additional 15 years of
life.
8 Hirsch (1967, 1).
9 MacIntyre (1985, 22). This quotation also serves as one of the mottos for Baghramian (2004).
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more meaningful way than by trusting on the power of the self-refutation argument. By doing
so it takes a similar kind of stand towards attempts to refute relativism solely on the basis of
that argument, which is also at the heart of Nozick’s, Margolis’, and MacIntyre’s respective
accounts  of  relativism.  By taking  this  kind  of  stand  on  the  issue  of  relativism,  I  hope  to  do
justice to the not-to-be-neglected truths that these major figures of contemporary philosophy
have attributed to relativism. I believe, however, it is possible to accommodate them without
relativistic implications.
The primary reason why I want to defend a view that the author’s intentions are relevant
for interpretation is basically the very same that led Hirsch to ascribe that kind of position to
them in interpretation, that is, it is the best principle available for making sense of what the
validity of interpretation, ultimately, amounts to. For Hirsch, the importance of the author’s
intentions is connected with the conditions he sees the very meaningfulness of criticism to
require.  In his view, without some kind of stable norm against  which the merits of different
interpretations can be comparatively evaluated, interpretive enterprises are in danger of losing
their intellectual credibility. In Hirsch’s words:
As soon as anyone claims validity for his interpretation (and few would listen
to a critic who did not), he is immediately caught in a web of logical necessity.
If his claim to validity is to hold, he must be willing to measure his
interpretation against a genuinely discriminating norm, and the only
compelling normative principle that has ever been brought forward is the old-
fashioned ideal of rightly understanding what the author meant.10
Hirsch’s account of the relationship between the meaningfulness of interpretive enterprise
and the kinds of standards it must involve so that it is able to achieve intellectual credibility is
shared by many. For example, Arthur Danto thinks that if interpretations are not required to
be supported by pieces of evidence and reasons, interpretation becomes an activity that is no
different from “seeing faces in clouds.”11 In fact, the contextual account of meaning implied
by Danto’s famous analysis of the role of the art world in our understanding of art has been
seen  to  impose  the  kinds  of  constraints  on  interpretation  that  the  meaningfulness  of
interpretation is precisely in need of. That is, since meanings are dependent on the theoretical
atmosphere of the art world, there are historical constraints on the kinds of meanings artworks
may embody at a particular time. Since the possible meanings artworks may possess are
historically conditioned in this way, there are also constraints on interpretations, which seek
to track what those meanings are. In other words, “the possible interpretations are constrained
by the artist’s location in the world, by when and where he lived, by what experiences he
could have had.”12 This is not to deny that interpretations could not be potentially endless.
However,  for  Danto,  our  incapacity  to  say  the  final  word  in  some  cases  does  not  mean
10 Hirsch (1967, 26).
11 Danto (1981, 130).
12 Danto (1986, 45-46).
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subsuming ourselves under a form of relativism, but it is merely a result of the trivial fact that
relevant knowledge is simply “unattainable”  in some cases.13
Then again, it is arguable that the constraints Danto’s account of the art world, ultimately,
sets for interpretation falls short of providing a foundation for evaluating the merits of
different interpretations in the way both Hirsch and Danto thinks the meaningfulness of any
interpretive endeavor requires. This is because the contextualist constraints implied by
Danto’s account, nevertheless, remain rather loose, and are thus unable to provide the kind of
foundation Danto and Hirsch are after. That is, the standards it gives for interpretation remain,
after all, so weak that they seem to be able to rule out only plainly absurd interpretations. An
example would be, say, a nineteenth-century Russian opera, which dealt with a turning point
in  Russian  history  being  interpreted  as  a  description  of  the  plan  that  led  to  Dimitri
Medvedev’s election as the Russian president in 2008. Such an interpretation would be
invalid  on  the  terms  implied  by  Danto’s  analysis  of  the  art  world  for  the  simple  and  trivial
reason that the opera was composed before the peculiar understanding of democracy leading
to Medvedev’s presidency arose in Russia. This kind of constraint, however, does not amount
to very much.14 If we, in other words, want to continue to talk about more and less valid
interpretations, we must take another look at intentionalism, for contextualism seems to fail
those of us who want to keep on talking about validity in interpretation.
For  some time,  analytic  philosophers  of  art  in  particular  have  given  another  look  at  the
question of the role of authorial intention in interpretation. However, the substantial defense
of intentionalism I intend to carry out in this study will take its primary inspiration from
another source, Donald Davidson. Given Davidson’s stature within late twentieth century
analytic philosophy it is, in fact, strange how seldom his views on meaning, intention, and the
holistic constitution of the human mind have been referred to in the discussion currently
carried out in analytic aesthetics over the role of the author’s intentions in interpretation.15 In
those texts, where Davidson explicitly considers the problem of literary language and
interpretation, he supports a view of interpretation which bears some significant similarities
with modest forms of intentionalism which are currently popular within analytic philosophy
of art. Davidson, for example, discusses at length the problem of Humpty Dumpty which
modest intentionalists have also been preoccupied with, that is, the problem of how a view
which otherwise construes a close relationship between meaning and intention is able to
embrace the fact that the author cannot mean whatever he wishes. The ignorance towards
Davidson’s views is noteworthy. Partly this is because Davidson discusses the same issues
modest intentionalists have focused on. But there is also ignorance of the fact that some
elements which are fundamental for Davidson’s philosophical views on meaning,
interpretation, and the constitution of the human mind supplement the modest intentionalist
13 Ibid. (66).
14 Compare Iseminger (1996, 321).
15 One exception is Stecker (2003, 12-14).
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position on interpretation and overcome certain major criticisms which have been addressed
against that view of interpretation. Initial support for this view will be provided in chapter two
by comparing Davidson’s way of accommodating the problem of Humpty Dumpty to an
intentionalist view of interpretation with the replies which modest intentionalists have used to
avoid their views from slipping into it. The defense of intentionalism drawing on Davidson’s
views will be extended in chapters three and four by taking up two approaches to
interpretation which are fundamentally at odds with any form of intentionalism and by
showing how a form of intentionalism built upon Davidson’s views is able to meet the
criticisms of intentionalism these approaches involve. The stage for the defense to be carried
out  in  those  chapters  will  be  set  in  chapter  one  by  a  critical  discussion  of  Joseph  Margolis’
“robust relativism,”  which is arguably the most systematic and convincing defense of a
relativistic view of interpretation in recent years.
By choosing Davidson’s work as a touchstone, the view of interpretation to be formulated
in this study can be seen to lead philosophy of literature and interpretation in a direction that,
in the eyes of many, should no longer be followed. John Gibson has, for example, insisted that
these disciplines should stop drawing so heavily on ideas initially introduced in the context of
philosophy of language, whose most influential figure is Davidson. Instead, in Gibson’s view,
what should be brought under closer investigation is precisely the way in which the
interpretation of literature requires factors that are not accounted for by the resources provided
by philosophy of language.16 I think there is some truth to Gibson’s claim, and I shall consider
the notion of interpretation in more detail at the end of my study. Before that, however, I think
we need to be clearer on how far philosophy of language is able to help us in grasping the
constituent factors involved in our interactions with artworks, and I believe that precisely an
investigation on the relevance of Davidson’s work provides a more detailed picture of where
the limits of philosophy of language with respect to the interpretation of art lie.
While Davidson’s work has been virtually ignored in analytic aesthetics, its relevance for
philosophy of interpretation and literature has already been considered in other contexts. The
first, and, at the same time, most extensive investigation to date, is the anthology Literary
Theory after Davidson (1993). In later writings, its editor Reed Way Dasenbrock has further
considered the relationship of Davidson’s work to literary theory. These have been collected
in the book Truth and Consequences (2001). A third major source is the symposium
“Davidson and Literary Understanding”  comprising three articles which appeared in number
two of the 26th volume of the journal Philosophy and Literature in 2002.
The way in which the relevance of Davidson’s work on the philosophy of interpretation is
unraveled in this study departs from the way it is addressed in these texts. This becomes
apparent especially in the theories that I have chosen as the primary examples of approaches
embodying a skeptical attitude towards the role of authorial intention in interpretation, namely
16 Gibson (2006, 443).
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the philosophical hermeneutics of Hans-Georg Gadamer and the view of interpretation and
literature contained in Richard Rorty’s pragmatism. In the texts mentioned above, the views
of these two philosophers are either not discussed at all, or they are discussed in relation to
issues different from those I shall be concerned with here.
Especially the intentionalist critique contained in Rorty’s work connects the question
regarding the strength of an interpretive position to those factors which have motivated some
philosophers to call into question the force of the criticism of relativism relying on the self-
refutation argument. While perhaps managing to provide a more satisfactory account of
validity than nonfoundationalist approaches to interpretation are able to, intentionalist theories
should, nevertheless, be discarded, for they are unable to accommodate certain challenges that
Rorty sees contemporary society posing for literature and literary theory.
The critiques of intentionalism, Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics, and Rorty’s
pragmatism do raise issues which for many suggest the need to commit to some kind of
relativistic outlook. Relativism may, however, be considered a more fundamental and all-
embracing issue than the question whether the author’s intentions should have a role in
interpretation or not. Now if the issue relativism truly is primary to the question of the
relevance of authorial intention in interpretation, it would seem a futile attempt to develop a
substantial  intentionalist  account  of  interpretation  if  that  endeavor  is  not  connected  to  a
systematic discussion of relativism, and especially of the possible problems it may involve.
For this reason, the first  chapter of this thesis is  devoted to a discussion of one of the most
systematic defenses of relativism in recent years, Joseph Margolis’  “robust relativism.”  That
exposition, and especially the problems Margolis’  defense of relativism is seen to be troubled
by in it, can be seen as plowing the path for the intentionalist theory to be developed on
Davidson’s work in the latter parts of this thesis, as well as for the defense of that position on
interpretation I intend to carry out there.
Contemporary philosophy has not only been marked by a growing skepticism towards
the self-refutation argument, but another tendency which can be discerned is that many
influential philosophers have to a growing extent begun to take inspiration from different
philosophical traditions. In some cases, those philosophers whose work is characterized by
this kind of element include some of the most important critics of the self-refutation
argument, Margolis being a good example. To choose Davidson’s views as a touchstone for
an investigation of the philosophical problems related to interpretation allows one to extend
this important trend. While it is unfair to accuse exclusively analytic philosophers for not
appreciating other philosophical traditions, analytic philosophy of interpretation as it is
currently carried out in analytic aesthetics could arguably be more responsive to the issues
raised outside of its circles, such as in pragmatism and in hermeneutics.17
17 In all fairness, it must be said that in analytic philosophy of art issues have been raised which it would be good
for hermeneutic philosophers to take into consideration as well. From an analytic perspective, an eye-catching
thing about hermeneutic approaches to interpretation is that in them no distinction tends to be made between
16
Although philosophical fox holes are still rather deep, especially Davidson’s philosophy
has emerged as an interface between the different front lines. Davidson’s views, for example,
ultimately formed the strongest influence that Rorty received from analytic philosophy, and
Rorty found the five volumes that made up Davidson’s collected papers “time bombs, on the
library shelves,”  which he hoped would be “detonated sooner or later.”18 Moreover, in recent
years there has been a growing interest in investigating the ways in which some fundamental
elements of Davidson’s philosophical views overlap with those that are at the heart of
hermeneutics, particularly Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics. In this respect, to choose
Davidson’s views on language, mind, and meaning as starting points for developing a more
systematic account of interpretation gives a possibility for crossing the barriers parts of
contemporary philosophy still involve. There is I think a real need for such a crossing which
the Davidsonian starting point provides. That is, given the topical questions related to
interpretation that have been raised in some traditions, one cannot help but share Joseph
Margolis’  estimation of contemporary philosophy according to which “English language
philosophy begins to appear uncompelling, defective, unresponsive to challenge, even
isolationist.”19
My ultimate reason for crossing philosophical boundaries is not, however, merely for the
sake of lending an ear to the other, but, rather, because it is my belief that in the contexts in
which I shall discuss Davidson’s views in the following chapters, their effect will truly prove
to be explosive. In recent years, the critical edge has usually been drawn from Continental
inspired theories towards analytic philosophy. In chapter three of this study, in particular,
that  edge  will  be  turned  in  the  opposite  direction.  To  quote  Margolis  again,  “I  admire  the
sense of rigor in the ‘analytic’  tradition, and I admire the large spirit of the Continental.”20 It
is my belief that the rigorousness Davidson’s theory brings to the discussion on
interpretation and understanding is able to point out difficulties in theories drawing on
Continental theories, without diminishing the expansive spirit characterizing those
approaches.
performative interpretation, that is, an interpretation of a work which, for example, happens through the
performance of a piece of music, and interpretation of a literary work. See, for example, Gadamer (2004/1960,
xxviii, 141, 157), Gadamer (1973/1960, xix, 141, 157), Palmer (1969, 119) and Warnke (1987, 53-54). Analytic
philosophers of art have, in turn, drawn attention to some fundamental differences between these two activities
and that even within the field of music it is important to distinguish between different forms of interpretation,
that is, performative and critical. See, for example, Levinson (1993) and Kivy (2006).
18 Rorty (2005).
19 Margolis (1995a, 6).
20 Ibid.
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Arise! Arise! To me! Your master calls you, nameless one,
primeval devil-woman! Rose of Hell! You were Herodias, and
who else? Gundryggia there, Kundry here! Come here! Come
hither, Kundry! Your master calls; obey!
Richard Wagner, Parsifal, Act Two
I Does Joseph Margolis’  Defense of Relativism Fall into an
Impasse?
Joseph Margolis has provided one of the most systematic and multifaceted defenses of
relativism in recent years. While much less influential, it embodies ideas similar to those
found in deconstructivist-inspired approaches to interpretation, whose influence within art
research shows very little signs of deterioration. By putting those ideas into a more rigorous
form, and by backing them up with detailed argumentation, Margolis’  account can, however,
be  seen  to  establish  the  attitude  towards  interpretation  it  shares  with  deconstructivism  on  a
more responsible foundation, that is, a formulation that, in Margolis’  own words, is not in
danger of committing “a logical disaster.”21
The reason why I have chosen Margolis’  theory from other possible options to consider
the issue of relativism is because of the diversified manner with which it approaches the
question. His theory does not shy away from controversial issues related to relativism, and by
trying to show that relativism need not have incoherent consequences, Margolis meets a
powerful tradition of philosophy head on. In his opinion, the self-refutation argument is far
from being a settled issue. Margolis sees his formulation of relativism as having a universal
scope, encompassing disciplines from the natural sciences to cultural studies, and in this
chapter, Margolis’  views are approached as far as they concern interpretation. The reason for
this sort of focus is not only that it connects the themes to be considered in this chapter with
issues  relevant  for  this  study  as  a  whole,  but  also  because  it  is  a  context  where  Margolis
himself believes his account of relativism is most likely to strike a chord, and where it has the
most likely prospects of uncovering certain neglected, fruitful possibilities. As Margolis
explains, “relativism is hardly interesting, presented as an abstract possibility. It gains its
standing by being put to use….”22 The rewarding prospects Margolis attributes to relativism
are connected to the justification of interpretive statements, that is, Margolis claims, for a
variety  of  reasons  to  be  specified  below,  that  interpretive  sciences  would  profit  from  being
modeled in the kinds of terms his relativistic logic sees justification to involve.
An important element of Margolis’  defense of relativism is a denial of a sharp distinction
between first-order and second-order questions. First-order questions include questions of fact
21 Margolis (1995b, 32).
22 Margolis (1999, 52).
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addressed by the individual sciences, including the different disciplines in art research.
Second-order questions include such questions as what should one take the ultimate nature of
reality to be and what sorts of factors is our knowledge concerning it founded on. These have
usually been thought to form the subject matter of philosophy.23 By emphasizing that these
two types of questions cannot be considered in isolation from one another, but, rather, that
their relationship is itself a second-order question, Margolis’  theory involves skepticism
towards the possibility of “a first philosophy”  that functions irrespective of first-order truths.
This is an attitude towards philosophical questions that it shares with Quinean naturalism.
However, against this train of thought Margolis claims that second-order questions, for
example, those regarding the justification of knowledge claims cannot be reduced to or
replaced with first-order causal questions regarding the reliability of our cognitive faculties, as
they are in Quine’s naturalistic epistemology.
The claim regarding the impossibility of distinguishing between first-order and second-
order questions serves as a basis for two important tenets of Margolis’  theory and the defense
of relativism it involves. First, that there is no fundamental reason for thinking that reality
must, ultimately, possess an invariant structure. Second, that it is possible to fall back on a
relativistic logic in the legitimation of statements if the situation under consideration is
considered  to  call  for  this  sort  of  decision.  Echoing  Kant’s  famous  formulation  on  the
relationship between concepts and intuitions, Margolis writes, “first-order inquiries without
second-order inquiries cannot but be blind; second-order inquiries without first-order inquiries
cannot but be empty.”24 In other words, the way in which the nature of such concepts as
“reality”  and “knowledge”  are approached cannot be carried out independently of what first-
order truths one is willing to accept, but this discourse “is ineluctably constrained by, and
relativized to, first-order discourse.”25
An important part of Margolis’  defense of relativism is his critique of a philosophical
assumption he calls “archism.”  The belief that is typical for this conception is not really a
view which may be attributed to a particular philosopher. Rather it is a supposition regarding
the possibility of thought that, in Margolis’  opinion, is shared by various philosophers from
Aristotle to the early Wittgenstein. In fact, Margolis claims that a substantial part of the
history of philosophy has been archist by nature, which is to say, the claim that reality must
ultimately possess an invariant structure has been regarded as a necessary precondition for
rational thought and meaningful inquiry, and, consequently, it has been thought that no
adequate philosophical account of knowledge or of truth can be irreconcilable with this
principle.
23 Margolis (1995a, 16-17).
24 Ibid. (17).
25 Ibid. (93).
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Margolis sees his argument against the assumption he refers to with the term “archism”  as
a form of “conceptual bet”  against a supposed “conceptual unavoidability.”26 In other words,
Margolis’  critical account of archism is motivated by the belief that no one has ever managed
to show that the possibility of meaningful discourse truly presupposes a commitment to the
archist’s thesis, and that discourses must be constrained by such factors the conforming to
which the archist introduces as necessary, such as to the principle of noncontradiction.
Margolis challenges the alleged authority of this position by outlining an an-archist
philosophy, which maintains “that reality may be a flux, that is, lacking invariant structure or
lacking necessarily invariant structure, and that rational thought need not invoke such
invariances.”27
Here we see how Margolis’  account of the relationship between first-order and second-
order questions is intended to pave the way for his rejection of archism and to lend initial
support  for  the  version  of  relativism  he  ultimately  offers.  There  is  no  necessary  reason  to
commit to archism on the second-order level, but that question itself is dependent on
considerations that arise from the first-order level. The reasons that lead Margolis to reject
archism in this case are in many respects similar to those that motivate philosophers such as
Nozick to insist on the need to reassess the standing of the self-refutation argument against
relativism, that is, “the insistence on fixity is simply invalid and profoundly inappropriate
given the human condition.”28
For Margolis, that condition is also essentially historical, the claim that “thinking is a
history,”  in fact, serving as a postulate for one of his most important works.29 As David Carr
so  perceptively  observes,  for  Margolis,  “history  is  not  so  much  a  problem  as  a  way  of
redefining all the other problems.”30 Acknowledging the historical nature of human thought
gives Margolis another reason for rejecting archism, for by insisting that the nature of reality
is ultimately invariant, the doctrine overlooks precisely this element of the human condition.
Moreover, the conceptual resources through which inquiry is conducted are historically
changing and, hence, contingent. Margolis’  view of historicity, thus denies the possibility of
grounding discourses and the principles governing them on an invariant foundation. In other
words, policies dominated by the archist spirit proceed on the questionable assumption that
reality has “a determinate structure entirely apart from, entirely unaffected, by the intrinsic
conditions of human knowledge, understanding, and inquiry”31 and that we would “possess…
an assured ability to discern the real properties of the world as it is independent of our
26 Ibid. (25).
27 Ibid. (27).
28 Ibid. (3).
29 Ibid (165).
30 Carr (1997, 139).
31 Margolis (1995a, 30).
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inquiries….”32 That  is  to  say,  there  cannot  be  the  sort  of  cognitive  privileged  position  with
regard to the nature of reality archism assumes.
1. Overcoming the Self-Refutation Argument
Once the force of the archist supposition has been undermined by the above factors, Margolis
believes that the elements begin to emerge on the basis of which the supposed definitiveness
of  the  self-refutation  argument  may  be  questioned.  Simultaneously,  the  prospects  for
formulating a coherent view of relativism open up. In Margolis’  opinion, the force of the self-
refutation argument is by no means independent of a commitment to the archist thesis, but,
rather, its ultimate standing is wholly dependent on whether the necessity of archism is
accepted or not. The problem, as Margolis sees it, has been that of “disconnecting logic and
metaphysics.”33 In other words, the self-refutation argument seems compelling only because
certain  formal  principles,  such  as  the  principle  of  non-contradiction  and  of  the  excluded
middle, are antecedently thought to lend support to archism.34 However,  if  there  is  a
possibility of rejecting archism, that is, of rejecting the claim that the denial of fixed essences
leads to incoherence, the aforementioned principles lose the kind of force they have been
thought to possess.
The consequence that Margolis draws from his criticism of archism is that “it is very
difficult to suppose that the assignment of truth-values to statements alleged to be about the
way the world is is altogether independent of our views of the way the world is.”35 That is to
say, assessments of truth-claims do not function irrespective of what we take the part  of the
world under dispute to be like, i.e., what is its ontological nature. This sort of connection
between alethic questions, that is, questions related to the ascription of truth-values, and ontic
questions transforms the terms with which the validity of those principles governing our
critical practices is to be assessed. In particular, it calls for a re-evaluation of the position of
bivalence.36 This is because if “the choice of truth values (or truth-like values) assigned, as a
matter of policy or principle, to any sector of inquiry is a function… of what we take to be the
nature of the domain in question,”  there are grounds for committing to bivalence, only if it is
seen  to  result  from  the  ontological  nature  of  that  domain.37 Yet,  if  there  is  a  possibility  of
rejecting archism, there are no necessary, unchanging reasons that force us to commit to
bivalence in inquiry.
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid. (35).
34 Margolis (1995b, 71).
35 Margolis (1995a, 41).
36 Ibid. (64).
37 Ibid. (65)
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In place of a bivalent logic Margolis outlines a relativistic logic for the assessment of
truth-claims. With a relativistic logic Margolis means “a many-valued logic that, relative to
some interpreted domain of discourse, admits as compatible, those constative claims that
would… be incompatibles in a bivalent logic.”38 By replacing the symmetrical values of
“true”  and “false”  with weaker values such as “plausible,”  “reasonable,”  and “apt”  that do not
bear the kind of mutually exclusive relationship to each other as the values used in a bivalent
logic, relativistic logic is able to justify incompatible statements. In other words, even if two
statements  were  incompatible  with  each  another,  this  still  does  not  imply  that  one  of  them
must necessarily be discarded. Despite the fact that this kind of logic relinquishes bivalence,
Margolis is firm that a resort to this sort of logic in justification does not lead to an “anything
goes”  attitude which is in danger of falling to the view that any conception and judgment is as
good as any other. Even if statements were judged in accord with weaker values than those of
“true”  and “false,”  there still remains the possibility of comparing the mutual validity of
statements adequately enough and even disconfirming certain statements as false. This is
possible even in the case where “truth”  would no longer apply.39 Moreover, considerations
concerning the coherence and consistency of arguments arise with the same kind of force in
the sort of relativistic logic preferred by Margolis as in a bivalent one. This assumption also
provides the kind of relativistic logic Margolis outlines the opportunity of disconfirming such
statements an anything goes attitude would arguably accept. 40
An important thing to note especially as we are concerned with the issue of the coherence
of relativism is that the purpose of Margolis’  relativism is not to provide a definition of truth,
but  to  clarify  the  foundation  of  the  assignment  of  truth-values.  This  fact  becomes  apparent
from a distinction Margolis makes between a view he calls “relationalism”  and his own robust
relativism. While the former holds that truth is defined relatively to, say, a sector of inquiry, a
scientific paradigm, or a given culture, robust relativism simply involves the claim that truth-
value assignments are constrained by ontic and epistemic factors. According to Margolis, it is
the former version of relativism that philosophers from Plato onwards have had in mind when
discussing relativism and which they have considered self-refutive. Acknowledging the
incoherence of relationalism, however, is of no consequence for the acceptability of robust
relativism.41 Margolis explains the difference between the two versions of relativism as
follows:
In short, in accord with the viable form of relativism, ‘true’  simply
means ‘true’! Truth-claims remain subject to ‘epistemic’  and ‘ontic’
constraints. ‘True’  means ‘true’, but whether relativistically
construed or not, the assignment of truth-values remains subject to
the vagaries of ‘L’  and ‘W’  and so on. That is, ‘relationalists’  hold
38 Ibid. (67)
39 Ibid. (68).
40 Ibid. (68); Margolis (1999, 49).
41 Ibid. (53-55).
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(by self-referential paradox) that ‘true’  means ‘true-in-Lk’; ‘robust
relativists’  hold that ‘true’  simply means ‘true’  as it standardly does
in bivalent logics.42
So, to recapitulate. The point is that Margolis’  robust relativism does not claim that truth
is relative in the sense that something could be true in one context without being true in
another. Instead, it maintains that the way in which truth or truth like-values are assigned to
statements is dependent on possible epistemic and ontic constraints. To emphasize the
constraints that especially ontic elements pose for justification is important for Margolis’
relativistic theory of interpretation.
2. The Ontology of Cultural Entities and Relativism in Interpretation
Margolis’  rejection of archism and the formulation of a relativistic logic to which it leads
proposes an approach to interpretation according to which there are no necessary reasons why
even incompatible interpretive statements about artworks and, say, about historical events
could not be simultaneously accepted. He gives further support for committing to this sort of
relativistic logic in justification by developing an ontological theory of cultural entities that
highlights their invariant nature. Here Margolis’  view that the logic of justification cannot be
separated from ontic questions becomes apparent. Since “it is impossible to disjoin the
account of the nature or logic of interpretation from one’s theory of the nature of what it is
that may or must be submitted to interpretation,”43 it is reasonable to commit to bivalence
only if the ontological nature of interpreted entities is of such a kind that it can support such a
commitment. The account of cultural entities formulated by Margolis is meant to demonstrate
that their ontological nature is indeterminate to the degree that the validity of interpretive
statements cannot be approached in terms of bivalence, but that some form of relativistic logic
is better suited to account for their justification.
Margolis regards cultural entities as “physically embodied and culturally emergent
entities.”44 This claim is meant to capture their distinctive ontological nature. While the
existence of cultural entities does presuppose some form of physical existence, their
properties cannot be reduced to the physical properties of the entity in which they are
embodied. Among these sorts of beings Margolis includes not only such things as artworks
and other cultural products, but human “selves”  as well. The notion of emergence is widely
used in philosophy, but in Margolis’  theory of cultural entities it acquires a fundamental
position that is rarely given to it in contemporary philosophy any more. He has explained his
42 Margolis (1995a, 69-70). Italics Margolis.
43 Margolis (1995b, 21).
44 Margolis (1999, 68).
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understanding of emergence in various ways, but I think the following quotation sums it up
effectively:
By “emergent,”  then,  I  mean the  obvious  empirical  fact  that  human
beings readily acquire language and culture and are literally altered
by succeeding thus, and also the ontologically explanatory notion that
their characteristic activities now –  science, politics, morality, art,
[etc.], are made possible only by changes in their very “natures”.
They are literally transformed by their enculturation, emerge as
uniquely hybrid beings –  selves –  irreducibly “second-natured”  by
their sui generis competences.45
To be sure, biological reality is characterized by a kind of emergence as well, in the sense
that certain higher level properties of biological organisms cannot be reduced to the properties
of their parts. Despite this similarity between cultural and biological reality, Margolis
nevertheless sees a crucial difference between the two. This especially concerns the elements
on which the emergence is founded. That is to say “the conditions… of the emergence of the
biological and of the cultural are utterly different from each other.”46 The decisive difference
between the two is that cultural emergence involves a kind of reciprocity between individual
entities and the specific level of reality to which they belong, that is, a kind of “hermeneutic
circle”  between part and whole, which is absent in the case of biological emergence. Unlike in
the case of biological entities, the emergent properties of cultural entities are essentially
context-sensitive and hence may change as those entities are inserted into different contexts.
Since this sort of view on emergence denies that cultural entities possess invariant,
determinate natures, it gives further support to commit to the kind of relativistic theory of
interpretation Margolis supports. Due to their “permeable”  and “porous”  nature, the properties
characteristic of cultural entities are alterable through interpretation.47 In this respect, for
Margolis, interpretation is essentially an imputational enterprise, that is, it is not an activity
that discovers the properties cultural objects possess independently of our ways of
approaching them, but, rather, different properties emerge with regard to different readings
and interpretations.
Margolis refers to these culturally emergent properties as “Intentional,”  a notion that is
meant to collect a wide variety of elements related to language and culture together.48 The
conditions of Intentionality serve as yet another distinctive mark of cultural emergence that
separates it from biological emergence. Because of the porous nature of cultural entities, that
is, the way in which they receive new properties through interpretation and through the effect
45 Margolis (2005, 617).
46 Margolis (1995a, 209).
47 Ibid. (252).
48 Ibid. (213) Margolis lists, for example, the following things under the heading of the “Intentional”: “‘lingual’
meaning, significance, signification, intensions, signs, symbols, reference, representations, expressions,
rhetorical functions, semiotic import, rule-like regularities, purposes, propositional attitudes, intentions, and the
like”  (ibid.).
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of history, in cultural emergence the character of the emergent properties is highly affected by
human intervention. A similar kind of effective factor is absent in the case of biological
emergence. In other words, unlike ants and sea shells, “man makes and remakes himself and
his cultural world.”49 “The reality of  our  cultural  world  is  inseparable  from  human  life  and
intervention….”50 This is not to deny the biological or non-Intentional origins of the human
species. However, it points to the specific way in which Margolis construes the relationship
between these realms. That is, while it is, indeed, so that “physical nature is… ontically prior
to human culture, cultural world is (in its turn) epistemically prior to the physical.”51
Epistemical priority here denotes precisely the fact that our conceptual resources are
culturally formed and develop historically, and because of this there is no possibility of
grasping how reality is in itself independent of them.
For Margolis, “whatever is historical may be directly altered by the historical process, by
interpretation and by intentional action.”52 Hence, the meaning of, say, Hamlet is  not
determined by the author’s intention or any other invariant factor that remains the same
throughout the history of the work’s reception, but “its meaning is heuristically schematized
in the intersection between our present power of reading, and what, from that evolving
perspective, we posit as its collected past.”53 That is, “the meaning of Hamlet is,  now,  a
function of how we reconstruct the history of past interpretations.”54 These quotations bring
out in an apt way the specific reciprocality Margolis considers cultural emergence involves;
the Intentional properties of cultural entities change, because people change, cultural entities,
thus, lacking determinate natures, are nothing but “histories.”
A particular reason that makes Margolis’  defense of relativism so admirable is that he
admits that relativistic views do, indeed, involve problems that need to be overcome before
they may be further applied. One such is the following: if cultural entities are allowed to
change  in  the  drift  of  history,  how is  it  possible  that  we  can  continue  to  speak  of  the  same
entity, given that the identity of that entity is in constant change? Or to put it in more
technical terms, how can referential unicity be guaranteed under change of identity?
In Margolis’  opinion, the key to overcoming this problem lies in the separation of
questions concerning the individuation of an entity from questions concerning the constitution
of its identity. That is, the possibility of individuating a particular entity as the same does not
presuppose that that entity must be thought to possess an inconstant nature.55 For Margolis,
and for other pragmatist-inspired theorists, such as Richard Shusterman, the individuation of
cultural entities is based on the inherited cultural practices that allow the career of a given
49 Margolis (1995b, 90).
50 Margolis (2000, 116). Italics Margolis.
51 Margolis (1999, 96).
52 Margolis (1995b, 103).
53 Ibid. (49).
54 Margolis (2000, 126).
55 Margolis (1995b, 35).
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cultural entity to have the kind of unicity that individuation requires. Observing this fact
demonstrates that, ultimately, cultural reality serves a dual role. That is, by both establishing
the possibility of individuating cultural entities and by transforming their nature, cultural
reality simultaneously serves as the ground for individuation and as the source of change. The
individuation of cultural entities is, in other words, a form of “numerical identity through
change.”56
So, Margolis’  account of cultural entities depicts a relationship between unity and change
similar to that embodied in Klingor’s description of Kundry in the motto at the beginning of
this chapter. After having laughed at Christ at the foot of the cross, Kundry was doomed to
wander around the world in different forms, without receiving a relief in death that she so
piteously craves for in Parsifal. Although during her wanderings Kundry has received many
forms, each time that Klingsor calls Kundry to seduce the Knights of the Grail through some
bizarre stroke of magic, the seducer is every time one and the same. In the case of cultural
entities, however, no such magic is required.
Margolis writes that “admitting the ontic distinction of artworks goes a long way toward
ensuring the plausibility of relativism.”57 Now,  if  one  recalls  Margolis’  insistence  that
questions concerning justification cannot be separated from ontic questions concerning the
possible ontological peculiarities of a given domain of reality, one sees how this sort of
account of cultural entities is intended to persuade one to commit to a relativistic logic in
interpretation. There is reason to invoke bivalence when accounting for the justification of
statements only if the ontological nature of the domain under dispute is of such a kind as to be
able to support such a commitment. Since the identity of cultural entities is porous and in
constant transformation, this sort of decision does not seem reasonable in this case.
3. Is There Really a Need to Fall Back on a Relativistic Logic?
The ultimate complexity of Margolis’  defense of relativism has not always been evident in the
literature.  It  is  for this reason that I  have spent some time spelling out the intricacies of his
argument. Now it is time to assess the convincingness of that defense. I shall address it from
two angles, the first of which will be carried out in this section. Here, I will take up that part
of Margolis’  defense in which a bivalent-logic is considered ill-suited for use in the
legitimation of interpretive claims made of artworks. This approach supports the view that a
relativistic logic is, instead, more capable of accounting for the complexities that activity
involves. The kind of relationship between first-order and second-order questions drawn by
Margolis shows that one’s response to the question regarding which logic to prefer in
legitimation  affects  the  question  what  sort  of  view  of  cultural  entities  should  one  hold.  As
56 Ibid. (82).
57 Margolis (1999, 85).
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Margolis explains the relationship between these two issue, “if (for argument’s sake) the
interpretation  of  artworks  favored  a  relativistic  logic  (as  I  believe  it  does),  then  we  should
have to ask ourselves how that might be reflected in our theory of what an artwork is….”58
For  Margolis,  this  assertion  suggests  that  precisely  the  kind  of  ontological  theory  of  culture
supported by him must be developed, for the view of emergence that theory includes manages
to explain the reality of all those properties that relativistic logic allows to be imputed to the
object.
However, what I take this interrelatedness perceptible in the different parts of Margolis’
defense of relativism to imply is that if a bivalent logic is not, after all, as ill-suited as
Margolis claims it to be, the support Margolis draws for a relativistic outlook on interpretation
from his theory of cultural entities is simultaneously undermined. This is because if it is
indeed so that when reflecting on “what an artwork is”  we must take into account the logic we
want interpretation to follow, as Margolis insists, his own theory of cultural entities seems to
lose ground when the use of relativistic logics in justification appears less compelling. That is,
if our theory of what an artwork is must reflect our view of the logic of justification, does not
a possibility for developing an ontological theory of culture without relativistic consequences
open up if we reject a commitment to the kind of relativistic logic in justification outlined by
Margolis.  What  that  theory  might  look  like  will  be  outlined  in  the  next  section.  The  rest  of
this section, however, is devoted to bringing out factors that I believe speak against favoring
the relativistic logic Margolis’  defense offers in place of a bivalent logic.
Support for the view that the relativistic logic developed by Margolis should, indeed, be
rejected, and that there is no immediate need to relinquish bivalent logic may be drawn from
an  examination  of  one  particular  case  of  interpretive  disagreement.  In  this  case,  that
disagreement concerns the significance of the character of Siegfried within Richard Wagner’s
Ring des Nibelungen. Roger Scruton has considered him to be the most important character of
the whole cycle,59 while Philip Kitcher & Richard Schacht have not only argued that it is
Wotan who holds this position, but that it is, in fact, odd how insignificant a role Siegfried, in
the end, occupies in Wagner’s work once a proper grasp of the work’s structure has been
worked out.60
Now, because this case involves two interpretations that are almost in contradiction with
each other, it serves as an illuminating example in which to consider the convincingness of
Margolis’  claim that relativistic logic is better suited for use in legitimating interpretive
statements than a bivalent one. It seems that a Margolisian analysis of the case presented
could offer two possible ways of coping with the disagreement apparent in it. First, by
appealing to the fact that since there is no ultimate reason to reject the use of relativistic logic,
Margolis could offer reasons to the effect that such a logic should be favored in this case.
58 Ibid. (71).
59 Scruton (2003).
60 Kitcher & Schacht (2004, 185-196).
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Moreover, because within this logic even incompatible statements can be judged valid, there
is no need to discard either interpretation, for both interpretations present in the case may be
simultaneously accepted.
Before coming to this solution in more detail, it is worth noting that another kind of
solution is possible for Margolis as well. Although his primary aim is to develop a relativistic
logic within which even incongruent claims may be validated, Margolis nevertheless wants to
leave room for the possibility that this kind of logic is, after all, able to retain sufficient
normative bite to judge which interpretations may be considered invalid. That is, in Margolis’
opinion, even though a decision to favor a relativistic logic does mean that “truth no longer
applies,”  that value being replaced with such weaker values as “apt”  and “reasonable,”  it does
not imply that claims could no longer “be disconfirmed, as false.”61
If  relativistic  logics  are,  after  all,  able  to  account  for  the  possibility  that  certain
interpretations are invalid, what sort of basis can it introduce for this disconfirming? One
factor which Margolis relies on is the historically emergent character of cultural entities. That
is, since the character of a given cultural entity is determined by the history of its
interpretations, that history may be considered to create, if not explicit constraints, at least a
kind of touchstone for present interpretations, through which their character is formed.
Margolis writes: “Responsible interpretation must to some extent consult the prior history of a
work’s interpretation, but it need not attempt to build linearly on that history or even know the
whole of it.”62 In his account of Margolis’  relativism, David Carr also draws attention to the
important position history occupies in Margolis’  attempt to avoid a slippage to an anything-
goes attitude. This has usually been considered that form of relativism which is incapable of
discarding any statements or interpretations whatsoever. Even though cultural entities do lack
a determinate nature, which stays the same in different contexts, this does not mean that
interpretations begin from scratch. Cultural entities are not tabula rasas, so to speak, which are
just waiting for interpretation to make their mark on them, for past interpretations and
tradition  have  already  made  their  imprints  from which  present  strokes  begin.  That  is  to  say
“narrative provides the appropriate, and appropriately contingent, ordering principle. Human
actions, human events, persons are such that we can tell stories about them. That’s all we need
to know.”63
The way reliance on history is here presumed to allow Margolis to reject one of the
interpretations of the character of Siegfried presented above is to consider one of them
irresponsible,  for  example  by  claiming  that  in  that  interpretation  the  past  interpretations  of
The Ring are not properly taken into account. Yet, this kind of reliance on the career of The
Ring does not seem to be able to provide the resources that Margolis is in need of in this
context. This is because, and this is a point that will be important also for the critical account
61 Margolis (1995a, 68).
62 Margolis (1999, 91) My italics.
63 Carr (1997, 143).
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of Gadamer’s hermeneutics presented in chapter three, traditions just do not exhibit the kind
of unified character that the role here ascribed to them by Margolis would require. That is, if
tradition already contains interpretations, which may depart significantly from one another,
how can a tradition of this kind provide the criteria for comparing the validity of different
contemporary interpretations? So, if the solution suggested by Margolis to the presented case
would be that one of the proposed views of the character of Siegfried should be rejected, that
solution is not available for him, unless he appeals to other factors than the history of
interpretations of The Ring in order to discard one of the proposed interpretations. If both
interpretations are, in other words, equally responsible, Margolis’  robust relativism is unable
to discard one of them.
The inability of Margolis’  robust relativism to formulate adequate grounds for discarding
one of the interpretations of The Ring need not severely weaken his insistence that a
relativistic logic should, after all, be favoured in interpretation, for he could also propose that
both of the interpretations should be accepted as a solution to that case. Since favoring a
relativistic logic need not have incoherent consequences, as it can ultimately be used to
validate incompatible interpretations, Margolis could solve the case by maintaining that there
is no need to discard either of the interpretations, because they can both be considered valid
within the kind of relativistic logic he has developed. For Margolis, this solution should be
favored in cases where it is likely to be able to take hold of the legitimative question under
dispute in a more satisfactory way, whatever that might include, than a bivalent one.
The question that now becomes relevant is whether the disagreement between the
interpretations offered by Scruton and Kitcher & Schacht is such a case. Should these
interpretations be assigned weaker truth-values, Scruton’s being apt and Kitcher’s &
Schacht’s reasonable, for example? One case in which accepting both interpretations would
be a solution to the case of incompatible interpretations which we would be willing to make,
is where both interpretations are well argued for, draw on a rich and wide evidential basis. It
also includes cases where they may both be considered responsible because they take into
account other proposed interpretations and discuss their merits. Precisely in a disagreement
between interpretations, which are characterized by these qualities, no evident criterion
suggests itself for discarding one of them in a rigid manner. In these kinds of cases we might
be inclined to say that both interpretations should be sustained, even though they diverge from
each other on some essential points.
Both Scruton’s and Kitcher’s & Schacht’s respective interpretations are characterized by
the kinds of features mentioned above. So, a likely option for Margolis to solve this dispute
would be to accept both interpretations, and to conclude that our feeling for the need to decide
between the two is merely the result  of our being brought up in a philosophical atmosphere
dominated by the archist spirit.
Now, even though this kind of solution to interpretive disagreement, indeed, embodies
those values related to plurality and contingency, whose embracing has served as one of the
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primary motivations for Margolis to develop a relativistic theory of interpretation in the first
place, some other factors may be raised that speak against the utilization of a relativistic logic
in tackling interpretive disagreements, such as the one presented above. Margolis writes that
“wherever we want to admit ‘incongruent’  truth-claims, we need only fall back to a
relativistic logic.”64 But who is this “we,”  who is supposed to make that decision? Are
Scruton and Kitcher & Schacht themselves among them? I have not found in Margolis’  work,
which is vast, an explicit answer to this question. Some fundamental elements of Margolis’
theory of relativism, such as the view of the relationship between first-order and second-order
questions it involves, however, give support for the view that Scruton and Kitcher & Schacht,
and  other  Wagner  scholars  should  have  a  hearing  when  the  decision  which  sort  of  logic  to
favor is made. That is, the question which logic to prefer in justification is no longer a matter
that merely concerns philosophers, but now that Margolis has uncovered the shaky ground on
which previous views on the incoherence of relativism have been laid, art researchers can take
up Margolis’  recommendation if they feel the need for it.
However, I am somewhat skeptical as to whether Scruton and Kitcher & Schacht would
themselves be willing to rely on a relativistic logic in tackling the disagreement apparent in
their interpretations. Kitcher and Schacht have, for example, written a book-length study on
The Ring in which it is meticulously argued that scene two of the second act of Valkyrie is the
most pivotal one in the cycle, a view from which their assessment of the position of Siegfried
follows. Would they be prepared to accept an interpretation of the same work which departs
from  their  own  on  certain  pivotal  points?  What  sense  is  there  to  embark  on  a  project  of
explaining one of the most gigantic works in the history of any art form with an attitude that
the force of those arguments one gives in support of one’s interpretation is so weak that one
is, nevertheless, required to accept an interpretation which is at odds with one’s own? What
kind of critical discussion could be carried out between Scruton and Kitcher & Schacht if that
dispute were guided by these kinds of assumptions? In this respect, I do not think that the
first-order disagreement between these interpretations of The Ring calls  for  the  use  of  a
relativistic logic when their ultimate justification is considered.
Some further support may be given for the assessment that the disagreement apparent in
Scruton’s and Kitcher & Schacht’s interpretations does not imply a need to use a relativistic
logic. In support of his interpretation Scruton relies on the author’s intention, that is, he thinks
Wagner intended Siegfried to be the most pivotal character in The Ring.65 Now, this is an
interesting  observation,  given  that  the  general  goal  of  this  thesis  is  to  develop  a  systematic
defense of intentionalist approaches to interpretation. The more interesting observation,
however, is that despite the fact that I have this goal, I, nevertheless, believe Scruton’s
interpretation is incorrect, because certain factors speak against the assessement of Siegfried’s
position it involves. Now, if such factors do exist, and if they can be relied on in the attempt
64 Margolis (1999, 53).
65 Scruton (2003, 162).
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to decide between different interpretations, it seems that we have arrived at yet another reason
for rejecting the use of relativistic logic.
For example, one piece of evidence that speaks against Scruton’s interpretation is the
structure which the composition process of The Ring ultimately took. To be sure, initially
Wagner had no intention of composing a work bearing the structure of The Ring as we now
know it, for that ultimately grew from an idea Wagner had of composing an individual opera,
Siegfrieds Tod.  In  this  piece,  the  story  of  Siegfried  was  indeed  intended  to  form the  central
part of the plot. The way in which the composition process of The Ring developed since then,
however, no longer offers support for Scruton’s claim. For once Wagner, realizing that he had
to compose another opera in order to make the present one he was composing understandable
to the viewer, managed to complete the whole tetralogy, the story of Wotan had removed
Siegfried as the figure around which and through whose actions the plot of The Ring
develops.66
Now, if one accepts that a reference to pieces of evidence similar to the one I just invoked
manages to call into question the accuracy of Scruton’s interpretation, at least as it concerns
the position of Siegfried, then is it not indeed the case that the need for assessing the validity
of interpretations in terms of a relativistic logic is not as pressing as Margolis sets it out to be.
That is, if it is truly possible to provide evidence that can speak against a given interpretation
as strongly as I think the composition process of The Ring speaks against  Scruton’s view of
Siegfried, why should we feel there is a need to validate incompatible interpretations in this
case?
Margolis could, of course, reply that a commitment to a relativistic logic does not rule out
the possibility of relying on these kinds of items of evidence in certain contexts to decide
which interpretation to prefer. If this indeed were possible, it would, in fact, simultaneously
give that logic the kind of normative bite it was accused of lacking above. However, does not
this solution come with a price? That is, if a relativistic logic can ultimately give certain
pieces  of  evidence  the  kind  of  strength  which  was  attributed  to  the  composition  process  of
The Ring above, does anything relativistic in that kind of logic any longer remain. The initial
motivation for Margolis to develop a coherent form of relativistic logic was to make the
simultaneous justification of incompatible interpretations possible. Now, if that kind of logic
can simultaneously give grounds for rejecting Scruton’s interpretation, it seems that that logic
has significantly departed from the one Margolis initially set out to develop.
Ultimately,  Margolis  seems to  face  a  dilemma.  On the  one  hand,  even  though he  thinks
that relativistic logic may be used in validating incompatible interpretations by favoring
weaker positive values over the almighty “true,”  it is nevertheless able to disconfirm certain
claims. I argued that at least the reliance on the tradition of interpretations, which Margolis
66 For example, Bryan Magee writes that “Wagner’s expansion of his original dramatic conception has had the
effect of dethroning Siegfried from the position of The Ring’s main character and replacing him with Wotan”
(Magee 2001, 105).
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introduces as one means for building normative bite within a relativistic logic, does not
manage to give the kinds of constraints on the validity of interpretations Margolis is in need
of in this context. On the other, the solution to the case of interpretive disagreements, which
argued that both interpretations should be accepted, was considered a less preferable option
than Margolis assumes. It was also observed that Margolis could perhaps rely on factors
similar  to  those  invoked,  such  as  the  composition  process  of The Ring,  in  order  to  make  a
decision between the two interpretations possible. That solution, however, deprives the logic
Margolis wants us to prefer in justifying interpretive claims from any clear relativistic
content, this solution thus being at least to some extent at odds with Margolis’  general aims
and ambitions.
4. Could Supervenience, After All, Work?
I shall now turn to the second strand of Margolis’  defense of relativism, which claims that the
indeterminate nature of cultural entities renders bivalent logic an unsuitable framework in
which to consider the validity of interpretive claims. It seems that there is a fairly easy reply
to this defense; develop an ontological theory of culture that does not lay a stress on the
indeterminate nature of cultural entities, this kind of theory thus being without such
relativistic consequences that Margolis’  version implies.
The response to Margolis’  ontological argument for cultural relativism, however, is not as
simple as might initially appear. This is because Margolis supports his version of cultural
realism by claiming that the majority of theories currently found in analytic aesthetics cannot
provide the resources for a viable form of cultural realism,67 an insufficiency that in Margolis’
opinion especially plaques Arthur Danto’s philosophy of art.68 This is a void that Margolis’
cultural ontology, with its emphasis on the emergent nature of culture, is intended to fill. That
is to say, since Margolis’  account of cultural ontology is the most viable form of cultural
realism in the field, and since that involves a view of cultural entities stressing their
indeterminate and alterable nature, there is no other option but to bite the bullet, and
acknowledge a need to fall back on a relativistic logic in justification.
Here is where the argument against the use of relativistic logics presented in the previous
section comes into play. My claim there was that given the relationship between first-order
and second-order questions lying at the heart of Margolis’  defense of relativism, a successful
response to Margolis’  proposal to frame the issue of legitimation in terms of relativistic logics
does not leave the ontological argument for relativism unaffected. To my mind the significant
implication  the  rejection  of  relativistic  logics  has  is  that  it  alters  the  terms  with  which  the
adequacy of a theory of cultural realism is to be assessed. As was indicated, Margolis
maintains  that  our  view  of  what  an  artwork  is  must  reflect  our  view  of  the  logic  of
67 Margolis (1989).
68 Margolis (1998).
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justification. Another way in which Margolis formulates the interrelatedness between these
issues is that “we must invent the ontologies we need… seeking only to make them plausible
and coherent and serviceable for our best analyses,”69 which to my mind is to say that if we
decide to use relativistic logics in justification, we need to explain the realism of all those
properties that kind of logic allows to be imputed to the cultural entity during its career. The
emphasis laid on the emergent character of cultural entities in Margolis’  cultural ontology
indicates how this may be achieved.
However,  if  the  issue  of  ontology  bears  this  kind  of  relationship  to  the  question  of
relativism, and if, in fact, there is no pressing need to fall back on a relativistic logic, does not
this imply that a possibility opens up for developing an alternative ontological theory of
cultural realism to Margolis’  cultural emergence, and more importantly, one which does not
involve relativistic implications for interpretation? Here is the impasse I sense Margolis’
theory  falls  into.  That  is,  if  the  argument  for  the  use  of  a  relativistic  logic  appealing  to  the
claim that legitimative questions related to interpretation exhibit an apparent need for it is
called into question, it seems that the ontological argument no longer supports relativism as
strongly as before. This is because the negative conclusion regarding the use of a relativistic
logic  alters  the  terms  with  which  the  adequacy  of  an  ontological  theory  of  culture  is  to  be
considered. In other words, if the ontological theory need no longer take the acceptance of a
relativistic logic into account, what one requires from an ontological theory seems to alter,
that is, it no longer has to be assessed on the basis of how it is able to account for the realism
of all those properties relativistic logic allows to claim about the object.
As we saw, Margolis thinks that cultural entities are characterized by an ontological
peculiarity in the sense that their existence presupposes some material entity to which they are
embodied, but despite of this their properties cannot be reduced to the properties of that entity.
There is, however, another non-reductive account of higher level properties than the kind of
emergence with which Margolis attempts to explain the constitution of Intentional properties.
That theory, in fact, is more popular nowadays within such disciplines as philosophy of mind
than Margolis’  version of emergence. This is the supervenience thesis. After reductive views
of the human mind and of mental properties and concepts were considered unworkable, for
example due to such ideas as the multiple realizability principle developed by Hilary Putnam
and Donald Davidson’s emphasis on “the anomalousness of the mental,”  supervenience arose
as a promising framework in which philosophy of mind could proceed.70 A commitment to
supervenience alone does not lead one to hold any specific view of the human mind and the
constitution of mental properties, but rather as Jaegwon Kim explains, “a host of classic
positions on the mind-body problem”  is “consistent”  with it.71 Where the fruitfulness of
supervenience was considered to lie was that it provided a kind of layered view of reality
69 Margolis (2000, 111-112).
70 Kim (1998, 3).
71 Ibid. (12).
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which managed to sustain the intuitive idea philosophers of mind wanted to keep that physical
reality is ontologically primary to the mental. Moreover, while the mental is not reducible to
the physical, the mental is nevertheless to a certain degree dependent on the physical.72 The
specific non-reductive character which the supervenience thesis is committed to and the
relationship it depicts between different levels of properties become apparent from the way
the core idea of the principle has been usually formulated. This states that “mental properties
supervene on physical properties in that for every mental property M, if something has M, it
has a physical property P such that necessarily if anything has P it has M.”73 In other words,
no mental difference without a physical one.
For philosophy of art the supervenience thesis, in turn, implies that cultural, significant,
meaningful, aesthetic, etc. properties are supervenient on physical properties in the sense that
their qualities are not independent from the physical properties of the object, but they
supervene upon them similar to the way mental properties supervene on physical ones and
evaluative on non-evaluative ones. In fact, Kim uses the way in which the aesthetic properties
of  a  statue  are  constituted  by  its  physical  properties  as  an  example  of  how  the  idea  of
supervenience works.74 The applicability of the supervenience thesis for philosophy of art has
been a matter of discussion in analytic aesthetics, and some skepticism regarding its prospects
has also appeared.75 However, to give one example, Frank Sibley’s already classic account of
aesthetic concepts involves a view of the relationship between aesthetic and non-aesthetic
concepts that bears a similarity to the supervenience thesis.76
Now, given that the supervenience thesis has already been used in explaining the
constitution of such properties aesthetics and philosophy of art are interested in, why cannot
an ontological theory of culture be developed from it which may be used to challenge the
position of Margolis’  cultural realism as the only viable form of cultural realism? Moreover,
given the relationship it depicts between aesthetic, intentional, cultural properties and their
physical basis, this kind of view of cultural ontology does not have any explicit relativistic
consequences. This theory, if successful, could thus be relied on in the attempt to challenge
Margolis’  relativism.
There is one significant obstacle to this attempt. This is the skepticism that Margolis has
presented towards the possibility of developing a more systematic account of cultural entities
on the basis of the supervenience thesis. He is very firm on this claiming, for example, that
the  “culturally  ‘emergent’  world  of  art  and  history  is  not  equivalent  to  any  mental  world
72 Ibid. (16-17).
73 Kim (1996, 223).
74 Ibid.
75 See, for example, Eaton (1994, 1998); Bender (1996); MacKinnon (2001).
76 Sibley, for example, claims that “aesthetic concepts, all of them, carry with them attachments and in one way
or another are tethered or parasitic upon non-aesthetic features”  (Sibley 1959, 442). Sibley’s work on aesthetic
concepts is still considered highly relevant, and it has served as an important inspiration for some more recent
accounts. For example, Jerrold Levinson’s version of aesthetic realism is, in his own words, “rooted”  in Sibley’s
“seminal essays”  (Levinson 2003, 61).
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‘supervenient’  on physical nature.”77 In fact, Margolis not only finds his cultural realism to be
significantly at odds with the idea of supervenience, but that commitment to the kind of
emergence which forms the core of that account undermines the view of the relationship
between the cultural and the physical the supervenience thesis involves, that is, “the bare
admission that the Intentional ‘natures’  of texts are alterable under interpretation instantly
renders untenable the supervenience thesis. This is a splendid and inexpensive gain.”78
The  reason  for  Margolis  to  hold  this  skeptical  an  attitude  towards  the  prospects  of  the
supervenience thesis seems to be that despite being non-reductive it nevertheless, in Margolis’
eyes, involves too deterministic a picture of the relationship between the Intentional properties
of the cultural entity and the properties of the physical entity in which it is embodied. These
properties cannot exhibit the kind of relationship with each other the supervenience thesis
presupposes, for “there is no known procedure (rule, criterion, algorithm, law, or the like) by
which, from a description of any physical events, we could infer in a reliable way any
culturally significant events we spontaneously recognize….”79 That  is  to  say,  cultural
properties are emergent precisely in the sense that the physical properties of the entity to
which the cultural entity is embodied do not determine what properties the cultural entity may
have as directly as supervenience implies.
The supervenience thesis also has a further implication which for Margolis renders it
incapable of accounting for cultural realism. This is the primacy which is ascribed to the
physical in supervenience in explaining the relationship between the higher and lower level,
that is, that there can be a difference on the higher level only if a change occurs on the lower
level. Given that Margolis’  emergence allows cultural objects to obtain new properties during
their career without any kind of change in their physical constitution, it is not a surprise that
Margolis is so skeptical towards the prospects of cultural realism formulated in terms of
supervenience, for that idea renders precisely this kind of adding or imputing impossible.
Now, rather than embarking on a systematic project of developing a theory of cultural
ontology with which to challenge Margolis’  cultural emergence and the relativistic
implications it involves, I shall here confine myself to showing that Margolis does not,
ultimately, manage to prove that any kind of view of supervenience could not serve as a
foundation  for  cultural  realism.  I  shall  give  two  reasons  for  this  assessment.  First,  it  seems
that the supervenience thesis manages to accommodate certain intuitions about the
constitution of aesthetic and artistic properties and the artist’s work we want to keep. Second,
it might be the case that Margolis is able to overcome certain criticisms addressed against his
cultural emergence only if he rephrases the core of his emergence in a way that the view on
the relationship between the physical and the cultural it involves begins to resemble the way
that relationship is construed in the supervenience thesis.
77 Margolis (1995b, 52).
78 Ibid. (54).
79 Ibid.
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One observation that I think lends support for the view that the supervenience thesis may
not be as incapable of accounting for the constitution of cultural properties as Margolis
insists, is the trivial-seeming fact that if an artist wants to modify the aesthetic character of her
work, she presumably will have to alter the physical properties her work possesses.80 This
observation is in line with the core of supervenience, that is, that higher-level changes require
lower-level  changes.  The  ending  of  Dimitri  Shostakovich’s  5th symphony serves as a good
example with which the relationship of the physical, material, or non-aesthetic properties of
the artwork to its aesthetic and cultural properties may be illuminated. The famous conductor
Arturo Toscanini considered that work a great triumph, apart from the ending of the
symphony, in which Toscanini considered Shostakovich had failed to compose the striking
climax he had sought. After hearing Toscanini’s evaluation, Shostakovich became furious,
because he thought that Toscanini’s aesthetic judgment of the piece rested on a
misunderstanding of the symphony’s true character. That is, Shostakovich tells us, his
intention was not to write “any exultant finales, for what exultation could there be?”  Rather,
Shostakovich continues his description, the rejoicing with which the 5th symphony ends:
Is forced, created under a threat, as in Boris Godunov. It’s as if
someone were beating you with a stick and saying, ‘Your business is
rejoicing, your business is rejoicing’  and you rise, shakily, and go
marching off muttering, ‘Our business is rejoicing, our business is
rejoicing’. What kind of apotheosis is that? You have to be a complete
oaf not to hear that. Fadeyev heard it, and he wrote in his diary, for his
personal use, that the finale of the Fifth is irreparable tragedy. He must
have felt it with his Russian alcoholic soul. 81
Now, the important thing to note is that the aesthetic character of hollowness and forced
rejoicing is based on one particular feature. This is the fact that the tempo marking of the
ending is considerably slower than it is in the case of other exultant climaxes in the history of
music. In other words, this tempo marking precisely turns the aesthetic character of the ending
80 Given supervenience’s ability to account for this elementary fact of artistic creation it is not a surprise that
Nick Zangwill has called the supervenience thesis “an entrenched principle of our ordinary ‘folk aesthetics’”
(Zangwill 2003, 329). Jerrold Levinson’s account of aesthetic properties is also of relevance in this context, for it
explores the ways in which the idea of supervenience may be utilized in a defense of aesthetic realism. However,
it is unclear how extensive a critique of Margolis’  ontological fluxism may be drawn from it, even if considered
successful in its present form. The main reason for this is that the critical points which antirealist versions of
aesthetic value, such as Alan Goldman’s, have raised against Levinson’s realist position, and which Levinson
has taken pains to meet (Levinson 1994; 2001), are in some respects different from those Margolis would
arguably raise. For example, whether aesthetic attributions contain as an essential element an evaluative aspect, a
key point of controversy between Levinson and some antirealists, does not seem to have that much bearing on
the issue, whether Margolis’  fluxism and the view of aesthetic properties it implies should be accepted or not.
See especially Margolis’  criticism of Eddy Zemach’s aesthetic realism in Margolis (2000). Margolis’  reasons for
finding Zemach’s version of realism inadequate are related to the skeptical attitude towards the supervenience
thesis his cultural ontology exhibits, that is, Zemach’s analysis involves a mistaken conception of the nature of
cultural entities. Margolis writes, “In a word, there is, finally, no point in speaking of the objective and actual
properties of artworks without explaining the ontic relationship between natural and cultural (culturally
emergent, or culturally constituted) entities. I press the point against both Zemach and Danto.”  (Ibid. 112.)
81 Testimony (140).
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upside down, and if that ending is played at a faster tempo than is indicated in the score, as is
often done, the ending would not possess those characteristic features Shostakovich intended.
Instead, it would provide that ending with musical qualities related to joy, happiness, and
optimism, that is, features the composer wanted to avoid.
Now, the reason for this being an illuminative case is that it precisely shows how in some
cases the aesthetic and cultural properties are connected with the lower-level properties a
work has. That is, the higher-level aesthetic properties of Shostakovich’s symphony, such as
the feeling of an empty triumph, is based on a lower-level, descriptive property, such as the
tempo marking of the ending. Presumably, if Shostakovich had wanted to give the
symphony’s ending a festive character, for example by being forced to obey the aesthetic
principles of the Politburo, he would not have given the piece’s ending the tempo marking it
presently has. At least in this case, there seems to be the kind of relationship between lower-
level  and  higher-level  properties  that  is  compatible  with  the  way  the  idea  of  supervenience
depicts their relationship.
Another example found in the arts lends support for a similar view of the constitution of
higher-level properties of cultural entities. In his novel Immortality, Milan Kundera outlines
an imaginary example which rises to an almost Putnamesque ingenuity. In the example,
Kundera presents a story concerning the development of the pictorial arts with one significant
difference to the way it actually developed. The discrepant feature between the two concerns
the conventions of Western portraiture. While in actual art history people are usually depicted
in portraits with a tranquil and subdued smile on their faces, in the possible art history
imagined by Kundera, the smiles the depicted persons carry on their faces are more akin to a
grimace,  which,  by  revealing  their  teeth  and  gums,  gives  the  portraits  in  this  alternative  art
history a character that is very far from the tranquility marked by actual portraiture.82 Now,
given this significant difference between the two art histories, it is arguable that, everything
else being equal, the paintings belonging to these alternative schemes of portraiture would
have different aesthetic properties. For this reason, the case imagined by Kundera in
Immortality lends support for the view of the constitution of higher-level cultural and
aesthetic properties depicted in the supervenience thesis. That is, the portraits in the
alternative art histories have different higher-level properties, whatever those might be,
because they have different descriptive lower-level properties, that is, differently painted
smiles.
The upshot of these two examples is that it does not seem reasonable to deny that there is
no  connection  whatsoever  between  the  Intentional  properties  of  a  cultural  entity  and  the
properties of the physical entity in which it is embodied. Margolis’  emergence, of course, by
no means denies this. What these two cases, however, do seem to imply is that perhaps
Margolis’  negative assessement concerning the prospects of developing an ontological theory
82 Kundera (1992).
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of  culture  on  the  basis  of  the  supervenience  thesis  is  too  pessimistic.  That  is,  while  it  may
indeed be the case that “there is no known procedure (rule, criterion, algorithm, law, or the
like) by which, from a description of any physical events, we could infer in a reliable way any
culturally significant events,”  as Margolis claims, the character of the culturally significant
properties should nevertheless be seen as more intimately connected to the physical properties
the cultural entity has than Margolis’  account of emergence assumes. If that, however, is the
case, then Margolis’  negative assessement of the prospects of developing a viable form of
cultural realism on the basis of the supervenience thesis indeed seems overhasty.
Another way of drawing support for the view that Margolis’  assumption on the prospects
of developing a cultural ontology on the basis of the supervenience thesis is too pessimistic is
to show that his own account of emergence manages to overcome some problems only if it
resorts to a view of the relationship between the different levels of properties which is similar
to the way that relationship is construed in the supervenience thesis. While finding the view
that “the mental is embodied in the material”  which forms the core of Margolis’  emergentism,
“a philosophically interesting”  position,  Göran Hermerén has some reservations about it,  for
he senses it contains a threat of ontological dualism, despite Margolis’  clear determination to
avoid it. In his opinion, that Margolis’  emergentism is in danger of slipping into some form of
dualism is a result of the way the embodiment relation is construed in it. Margolis is a
materialist in the sense that the existence of a cultural entity always presupposes some form of
physical existence, that is, cultural entities are physically embodied. At the same time,
Margolis is driven by anti-reductive goals, which is to say that despite being physically
embodied, culturally emergent properties cannot be reduced to the properties of the physical
entity in which the cultural entity is embodied. In other words, the way Margolis saves his
materialism from becoming a form of reductionism is that the emergence relation “cannot be
defined in material terms.”83 However, according to Hermerén, “the problem is how to avoid
ontic dualism, if this move is made.”84
As we saw, Margolis draws an analogy between artworks and persons, construing them
both  as  selves.  Now,  Hermerén  argues  that  precisely  the  way  the  relationship  between
material properties and cultural properties is drawn in Margolis’  emergentism overlooks
certain crucial differences in the emergence relations characterizing these two cases. This is
the fact that while the body where one’s person is embodied did not exist before that person
was born, the block of marble in which Pietá, for example, is embodied did exist before
Michelangelo set out to carve that piece, Pietá thus being more independent from its material
basis than a person is from his body. Another factor that Hermerén thinks separates these
embodiment relations from each other is that “the physical body is also likely to change
within a few decades in a way the marble does not.”85 Now, the fact that Margolis overlooks
83 Hermerén (2005, 559).
84 Ibid.
85 Ibid.
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these differences between the embodiment relations Hermerén takes as an indication that in
the case of artworks Margolis ends up construing the relationship between its physical
properties and its culturally emergent properties in a too independent way. This is the reason
why Hermerén believes that Margolis’  view may have trouble in avoiding ontic dualism.
However,  I  do  not  believe  that  the  threat  of  ontic  dualism is  as  pressing  as  Hermerén’s
criticism assumes. This is because Margolis seems to have the possibility of construing the
embodiment relationship holding between the Intentional properties of the cultural entity and
the material properties of the entity in which that cultural entity is embodied in a way that a
slippage into any form of dualism can be avoided. That this possibility is available for
Margolis may be shown from the fact that in his emergentism cultural entities may lose those
Intentional properties they have at one point of their history possessed. For example, one case
in which this may, in his opinion, occur is when the material properties of a cultural entity
deteriorate, Margolis referring to Da Vinci’s Last Supper as a case in point.86
Now, if Margolis is able to account for the possibility that cultural entities can lose their
Intentional properties as a result of deterioration in material, it seems that the threat of ontic
dualism is not as pressing as Hermerén thinks. That is, Margolis’  emergentism can construe
the relationship between Intentional properties and the material properties to which the
cultural entity is embodied in a way that the two levels do not become as independent from
each  other  as  they  do  in  some  form  of  ontological  dualism,  as  for  example  in  the  straw
Cartesian view according to which our mind is wholly separable from our body.
However, the reason why Margolis’  ability to form a tighter relationship between the
cultural  and  the  material  than  ontological  dualism  allows  room  for  is  not  an  interesting
conclusion because it allows his emergentism to overcome the criticism Hermerén addresses
to it, but because once this manoeuvre has been made the content of that view no longer
seems to be at variance with the supervenience thesis to such high a degree as Margolis has
assumed. That is, if the emergence developed by Margolis allows for the possibility that
cultural entities may lose their cultural properties as a result of deterioration in their material
basis, as is the case with Last Supper, does not his emergentism begin to overlap with the
supervenience thesis in certain significant respects, that is, that higher level changes are
explained in terms of changes at the lower level. At least, the supervenience thesis implies an
assessment  of  the  case  of Last Supper similar to the one Margolis’  emergentism eventually
provides. Now, if this kind of point of contact may be construed between Margolis’  account
of emergence and the supervenience thesis, the critical assessement of supervenience
Margolis’  relativism involves again turns out to be overhasty, for it might be the case that
Margolis’  position on cultural ontology begins to look more compelling the more it begins to
resemble the supervenience thesis.
86 Margolis (1999, 91).
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5. Conclusions
The title of this chapter asks whether Margolis’  defense of relativism falls into an impasse. I
think this is indeed the conclusion we have now arrived at. The reading of Margolis’  defense
of relativism presented in this chapter saw it as consisting of two interrelated strands, which
are jointly intended to support the conclusion that a relativistic logic should be favoured in
interpretation. After the force of the philosophical assumption Margolis called “archism”  was
shown to be less binding than has been assumed, Margolis thought that a possibility opened
up for favoring a relativistic logic in some sectors of inquiry if that kind of option was
considered to be better suited for meeting the challenges a given legitimative question poses.
That is, since relativism need not be an incoherent view, we can rely on a relativistic logic
whenever we feel the need for it. Margolis drew further support for favoring the kind of
relativistic logic outlined by him from an ontological theory of cultural entities which
highlighted their indeterminate and alterable nature. Since cultural entities are only histories,
their nature does not exhibit the kind of determinacy that a commitment to bivalence, in
Margolis’  opinion, requires. Hence, a relativistic logic is better suited for accounting for the
legitimation of interpretive statements than a bivalent one.
Both of the lines that Margolis’  defense of relativism ultimately takes have now been
blocked. First, it was argued that the use of relativistic logic in the legitimation of
interpretations is a less compelling option than Margolis assumes. That conclusion was seen
to  have  an  effect  on  the  second line  constituting  Margolis’  defense  of  relativism.  That  is,  a
rejection of relativistic logic in interpretation was seen to alter the terms with which the
prospects of an ontological theory of culture are to be assessed. This in turn was taken to
imply that Margolis’  emergentism does not occupy the kind of privileged position in regard to
this issue Margolis assumes. Margolis in other words ultimately fails in his attempt to show
that his emergentism is truly the only framework upon which a viable form of cultural realism
may be built.
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Mime
I was brewing this broth; drink it now,
And I will win your trusty sword and
with it the helmet and treasure.
Siegfried
So you would rob me of my sword
and what it earned me, the ring and the booty?
Mime
Why must you mistake me?
Do I stammer and stumble over my words?
I take the utmost trouble hypocritically to hide
my inmost thoughts, and you, stupid scamp, misunderstand me.
Open your ears and listen closely: hear what Mime means!
Richard Wagner Siegfried Act Two
II From Humpty Dumpty to James Joyce: Donald
Davidson’s Late Philosophy and the Question of Intention
Having now provided the relativist with something to chew over for some time, I shall move
on to the question regarding the position of the author’s intentions in interpretation. In the first
parts of this chapter, I shall offer a reading of some aspects of Donald Davidson’s thinking,
which will be relevant for the intentionalist theory of interpretation to be developed further in
the later parts of this thesis. The examination of Davidson’s views I present is based on an
assumption that as Davidson’s philosophical career proceeded certain of its key conceptions
underwent transformations. This chapter tries to track the character of these changes, as well
as the effect they had on the whole of Davidson’s philosophical work.
Commentators on Davidson’s work have already pointed out that some kind of
transformation indeed seems to have occurred particularly in the way Davidson approaches
language, and some formulations found in Davidson’s later texts have raised confused
reactions, for they have been seen to be hard to reconcile with his earlier views.87 It is perhaps
in line with this bewilderment that different kinds of assessments have been presented on the
relationship between Davidson’s earlier and later texts. For example, Björn Ramberg thinks
that the skepticism towards the very idea of there being such a thing as a language –  an
insistence which underlies Davidson’s later texts on language as a whole –  is merely an
extension of the goal apparent in Davidson’s earlier texts which refrain from giving a role to
such linguistic concepts as meaning and reference in a viable semantic theory.88 Martin
Gustafsson,  in  turn,  claims  that  Davidson’s  views  underwent  a  more  significant
transformation. In his opinion, the very picture of language functioning in the background of
87 See, for example, Hacking (1986, 447).
88 Ramberg (1989, 1).
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Davidson’s approach changed. That is, while the major goal of Davidson’s earlier texts
especially from “Truth and Meaning”  (1967) onwards was to construct an adequate semantic
theory for natural languages, a theory whose structure was provided by Alfred Tarski’s formal
account of truth, in Gustafsson’s opinion, “the post 1984 Davidson”  “gives up the notion of
natural languages with a specified structure”  which is assumed in the attempt to construct a
systematic semantic theory for natural languages. Instead, Davidson takes as his starting point
the “truly creative and unforeseeable elements”  involved in language use, and insists that
these kinds of factors should have a more prominent position within philosophy of language
than has previously been the case.89
Evidence in support for both diagnoses may be found. For example, the more moderate
reading offered by Ramberg receives support from the fact that one of the requirements
Davidson sets for the adequacy of a semantic theory in his earlier texts is its ability to
embrace  the  fact  that  while  the  set  of  words  and  the  rules  on  the  basis  of  which  they  are
connected into more complex expressions is finite in character, people are nevertheless able to
understand an infinite number of expressions.90 The kinds of linguistic phenomena invoked
by Gustafsson are thus arguably within the scope of a semantic theory that is able to meet this
particular requirement introduced by Davidson.
Then again, Gustafsson’s reading also seems to capture features that are important for
Davidson’s thinking. That the kinds of features highlighted by Gustafsson indeed came to
occupy a more essential position within Davidson’s approach to language becomes apparent
from the very first page of Davidson’s article “A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs”  (1986), a
text that for Gustafsson marks the decisive turning point in Davidson’s thinking.91 There,
Davidson insists that philosophers have tended to neglect the kind of creative language use
that  is  typical,  for  example,  of  the  linguistic  behavior  of  the  radio  sitcom  writer  Goodman
Ace. Davidson thinks that this way of using language is not all that rare, but, in fact,
“ubiquitous.”  For this reason it should have a proper place in philosophical accounts of
language as well, and its possible philosophical imports should be considered.92
1. The Principle of Charity and Holism in Davidson’s Late
Philosophy
In this chapter the investigation of Davidson’s views will build on Gustafsson’s understanding
of the development of Davidson’s philosophical work. I shall explore the consequences that
Davidson’s “post 1984”  thinking has on some of the central notions and conceptions of
89 Gustafsson (1998, 439).
90 Davidson (1984/1967, 17).
91 However, as Gustafsson also observes, in some earlier texts, Davidson already presented ideas similar to those
that are important for “A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs.”  See especially Davidson (1984/1982).
92 Davidson (2005/1986, 89).
42
Davidson’s philosophy. The aspect of Davidson’s work I will in particular be interested in is
the role Davidson ascribes for the so-called principle of charity in interpretation and
understanding. As is well known, at a basic level this principle maintains that in interpretation
the subject should be assumed to possess a certain degree of basic rationality and to hold
mostly true beliefs about the world. The need for these kinds of assumptions follows from the
emphasis that is laid on the interrelated nature of belief and meaning in Davidson’s approach.
This, in turn, is a consequence of the claim that approach involves that the concept of truth
would  serve  the  ends  of  a  semantic  theory  much  more  profitably  than  such  an  obscure
intensional notion as meaning.93
Davidson’s approach to philosophy of language is formed through the perspective of the
radical interpreter. That is, Davidson replaces the Socratic question “What is meaning?”  with
the  question,  what  does  the  interpreter  have  to  know  so  that  she  is  able  to  provide  an
interpretation of the speaker’s utterances? Davidson’s starting point owes a lot to the account
of radical translation offered by his teacher Willard van Orman Quine, and while Davidson is
much more optimistic about the prospects of providing a theory of meaning for a language
than Quine was, he, nevertheless, credits precisely Quine for “having saved philosophy of
language as a serious subject by showing it could be pursued without what there cannot be:
determinate meanings.”94
For  Davidson,  what  sentences  a  person  holds  true  is  a  function  of  two factors;  what  the
speaker believes and what he takes those sentences to mean. The problem this picture of the
relationship between belief and meaning poses for the interpreter is that she cannot infer
meaning without knowing what the person whose utterances are under interpretation believes
and vice versa.95 Here  is  where  the  principle  of  charity  steps  in,  for  by  providing  the
interpreter with the trust that most of the speaker’s beliefs are true, he is able to break into the
circle that the speaker’s beliefs and the meanings of her utterances form. The principle of
charity is, in other words, “intended to solve the problem of the interdependence of belief and
meaning by holding belief constant as far as possible while solving meaning.”96
The idea that interpretation should be constrained by the principle of charity has received
a  fair  amount  of  criticism ranging  from the  claim that  it  involves  too  idealistic  a  picture  of
human rationality,97 to the observation that in some cases following the principle of charity
would, in fact, give the wrong interpretive result, that is, in certain kinds of cases it is in
danger of giving an interpretation of the speaker’s utterance that we would intuitively regard
as incorrect.98 Moreover, in an age of multiculturalism which highlights the presence of
cultural differences and our likely inability to bridge them, the principle of charity must sound
93 Davidson (1984/1967, 20-22); Davidson (1984/1973, 126).
94 Davidson (2001, 145).
95 Davidson (1984/1973, 134-135).
96 Ibid. (137).
97 Henderson (1992).
98 Grandy (1973).
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like a remnant of European logocentricism and the male-dominated system which gave rise to
it. Colin MacCabe, in fact, explicitly equates the attitude which, in his view, receives an
expression in the principle of charity, with old forms of imperialism. The deplorable fact with
this principle is that it does not leave room for “a radical confrontation with difference.”99
Some of the criticisms aimed at  the claim that the principle of charity should occupy as
essential a position in interpretation as Davidson insists have, however, been seen to rest on
mistaken conceptions about the ultimate nature of that principle. According to Ramberg, their
usual failure is that they overlook how fundamental Davidson considers the assumptions
contained in the principle of charity to be for interpretation. That is, the requirement
expressed in the principle that assumes the speaker is largely correct about the world and
holds a largely rational pattern of beliefs and other propositional attitudes should not be
construed as a kind of “rule of thumb”  that may or may not be followed. This is a conception
of the principle that some criticisms are, in Ramberg’s opinion, underlain by.100 As Davidson
observes, charity is not “an option,”  but it is “forced on us,”101 which is to say that given the
interrelated nature of the agent’s beliefs and the contents of his utterances, the interpreter has
no other option, but to count his subject of interpretation right in most matters if he is to make
sense of the utterances of the speaker. In other words, charity is “not a virtue, but simply a
condition of understanding others at all.”102
Although  the  core  of  the  principle  of  charity  assumes  this  kind  of  outlook  on  human
cognitive faculties, Davidson emphasizes in many places that the centrality of charity for his
account of interpretation does not make it incapable of accommodating the phenomenon of
irrationality within it. Neither does it rule out the existence of false beliefs, and hence the
possibility of disagreement between interpreter and the one whose utterances are under
interpretation. After having presented the core of the principle of charity and how that
requires the interpreter to attribute a certain degree of basic rationality to the subject, Kathrin
Glüer continues by remarking how “the usual disclaimers are in order”  precisely at the point
to which her exposition of Davidson’s views has just proceeded.103 As she remarks, “charity
does not exclude the possibility of mistaken belief, and it does not recommend making aliens
right as often as possible either.”104
It is, nevertheless, difficult to assess the ultimate validity of the kinds of criticisms
accusing Davidson’s account of charity of ignoring differences between ways of thinking, for
Davidson leaves the amount of false beliefs and irrationality that the principle can, ultimately,
allow  room  for  unspecified.  Still,  the  fact  that  Davidson’s  account  does  involve  “the  usual
disclaimers”  suggests that the criticisms, such as MacCabe’s, do, after all, involve too strong a
99 MacCabe (1986, 7).
100 Ramberg (1989, 73-75).
101 Davidson (1984/1974, 197).
102 Davidson (2005/1998, 319).
103 Glüer (2006, 341).
104 Ibid. (341-342).
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reading of charity. In fact, what Davidson might say to these criticisms is that they overlook
what  the  individuation  of  differences  requires,  that  is,  how  the  individuation  of  differences
rests  on  a  substantial  amount  of  sameness.  Rather  than  committing  oneself  to  the  view that
there are no differences between the way people think, the principle should be understood to
imply a weaker view according to which we can quarrel with different world views but
“without a vast common ground, there is no place for the disputants to have their quarrels.”105
That is to say, differences in opinion and in beliefs are “intelligible only against a background
of massive agreement.”106 Or as Pierce Rawling encapsulates the implications of the principle
of charity, “just as there is no chaos except against a background of order, so there is no
irrationality except against a background of rationality.”107
The reason why I have decided to approach Davidson’s views on the principle of charity
through his later texts is that they, in my view, provide an account of the conditions of
understanding which allows the Davidsonian position on interpretation and understanding to
overcome precisely those criticisms which accuse the principle of assuming too rosy a picture
of human cognitive faculties. This is because in the approach to language offered by the “post
1984 Davidson”  the rationality assumptions interpretation and understanding are seen to
involve are depicted in a more detailed and context-sensitive fashion than in certain initial
formulations of the principle of charity. Simultaneously, Davidson allows much more
variance between the assumptions that are at work in different contexts than was previously
the case. The kind of skepticism these texts by Davidson as a whole adopt towards
conventionalist accounts of meaning suggests that in many cases the success of
communication is explained in terms of highly unique and perhaps passing elements. These
are,  in  Davidson’s  opinion,  not  accounted  for  by  those  approaches  emphasizing  the  role  of
shared rule-governed linguistic practices as conditions of understanding. It is precisely these
features found in Davidson’s later thought that I think provide a possibility for reconsidering
the  ultimate  role  of  the  principle  of  charity  in  the  Davidsonian  picture,  and  the  kinds  of
faculties that are called for from the interlocutors so that they can reach understanding.
The reading of Davidson’s views offered below, however, is not only intended to serve
exegetical purposes, but it will simultaneously introduce those aspects of Davidson’s thinking
which will be relevant for the intentionalist theory of interpretation to be developed in the
latter parts of this thesis. In the second half of this chapter, I shall argue that an intentionalist
theory established on the kind of Davidsonian foundation provided in the first part is able to
formulate a convincing reply to a problem that modest intentionalist views on interpretation
currently found in analytic philosophy of art have had trouble overcoming. This conclusion
will, however, serve only as one of the reasons why I think a modest intentionalist theory of
interpretation should be built on Davidsonian elements. Another reason is provided by the
105 Davidson (1984/1977, 200).
106 Davidson (1984/1973, 137).
107 Rawling (2003, 93).
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holistic outlook on human mentality that Davidson’s texts contain. While holistic emphases
may already be found in various parts of Davidson’s earlier texts, in Davidson’s later texts, he
develops that view into a more systematic picture of the relationship between mind and world.
The latter parts of the first half of this chapter give the outlines of this development.
Meaning, Intention, and Conventions
Davidson’s later philosophy of language is connected with the tradition in philosophy of
language whose different formulations P.F. Strawson has collected under the heading
“communication-intention theories”  and for which Ludwig Wittgenstein’s later philosophy
served as an initial inspiration. As opposed to the formal accounts of language which
dominated the earliest days of analytic philosophy, this approach is founded on the assumption
that language is primarily a medium for communication, and that theories of meaning should
approach it in such terms.108 This  is  an  assumption  Davidson  shares  as  well.109 However,
Davidson’s later philosophy of language simultaneously departs from this tradition in certain
ways, for example by providing a different view of the role of conventions in communication
from the one these approaches in general involve, a view that culminates in Davidson’s claim
that “there is no such thing as a language, not if a language is anything like what many
philosophers and linguists have supposed.”110
By conventionalist theories of meaning Davidson understands views in which the
meanings of expressions are considered “systematic and learned in advance”  in the sense of
being “governed by learned conventions or regularities.”111 One formulation in which
Davidson thinks this kind of outlook on language receives an expression is the controversial
reading of Wittgenstein’s private language argument offered by Saul Kripke.112 However, the
view of meaning emerging from that exposition is in no way unique, for similar emphases are
to be found, for example, in John Searle’s philosophy of language, which elaborates the
speech act approach to language initiated by John L. Austin. Both accounts see language as
consisting essentially of a set of rule-guided practices, the rule-guided nature of meaning
108 Strawson (1971/1969).
109 See especially (Davidson 2005/1994, 120).
110 Davidson (2005/1986, 107).
111 Ibid. (93).
112 Davidson (2001, 111-121). Because of its controversial nature, I shall refer to the views put forward in
Kripke’s work Wittgenstein on Private Language and Rule-Following as Kripkenstein’s. For example, while
David Stern finds Kripke’s work the most discussed work on Wittgenstein in recent years, (Stern 2004, 2) he
claims that Kripke nevertheless “misunderstands Wittgenstein’s use of the [private language] argument”  (ibid.
188). Kripke himself is not unaware of the problematic nature of his reading, for in the introduction to the work
he emphasizes that “the present paper should be thought as expounding neither ‘Wittgenstein’s’  argument nor
‘Kripke’s’: rather Wittgenstein’s argument as it struck him, as it presented a problem for him”  (Kripke 1982, 5).
Davidson also acknowledges the difficulty of saying whether the views presented are Wittgenstein’s or not. For
this reason, while discussing the work, Davidson refers to the ideas as Kripkenstein’s, and I shall follow him in
this (Davidson 2005/1994, 119).
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serving as the condition of communication. The feature which unites Davidson’s later texts on
philosophy of language is an attempt to call into question precisely the role conventions are
assumed to occupy in this picture.
Davidson finds the continuing popularity of conventionalist accounts of language puzzling,
for he thinks their core idea is hard to reconcile with our frequent experience where the
regularities and conventions of language are broken by novel uses of language and by such
linguistic phenomena as malapropisms, but in which language users have no difficulties in
understanding what the uttered expressions were intended to mean. Davidson thinks that one
does not even have to invent “bizarre anecdotes or wonderlands”  to make the point that
people “all the time… get away with”  linguistic mistakes and other cases where they
transgress regularities of language.113 If these kinds of cases are not only possible, but mark
the use of language at large, the ultimate position of conventions in accounts of linguistic
interaction must, in Davidson’s opinion, be re-assessed. That is, “the theoretical possibility of
communication without shared practices remains philosophically important because it shows
that such sharing cannot be an essential constituent in meaning and communication.”114 What
is, instead, needed is “a deeper notion of what words, when spoken in context, mean.”115
As an alternative, Davidson develops a theory of meaning where the speaker’s intentions
replace conventions as the most important constituent of meaning. Davidson claims, for
example, that what the speaker’s “words mean is (generally) what he intends them to.”116 The
disclaimer “generally”  is important, for despite Davidson emphasizing the role of the
speaker’s intentions, he does not hold the view that the speaker is able to mean whatever he
wishes with his choice of words or that he could not fail  to mean what he intended. This is
ultimately because the hearer’s readiness to interpret the utterances of the speaker must be
taken into account, and if the speaker does not succeed in this in an appropriate way, he will
have failed to mean what he intended. When framing the meaning the speaker intends his
utterance to possess, that is, the way he intends that utterance to be interpreted by the hearer,
the speaker must take the hearer’s readiness to interpret the utterance into account in the sense
that the speaker must have a reasonable belief that the hearer is ultimately able to interpret the
utterance in the way he intends it to be interpreted. In other words, “we always have the
interpreter in mind; there is no such thing as how we expect, in the abstract, to be
interpreted.”117
What emerges from this starting point is a picture where language use is seen to involve a
particular kind of interaction between linguistic interlocutors which is formed through the
expectations they have of each others’  linguistic capacities. What this process involves more
specifically becomes apparent from Davidson’s way of describing linguistic interaction in
113 Davidson (2005/1986, 99).
114 Davidson (2005/1994, 119).
115 Davidson (2005/1986, 91).
116 Davidson (2001, 14).
117 Davidson (2005/1986, 103).
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terms of a distinction between a prior theory and a passing theory of language. With the first
notion Davidson denotes the ways in which the speaker and hearer are prepared beforehand to
interpret and understand the utterances of the other, as well as assumptions of the picture that
the interlocutors have about each other’s linguistic capacities. The passing theory, in turn,
expresses how the speaker intends his utterance to be interpreted, while for the interpreter, it
expresses  the  way  she  ultimately  does  interpret  the  utterance  of  the  speaker.  If  the  two
coincide, communication succeeds. The relationship between the prior theory and passing
theory can be spelled out as follows. The speaker wants to be understood and proceeds in such
a way that the interpreter can accomplish the required interpretation. Again, the speaker is not
confined to the theory that he believes the interpreter to have [prior theory] because he may
deliberately give clues etc. that help the interpreter to gear his theory of interpretation [passing
theory]. The interpreter’s prior theory is important for the speaker for it underdetermines how
he proceeds, but it does not determine what can be meant, it only determines what clues he
must give.118
That is, according to the Davidsonian view, every speech situation involves certain initial
assumptions regarding how the interlocutors presume the listener is equipped to understand
one’s utterances. However, Davidson’s point against conventionalist accounts is that
conventions cannot exhaustively explain what is required for this interaction to succeed. In
other words, they cannot explain how the speaker manages to gear her passing theory in the
way the speaker intends, and neither can conventions tell what clues the speaker must give so
that the hearer is able to gear her passing theory to provide for the intended interpretation. In
Davidson’s opinion, this process is not characterized by the kind of systematicity and
preparation that linguistic interaction is, in his opinion, assumed to involve in conventionalist
accounts.119 Rather, it often requires recourse to such things as “wit, luck, and wisdom.”
A more detailed look at Kripkenstein’s and Searle’s respective theories of meaning
provides a clearer picture of how Davidson’s view of communication departs from
conventionalist accounts. Central for Kripkenstein’s attempt to overcome the challenge on the
impossibility of arriving at factors that determine what expressions mean posed by the skeptic
is an insistence on the need to replace the very picture of language on which the skeptic’s
challenge rests. Instead of considering language a medium whose individual elements receive
their meaning from a relationship of correspondence to something external to them,
expressions should be thought to derive their meaning from the various roles they occupy in
the language games a particular linguistic community consists of.120 The conventions that
underlie these language games are, in turn, essentially rule-governed in the sense that they
give the criteria for the correct application of a particular linguistic item. The meaning of an
expression is, in other words, neither based on something internal to the speaker’s head nor to
118 Ibid. (101). My italics.
119 Ibid. (93).
120 Kripke (1982, 76-77).
48
the  state  of  affairs  that  expression  corresponds  to.  It  is,  instead,  based  on  the  rules  which
govern the use of that expression in the various language games making up the linguistic
community the speaker inhabits.
Due to the relationship that is seen to hold between rule-governed conventions and the
criteria of understanding in Kripkenstein’s view, an understanding cannot be attributed to a
person,  who  “no  longer  conforms  to  what  the  community  would  do  in  these
circumstances….”121 That is, if the linguistic behavior of an individual diverges too
extensively from the rules that his community’s language games set for the use of a particular
expression, and hence its meaning, it is impossible to attribute definitive content to the
expressions of this kind of individual. The view of language use involved in this picture is
thus formed on the assumption that “we expect [other members of the language game] to
behave as we do.”122 Given these sorts of emphases, it is understandable why David Stern
thinks that the account of communication provided by Kripkenstein places substantive
restrictions on how individuals may behave in linguistic contexts.123
Although Searle, ultimately, formulates a conventional account of language similar to the
one offered by Kripkenstein, he nevertheless arrives at that view through a rather different
kind of route. Searle regards the speaker’s intention as by no means irrelevant, for he thinks it
is one of the crucial factors that separate meaningful expressions from mere noises.
Nevertheless, he ultimately draws the connection between intentions and conventions in a
way that the latter become the primary elements upon which an explanation of the success of
communication is founded. For Searle, conventions are primary to an intention of an
individual speaker in the sense that that intention must be formed through the rule-governed
elements of language, so to speak. In other words, “the intention will in general be achieved if
the hearer understands the sentence, i.e., knows its meaning, i.e., knows the rules governing
its elements.”124 Since the success of intentions is explained in terms of their relationship to
the rule-governed linguistic practices of a given community, Searle’s outlook too implies a
view where various sorts of restrictions are imposed on the linguistic behavior of a person.
The  way  Davidson,  ultimately,  departs  from  the  view  of  communication  provided  by
Kripkenstein’s and Searle’s accounts can be begun to be unpacked through his claim that
there, in fact, “is no word or construction that cannot be converted to a new use….”125 Once
the full imports of this claim have been drawn, Davidson’s reasons for rejecting
conventionalist accounts of communication become apparent.
One  reason  for  Searle  to  emphasize  the  role  of  conventions  at  the  cost  of  the  speaker’s
intentions is the need to avoid a view of meaning usually referred to as the Humpty Dumpty
view of meaning, named after the fictional character in Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking-
121 Ibid. (95).
122 Ibid. (93).
123 Stern (2004, 154).
124 Searle (1969, 48).
125 Davidson (2005/1986, 100).
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Glass, and What Alice Found There, where Humpty, after having intended “glory”  to mean “a
nice knockdown argument,”  claims to the baffled Alice that his utterances mean whatever he
intends them to mean. This is widely considered an unsatisfactory theory of meaning amongst
philosophers, for example, by overlooking the essential intersubjective and public character of
linguistic meaning. In fact, by laying such stress on the speaker’s intentions in meaning
determination, Searle claims that Paul Grice’s account of meaning highlighting the role of the
speaker’s intention is in danger of falling precisely into Humpty Dumpty-ism.126
However, Davidson does not believe that the only way to avoid Humpty Dumpty-ism is to
give conventions of language the kind of role they occupy in Searle’s account of meaning.
Davidson accommodates the morals philosophers have drawn from the case of Humpty
Dumpty by emphasizing the fact that the speaker must take the hearer’s readiness to interpret
his utterances into account when framing the meaning he intends his utterance to possess.
This feature in Davidson’s attempt to overcome the problem of Humpty Dumpty indicates
that different demands are placed on the speaker in Davidson’s account than in Searle’s. That
is,  even  though  the  speaker  does  not  have  to  follow  pre-established  conventions  or  rely  on
something both he and his interlocutor have prepared for in advance in order to be
understood, the speaker, nevertheless, has to make himself interpretable. The intention, in
other words, has to be reasonable in light of the audience’s capacity to understand. This is a
condition of communication Davidson calls “the requirement of interpretability.”  It is
precisely this requirement that for Davidson provides “the irreducible social factor”  involved
in language use, for it draws attention to the fact that “someone can’t mean something by his
words that can’t be deciphered by another.”127 This is not because the speaker went beyond
the rules of the language game or because he did not formulate his intended meanings in
terms of the elements governing the use of the expression in the language game, but because
he did not manage to make himself interpretable to the receiver in the sense of providing clues
for him that would have enabled the receiver to gear his passing theory in the way the speaker
intended. The reason for the failure of Humpty’s intended meaning was not merely the  fact
that he went beyond the rules governing the elements of his community’s language games,
but Humpty’s utterance did not ultimately mean what he intended, because he failed to make
himself interpretable to Alice. That is, given what Humpty knew about the linguistic
capacities of Alice, as well as the way their linguistic interaction had proceeded to the point
where Humpty made his utterance, the attempt to give the meaning Humpty intended “glory”
to have, i.e., “a nice knockdown argument,”  could not be considered a reasonable one. Since
the requirement of interpretability states that “you can change the meaning provided you
believe… that the interpreter has adequate clues for the new interpretation,”128 Humpty’s
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utterance can be considered a failure even on his own terms, for he himself admits that Alice
was not in a position to grasp the meaning he intended his utterance to possess.
Now, given that Davidson’s answer to the problem of Humpty Dumpty relies on the
reasonableness of the intended meaning, he must provide some sort of account of what that
assessment is ultimately based on. In other words, what are the criteria the speaker must fulfill
so that he can be said to have conformed to the requirement of interpretability? How does one
make oneself interpretable in the appropriate way? To these questions Davidson seems to
have only one answer: it is impossible to construe a definitive yardstick for measuring what
the reasonableness ultimately amounts to across cases. This negative estimation follows
directly from the skepticism Davidson’s approach takes towards the role of conventions.
Since the success of communication cannot be explained in the terms provided by the
conventionalists, neither can the principles offered by them referring to the rule-governed
conventions of language be relied on in the attempt to explicate what conforming to the
requirement of interpretability ultimately amounts to. That is, if conventions pose no ultimate
restrictions on what can be meant, neither are they able to serve as foundations for assessing
whether the requirement of interpretability has been met in a specific case.
Despite there being no definitive list of criteria that could be applied across cases
Davidson, nevertheless, does introduce certain norms that the satisfaction of the requirement
of interpretability, in his opinion, requires. Davidson writes:
What should we say of the many cases in which a speaker expects, or
hopes, to be understood in a certain way but isn’t? I can’t see that it
matters…. If a speaker reasonably believes he will be interpreted in a
certain way, and speaks with the intention of being so understood, we
may choose to say he means what… he would have meant if he had
been understood as he expected and intended. Reasonable belief is
itself such a flexible concept that we may want to add that there must
be people who would understand the speaker as he intends, and the
speaker reasonably believes he is speaking to such a person.129
Although Davidson’s work contains rather detailed examinations of what conditions must
be satisfied for communication to succeed, he admits his incapacity to provide a final answer
to the question of how people, ultimately, succeed in communicating with one another, that is,
how a hearer manages to gear his passing theory to coincide with the one the speaker intends
him to use. Davidson, in fact, observes that there is something “mysterious”  in the whole
process.130 The  core  of  Davidson’s  views,  nevertheless,  remains  the  same despite  admitting
his failing in the face of this question: rule-governed linguistic conventions do not play an
indispensable role in the process where two people come to understand each other. The
understanding does not require that the speaker follows the established conventions of his
language, and neither does communication require that the hearer is able to detect the
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conventions underlying the speaker’s utterances, but rather, in many cases, the hearer
manages to derive the passing theory his interlocutor intends her to use:
by wit, luck, and wisdom from a private vocabulary and grammar,
knowledge of the ways people get their point across, and rules of
thumb for figuring out what deviations from the dictionary are
most likely. There is no more chance of regularizing or teaching
the process of creating new theories to cope with new data in any
field –  for that is what this process involves.131
For these reasons, “the attempt to illuminate how we communicate by an appeal to
conventions”  should be abandoned.132
From Charity to Imagination: Rationality Assumptions in Davidson’s Late Philosophy
of Language
As we saw,  Davidson  acknowledges  that  a  commitment  to  the  principle  of  charity  does  not
rule out the existence of false beliefs or the presence of irrationality. Rather, the principle
highlights the fact that irrationality and attributions of false beliefs depend on a background of
general rationality and a largely true set of beliefs about the world. These disclaimers show
that Davidson has always accepted the possibility that interpretation need not proceed under
the kinds of assumptions regarding human cognitive capacities receiving an expression in the
core  of  the  principle  of  charity.  However,  while  references  to  the  principle  of  charity  still
appear in Davidson’s later texts,133 it seems that especially in those writings where Davidson
formulates his anti-conventionalist account of meaning presented in the previous section, the
assumptions he considers understanding and interpretation to involve depart in some
significant ways from how they are construed in the principle of charity. This is because the
description  of  communication  as  a  dialectics  between  the  passing  and  the  prior  theory  of
language presented in them provides a more context-sensitive and nuanced account of the
assumptions involved in interpretation and understanding than is the case with the principle of
charity.
Another interesting change that may be detected in Davidson’s thinking concerns the
scope  of  the  rationality  assumptions.  In  the  earlier  texts,  where  the  principle  of  charity
occupies an essential  position,  the emphasis is  on the radical interpreter and on the kinds of
assumptions the principle allows him to make about the cognitive faculties of the person
whose utterances are under interpretation. In the later texts considerations of rationality start
to  concern  the  speaker  as  well.  This  sort  of  extension  of  focus  becomes  apparent  from
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Davidson’s claim that the speaker must conform to the requirement of interpretability, that is,
the speaker must have a reasonable belief that his interlocutor is able to capture the meaning
he intends his expressions to possess by his choice of words, and other contextual clues
provided by the speaker in the course of making an utterance. The success of the speaker’s
intention, in other words, becomes a question of weighing whether the speaker has proceeded
in a way that the hearer can be rationally expected to grasp what he intended, that is, whether
the framing of the intended meaning is within the limits of rationality. Humpty failed to mean
what he intended precisely because his intended meaning went beyond the limits of what it
was rational to expect from Alice.
It seems that Davidson’s later texts provide an account of understanding and
communication, where they are seen to involve a particular kind of shared awareness between
the speaker and hearer. On the one hand, this common space allows the speaker to reasonably
presume that if he proceeds in a specific way at a particular point of the interaction, he will be
understood by his audience in the way he intends to be understood, for he knows that taking
those courses of actions enables his interlocutor to gear her passing theory so that she is able
to arrive at the interpretation intended by him. 134 On the other, the hearer’s capacity to gear
her passing theory in the way the speaker intends through the clues provided by the speaker is
based on the fact that the hearer knows that the speaker knows that by proceeding in this way
the hearer will be able to grasp the intended meaning. It is, therefore, not only important for
the success of communication that the speaker and hearer share certain background
assumptions with each other, but this must be supplemented by a kind of reflexivity between
them, that is, the speaker must know that the hearer has this background, and the hearer must
know that the speaker has that background, and the hearer must, furthermore, know that the
speaker knows the hearer has this background, and the speaker must know that the hearer
knows that the speaker knows that the hearer has this background.135
Given that Davidson acknowledges the need to accommodate the existence of false beliefs
and irrationality to an outlook otherwise infused by the assumptions involved in the principle
of charity, it is arguable that Davidson never thought that that principle expresses everything
there is to say about understanding and interpretation. In other words, Davidson’s earlier texts
admit that there is a kind of gray area, where the principle of charity is no longer able to serve
as the condition of understanding. Nevertheless, it is hard to say whether the later texts are
intended to draw attention to the logic of communication involved in an area where Davidson
did not dare go before, for despite their providing a different view on the conditions of
understanding than the principle of charity, these two parts of Davidson’s work do not seem
to diverge from each other over the point at issue here. That is, the latter texts as a whole are
not devoted to an investigation of how communication succeeds under the assumption that the
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speaker holds a large set of false beliefs about the world and that the web of his beliefs and
desires do not make up a consistent whole. The factor that rather serves to separate
Davidson’s later texts from his earlier ones is that in the latter case the conditions of
communication are approached through a more flexible and context-sensitive conception of
rationality, which acknowledges that “the kinds and degrees of deviation from the norms of
rationality that we can understand or explain are not settled in advance”136 and that
“reasonable belief”  is a “flexible concept.”137 It is my belief that it is precisely the emphases
in Davidson’s later texts outlined above that gives a possibility for the Davidsonian position
to formulate a convincing reply precisely to those criticisms which claim that the principle of
charity assumes an over-idealistic picture of human cognitive capacities.
Before coming to this issue in more detail, however, let me point out another interesting
transformation  in  Davidson’s  views  that  the  later  texts  bring  to  light,  and  which  is  a  direct
result  from  the  looser  and  more  context-sensitive  conception  of  rationality  they  involve.  In
Björn Ramberg’s view, Davidson’s earlier texts provide a dynamic picture of language, even
though this implication has rarely been drawn attention to in the commentary literature on
Davidson.138 The later texts, however, seem to emphasize this aspect of language even more
strongly. This is due to Davidson’s anti-conventionalist leanings, for that implies that the
capacities which communication and understanding are seen to require become more
multifarious in character compared to those that were called for from the radical interpreter.
That is, it no longer involves just a capacity to perceive what sentences the speaker holds true,
but the faculties on which understanding rests on may diverge significantly from each other
from case to case. One capacity which seems to receive a growing importance in Davidson’s
account of communication is imagination. As unlikely as this might sound, Davidson, in fact,
himself states that once we have accepted his anti-conventionalist tenets which reject the idea
that understanding a language consists of following the rule-governed practices of the
language games of one’s community, but which is instead marked by a continuous revisal of
interpretive suppositions, a faculty the exercise of which successful linguistic interaction may,
in Davidson’s opinion, in many cases require is “imagination.”139 Jeff Malpas also draws this
kind of implication from Davidson’s anti-conventionalist emphases.140
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Imagination is, of course, a highly-loaded word in philosophy, and different kinds of
capacities have been referred to with that notion in the course of its history. What seems to be
understood with that notion in this context, however, is a capacity to build a diversified
picture of human capacities and of the constituents human situations may involve, as well as
how these general facts intertwine with the elements making up the individual situation the
speaker and hearer inhabit at a particular time. The importance of imagination for the kind of
outlook on communication developed by Davidson in his later texts does not follow merely
from the emphasis apparent in them that in various cases the success of communication may
rest on highly unique and passing elements, but the particular reflexive character
communication is seen to involve in it has a similar implication. That is, in order to be
understood the speaker must first of all form a picture of his receiver’s linguistic capacities,
this background underdetermining how he proceeds in communication. Secondly, the
speaker’s progression must be accompanied by an understanding of why it is precisely this
way of proceeding that makes the receiver capable of gearing her passing theory in the
intended way, that is, why by proceeding in this way the speaker is able to make herself
interpretable for the receiver. Both of these procedures require that the speaker possesses a
complex “awareness of human interests and attitudes,”  as well as an ability to see how those
come into play in individual cases.141 That is, the speaker must grasp how the material he
shares with his interlocutor is to be utilized so that the hearer is able to understand him.
While it might seem that these kinds of imagination-related capacities are required
primarily from the speaker, this, however, is not the case, for the success of communication
requires that the hearer utilizes similar faculties. That is, understanding requires that the
hearer can detect those factors the speaker is relying on in his attempt to communicate, and
that she is able to grasp why with certain linguistic and other possible additional behavior the
speaker intends the hearer to gear her passing theory in a certain way. As was the case with
the speaker, what is required from the hearer here is a capacity to apprehend the constituents
human situations involve, as well as an awareness of their position in the case at hand.
Communication, in other words, requires that the speaker and hearer possess a mutual
conception of how the different parts that complex awareness consists of may be put to use in
their context of communication so that understanding is achieved.
The loosening of the assumptions regarding rationality apparent in Davidson’s later texts
goes hand in hand with the growth in importance that imagination acquires in the approach.
That is, while it may still be the case that speakers and hearers sharing a largely similar set of
true beliefs with each other serves as a kind of initial condition that is required for
communication to succeed, in the later texts, understanding and interpretation involves much
more finely-grained capacities than just the capacity to tell what sentences one’s interlocutor
holds true.
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Now, this exposition reveals that Davidson’s later texts provide an account of the
conditions of understanding and interpretation with somewhat different points of emphasis
from those his earlier ones involve. Moreover, by highlighting the fact that Davidson’s views
truly underwent this kind of transformation, the Davidsonian position on interpretation and
understanding is also able to formulate convincing replies especially to those criticisms which
accuse it of assuming a too idealistic view of human cognitive capacities, and to modify its
ultimate content along the lines that some commentators have suggested. For example, David
K. Henderson has some reservations about giving the principle of charity the kind of role in
interpretation and understanding that Davidson gives it. This is not only because the
assumptions of rationality it involves are, in Henderson’s view, hard to reconcile with our
own frequent experiences of behaviour which deviate from the norms of rationality, but
because empirical research on human psychology also shows that in certain kinds of cases
humans act in highly irrational ways.142 Maria Baghramian raises similar cautions about the
principle of charity.143 In her opinion, these are especially damaging for Davidson’s outlook,
for observations similar to those coming to light in Henderson’s criticism imply that “the link
between rationality and successful interpretation”  she considers fundamental for Davidson’s
account is in danger of breaking down.144
Henderson’s solution to the problem of how to reconcile these observations with the role
the principle of charity is intended to play in the radical interpreter’s attempt to translate the
utterances of his interlocutor, is to cut the interpretation process into half, the decisive
differentiating feature between the two phases precisely concerning how strong senses of
charity are required in them. In the first phase, Henderson thinks interpretation must proceed
under the kind of strong reading of charity Davidson suggests, this strong reading concerning
for example such entities as “observation sentences, truth-functions, low-level empirical
generalizations concerning technological matters, and occasion sentences.”145 The  phase  of
interpretation involving the strong sense of charity forms a kind of preparatory stage for later
interpretive refinements. To posit this kind of preparatory role for the principle of charity is in
line with Davidson’s emphasis on the fact that the presence of irrationality and identification
of false beliefs is possible only against the background of general rationality and a largely true
set of beliefs.
Interpretation cannot, however, proceed entirely under the assumptions inherent in the
principle of charity precisely because that would require attributing a degree of rationality to
the  subjects  of  interpretation  which  cannot  stand  the  test  of  our  experience  and  that  of
empirical psychology. In the later stages of interpretation building on the ground prepared by
the principle of charity, a principle Henderson calls “the principle of explicability”  takes the
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position of the principle of charity as the basic requirement of interpretation. At this point of
interpretation, “construing the source-language users as correct or consistent is beside the
point,”  but instead the goal is to immerse their behavior into an explanatory framework that
makes the instances of behaviour under interpretation “explicable.”  Explication and
interpretation can be achieved without assuming the full rationality of the agent in cases
where it is possible to supplement the explication with an explanation of the irrationality the
interpretive scheme used attributes to the agent. This feature of the principle of explicability
brings out a crucial difference between interpretation guided by this principle and by the
principle of charity in turn. For when Davidson in some places claims that if the interpretive
scheme proceeding under the assumptions of charity attributes an outlandish belief or an
irrationality to an agent it is more likely that there is something wrong with the interpretation
than with the agent. In Henderson’s opinion, in the case of the principle of explicability,
“when such an attribution of inconsistency can be incorporated within an explanatory account,
the inconsistency of the attributed beliefs does not count as evidence against the translation
manual by which they are identified.”146
One field which becomes important for interpretation in the refinements Henderson
suggests for the Davidsonian position is empirical and social research on human behavior.
These areas of research become important for they provide predictions on how people behave
in given situations, and what sorts of deviances from certain standards of rationality are to be
expected in given cases. In other words, research results presented in them serve as tools for
interpretation, for they provide an explanation for irrational behavior.147  Hence, interpretation
need  not  assume  such  a  link  between  attributions  of  rationality  and  the  success  of
interpretation, and attributions of inconsistent beliefs and irrationality need not speak against
the interpretation scheme. For “if the empirical knowledge on which the weighing of
attributions of error is based is sufficient to support explanations, then the errors attributed to
the speakers of the source-language will often be explicable in terms of that knowledge.”148
Now, leaving aside the question whether those fields of empirical research introduced by
Henderson should truly have as fundamental a position in understanding and interpretation as
he  suggests,  the  factor  I  want  to  draw attention  to  here  is  that  the  picture  of  the  rationality
assumptions involved in interpretation and understanding provided by Davidson’s later texts
shows  that  it  is  possible  for  the  Davidsonian  position  to  accommodate  Henderson’s  critical
remarks, as well as the refinements he suggests to it. That is, the principle of charity has only
a preparatory role in interpretation and understanding, and at a certain point a principle with a
more detailed content takes its position. This is because if the prior theories of linguistic
interlocutors, which form the initial horizon for the communication situation, may be based
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on such  individual  things  as  “knowledge  of  the  character,  dress,  role,  sex,”149 it is arguable
that the prior theory can also include such elements invoked by Henderson. That is, if
according to the account of communication provided by Davidson’s later texts it is seen to
require a complex, reflexive awareness of human attitudes, surely that kind of awareness
through which one forms interpretive suppositions for different kinds of speakers can be
supplemented by empirical research on human psychology.
Henderson does not, in fact, regard his critical account of the principle of charity so much
as an insistence on the need to relinquish charity in interpretation altogether as an attempt to
refine “the present formulations of the principle.”150 I think it is possible to read Davidson’s
later texts as having precisely this same goal. The refinements that Davidson’s anti-
conventionalist account of communication provides for the Davidsonian position on
interpretation and understanding as a whole allows that view to accommodate some other
critical points as well. After presenting her criticism of Davidson’s account of the principle of
charity as a fundamental condition of understanding in which she raises critical points similar
to those Henderson presents, Baghramian concludes that “we do not… require either a stable
a priori bridgehead or blanket charity in order to understand each other.”151 Instead, in her
opinion, we should see how “numerous”  and “varied”  those “entry points”  are that allows us
to  enter  into  the  system  of  thought  of  another  person.152 I think this is an insistence which
Davidson’s views on communication and understanding ultimately come to share as well.
Holism of Mind and World and the Problem of Skepticism
Another transformation that may be detected in Davidson’s views concerns the scope of the
holistic emphases found in various parts of Davidson’s earlier texts. The term “holism”  has no
fixed point of reference in philosophy, and there is no philosophical context in which it would
be primarily used, but different kinds of views presented not only in different sections of
philosophy, but in completely different philosophical traditions as well, have been collected
under that term.153 What Davidson means by calling his philosophy a form of holism is that it
is  committed  to  a  view  according  to  which  “various  aspects  of  the  mental  depend  on  each
other.”154 While Davidson’s earlier texts may already be seen as embodying this kind of
outlook on the mental, in his later texts, Davidson began to develop that view into a more
systematic and wide-ranging philosophical view, as well as to consider its implications for
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some of the most fundamental questions of philosophy. As Marc Joseph puts it, Davidson’s
views eventually formed “a unified theory of mind, language, and action.”155
In Davidson’s opinion, the holistic view of the mind emerging from his work involves an
account of the relationship between mind and world that departs in some significant aspects
from the way that relationship has been construed by a large body of influential philosophers.
The  view  which  Davidson  contrasts  his  account  to  is  not  so  much  a  view  that  would  have
been developed independently by a particular philosopher as a view which became dominant
because of certain other kinds of assumptions the work of a group of philosophers involved.
This view, which, in Davidson’s view, has become “so ingrained in our philosophical
tradition that it is almost impossible to escape its influence,”156 has received various
formulations in the history of philosophy, but a metaphor, which is quite often used to capture
its core, derives from David Hume. Hume describes the human mind as “a theatre that
watches the passing show,”  where the show may be regarded as consisting of such elements
as “‘appearances’, sense data, qualia, what is ‘given in experience’.”157 The problem which
the philosopher faces is to provide an explanation of how it is possible to prove that the
elements of the show truly correspond to the way things are in the outer world.
Davidson does not think that the view of the mind he is offering in place of the kind of
account expressed in Hume’s views is in any way unique, but it can be seen as a part of a
larger philosophical development in which we are witnessing “the emergence of a revised
view of the relation of mind and world.”158 One account, with which Davidson’s analysis
bears a particularly close relationship to, is the controversial criticism of modern philosophy
offered  by  Richard  Rorty.  For  Rorty,  holism  represents  “a  distrust  of  the  whole
epistemological enterprise,” 159 in other words, the enterprise which understood philosophy as
a discipline whose quest it was to uncover the conditions under which the passing show the
mind is watching matches up with the show as it is really acted out in external reality. Though
Davidson’s account lacks the historical depth that Rorty’s criticism involves, he shares
Rorty’s understanding of how holism departs from the tradition of epistemology-centered
philosophy. For both, holism is not an outlook whose primary intention is to formulate a
successful reply to the challenge posed by the skeptic regarding the foundations of our
knowledge. That is, how do we know that our subjective impressions truly correspond to the
way the world is, which has, in both Rorty’s and Davidson’s opinion, provided the fuel for the
whole epistemological enterprise.160 Rather, holism tries to provide a view on things that
allows us to see how “answering the global skeptic will no longer be a challenge.”161 Or, as
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Rorty summarizes the implications of Davidson’s critical reading of modern epistemology;
we can just tell the skeptic to get lost.162
Central for Davidson’s attempt to overcome the philosophical framework, which is
dominated by the quest for formulating a successful answer to the skeptic, is to replace the
conception  of  the  mind  on  which  the  epistemological  enterprise  as  a  whole  rests.  On  that
account there are special sorts of objects which the mind has a special relationship to and
whose contents it can know immediately. The skeptic can be seen as sharing this kind of
understanding of the mind with the epistemologist, for the challenge posed by him precisely
concerns the impossibility of ascertaining that the sensations, whose contents our mind’s eye
can grasp immediately, truly correspond to the way the world is. The way the holistic account
of the mind formulated by Davidson departs from the picture assumed in the epistemological
enterprise is precisely that it gets rid of the idea that there are special objects before the mind
that the mind can “‘entertain’, ‘grasp’…‘or be ‘acquainted with’.”163 Davidson sees this not so
much as providing a solution to the problem of building an indubitable ground for knowledge
as a way of eliminating the question altogether. That is, to “dispense”  with such entities is to
dispense with the epistemological enterprise altogether, “for we cannot ask how such entities
can represent the world if there are no such objects….”164
In Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature,  Rorty  argues  that  the  empiricist  view  of
justification is plagued by a confusion between causal explanation and justification, that is,
the  causal  role  the  sensation  plays  in  the  belief  and  what  provides  justification  for  our
believing in that belief. The empiricist presumes the two questions to be identical with each
other,  whereas,  in  Rorty’s  opinion,  they  are  not.  That  is,  it  is  a  different  thing  to  say  that  a
particular  sensation  has  a  causal  role  in  the  process  as  a  result  of  which  we come to  hold  a
particular belief than to say that that sensation serves as a bedrock foundation for the belief
we come to hold.165 Davidson formulates the confusion he thinks the empiricist outlook on
justification is plagued by in terms of a distinction between “causal intermediaries”  and
“epistemic intermediaries.”166 With the help of this distinction Davidson tries to locate the
ultimate role that sensations play in our coming to have beliefs about the external world.
Davidson does not think that “experience and perception play no role in our beliefs about the
world,”  but that their effect is purely causal in character.167 That is, a certain noise does
indeed give rise to a sensation by acting on our cochlea, but that sensation alone does not
serve as an explanation of why we come to hold the belief we eventually come to hold,  for
that depends on other beliefs we hold at that time. Sensations cannot serve as epistemic
intermediaries between the world and our beliefs, for that would require that the reason for
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our beliefs would be provided by the content of the sensation alone. This, however, is not so,
for those reasons are provided by a host of other beliefs we hold.168 The  mistake  of  the
empiricist is, in other words, the following, “sensations cause some beliefs and in this sense
are  the  basis  or  ground of  those  beliefs.  But  a  causal  explanation  of  a  belief  does  not  show
how or why the belief is justified.”169
The reason why the view on the relationship between mind and world Davidson offers in
place of the outlook following from the empiricist view of justification may be called
“holistic”  is  that  in  it  beliefs  and  propositional  attitudes  are  understood  to  “come  only  as  a
matched set,”170 which is to say that “we identify thoughts, distinguish among them, describe
them for what they are, only as they can be located within a dense network of related
beliefs.”171 This kind of holism provides an alternate picture of belief constitution to the one
assumed in the empiricist  outlook. It  is  precisely this difference between the two views that
explains why the holist can tell the skeptic to get lost. Since the contents of our beliefs are not
determined by how our mind represents reality, the skeptic’s question, how do we know that
our mind represents reality accurately is no longer a question that makes sense, or as
Davidson at one point puts it, the idea of “a confrontation”  between our beliefs and reality is
“absurd.”172
To extend his attempt to overcome the skeptic’s challenge Davidson turns to the
conditions of interpretation, as they are expressed in the principle of charity. In his opinion,
this approach to the question of the foundations of our knowledge shows that the mistake in
the epistemological enterprise has been the assumption “that the truth concerning what a
person believes about the world is logically independent of the truth of those beliefs.”173 It is
precisely  this  disconnection  that  has  left  the  door  open  for  the  skeptic  to  formulate  his
challenge according to which we could hold most of those beliefs we currently do hold,  but
still the external world could be very different in character from what our beliefs express. This
is  a  gap  that,  in  Davidson’s  opinion,  can  be  closed  by  reflecting  on  the  nature  of
interpretation, for together with the holistic account of the mind the conditions that process is
seen to involve by Davidson implies that most of our beliefs must be true. Since “holism
maintains that the contents of speech and thought depend on the relations among meanings
and among thoughts,”  the identification of a single belief requires that it is inserted in the
logical network of other thoughts.174 This emphasis involved in holism, in turn, implies that
“what is not largely consistent with many other beliefs cannot be identified as a belief.”175 If a
place for a given belief cannot, in other words, be found in the network a person’s
168 Ibid. (46).
169 Ibid. (143). Italics Davidson.
170 Ibid. (96).
171 Ibid. (98).
172 Ibid. (137).
173 Ibid. (206).
174 Ibid. (65).
175 Ibid. (155).
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propositional attitudes form, the belief in question cannot be attributed to him. Since the
identification of a single belief requires introducing a pattern of other propositional attitudes
in which a place can be located for that belief, and since under the assumptions provided by
charity  it  is  impossible  to  make  sense  of  that  pattern  if  it  would  not  consist  mostly  of  true
beliefs, the interpreter’s ability to make sense of a person’s behavior and utterances is an
indication that most of his beliefs must be true. This is basically what Davidson means with
his controversial claim that “coherence yields correspondence.”176 In  other  words,  it  is
impossible to make sense of a person’s utterances and behavior if most of his beliefs are false.
This conclusion leads Davidson to observe that while “the foundations of interpretation are
not the foundations of knowledge… an appreciation of the nature of interpretation can lead to
an appreciation of the essentially veridical nature of belief.”177
2. Overcoming the Intentionalist Debate in Analytic Philosophy of
Art
It  might  come as  a  surprise  to  someone  with  only  a  little  knowledge  of  Donald  Davidson’s
philosophy that he has, in fact, claimed literary language to serve as “a prime test of the
adequacy of any view on the nature of language.”178 As strange as this might sound given that
analytic philosophers of language have rarely considered the problems of literary language,
the claim, actually, can be seen to capture the character of the transformation that Davidson’s
approach to language was argued to have undergone in his later texts in the first parts of this
chapter. The texts in which Davidson explicitly considers the problem of literary language
and the interpretation of literature embody a view which ascribes an important role for the
author’s intentions in interpretation. In this respect, Davidson supports a view of
interpretation that in many ways involves emphases similar to those that are important for
modest intentionalist accounts of interpretation which have recently received growing support
in analytic philosophy of art.
Although anti-intentionalist theories of interpretation still have their supporters within this
tradition,179 in recent years, some form of intentionalism has emerged as the most supported
view of interpretation. The current discussion is carried out between two different forms of
intentionalism in particular; modest actual intentionalism (MI) and hypothetical
intentionalism (HI). The significant difference between these two views is that while modest
intentionalists argue that as long as certain conditions are met the meaning of the work should
be identified with what the author actually intended it to be,180 hypothetical intentionalism
176 Ibid, (137).
177 Ibid. (175).
178 Davidson (2005/1993, 167).
179 Dickie and Wilson (1995).
180 See, for example, Livingston (1996, 627).
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sees this variant of meaning to be composed differently, identifying it with the best hypothesis
concerning the author’s intention made by an appropriately equipped audience.181
The remaining parts of this chapter are devoted to an examination of this debate. I shall
especially concentrate on examining whether Davidson’s ideas on meaning, intention, and
interpretation presented in the first parts of this chapter have something to contribute to the
debate currently carried out. I shall not provide a detailed examination of what every
philosopher who has participated in the discussion has said, but I shall unravel the discussion
through a particular problem that has occupied an important position in the debate as a whole.
This is again the problem of Humpty Dumpty.
The Role of Humpty Dumpty in Analytic Philosophy of Art
The view of meaning associated with Humpty Dumpty’s name has already been touched upon
earlier in this chapter. As became apparent, there is virtually no philosopher who agrees with
Humpty’s claim regarding his ability to mean whatever he wishes, but rather, as Michael
Hancher points out, philosophers have tended to side with Alice, while Humpty has been
considered “a monster of private language.”  Humpty is, in other words, a desperate figure,
who in “the age of Saussure and Wittgenstein”  has been left alone without any “real allies,”
and rightly so.182 However, the problem of Humpty Dumpty seems to appear in philosophy of
art even more often than in philosophy of language. Monroe Beardsley, for example,
considered the view of meaning expressed in Humpty Dumpty’s declaration to Alice, and a
will to avoid slipping into that kind of view was one of the main reasons for him to end up
supporting an anti-intentionalist account of interpretation, that is, the thesis that intentions are
irrelevant for the meaning of the work.183
However, the case of Humpty structures the current debate between HI and MI even more
strongly. In this context, it takes the form of the distinction between utterer’s meaning, i.e.,
what the author intended, and utterance meaning, i.e., what the work’s meaning, ultimately, is.
Humpty Dumpty-ism has been seen as the view that regards the two as identical with each
other. Recently, William Irwin has supported this type of theory, explicitly stating that if
Humpty in actual fact had the intention to mean “there’s a nice knockdown argument for you”
with “there’s glory for you,”  his utterance truly meant that, despite the fact that Alice did not
have the faintest idea what her interlocutor had meant with his utterance.184 However, like
181 Jerrold Levinson is the foremost defender of the hypothetical intentionalist position on interpretation. He
develops his account, for example, in Levinson (1996, 175-179). See also Levinson (1999) and (2002). For
another detailed criticism of actual intentionalism from a hypothetical intentionalist point of view see Trivedi
(2001).
182 Hancher (1981, 49-50).
183 Beardsley (1981, 49).
184 Irwin (1999, 56-57).
63
Humpty,  Irwin  has  also  been  left  alone  without  any  real  allies,  for  both  the  supporters  of  HI
and MI acknowledge that Humpty Dumpty-ism is a view which should be avoided.
Now,  the  case  of  Humpty  functions  in  the  background  of  the  current  debate  in  some
significant ways. For Jerrold Levinson, MI’s supposed inability to provide a sufficient reply to
the problem has served as one of his primary motivations for developing the hypothetical
version of intentionalism.185 Levinson’s version is able to avoid the problem with ease, since
by identifying utterance meaning with the best hypothesis made by an appropriately informed
audience, HI can avoid utterance meaning from collapsing into utterer’s meaning. For if
utterer’s meaning, that is, what the author intended, fails to coincide with the attribution made
by the appropriately informed audience, the utterance meaning of the work is determined by
the latter and not the former. This avoids the conclusion that arguably would be implied by
Humpty Dumpty-ism.186
While acknowledging the actuality of the problem of Humpty Dumpty for MI, its
supporters have been relatively optimistic about the prospects of MI avoiding a slippage into
Humpty-Dumpty-ism. Moreover, it seems that they see a successful answer to the problem to
imply a more substantial consequence. That is, since one of the main counterarguments HI
has addressed to MI is that the view cannot overcome the problem of Humpty Dumpty, a
successful answer to it may be seen to have a significant implication for the debate between
HI and MI as a whole. That is, MI’s ability to accommodate Humpty Dumpty-ism suggests
that of the two it is precisely that approach to interpretation which should be favored, for HI
involves problematic features that MI can avoid.187
Below, I shall first introduce some qualifications supporters of MI have introduced,
which, in their opinion, allows the modest intentionalist position to successfully accommodate
185 Levinson, for example, argues that one of the advantages HI has over MI is that it manages to preserve the
“intuitive difference between what ends up being said (or conveyed) in a complex discourse situation, whether
literary or non-literary, and what some agent was trying (or aiming) to say…”  (Levinson 1996, 193).
186 Ibid. (186).
187 For example, Gary Iseminger (1996) goes through various objections which have been raised against modest
actual intentionalism, and argues that that view is able to meet all of them. After having shown this, he remarks
that “the result is a stalemate between actual intentionalism and hypothetical intentionalism….”  (ibid. 323).
Iseminger then moves on to draw attention to some factors which, in his view, modest actual intentionalism is in
a better position to account for than hypothetical intentionalism, and which, thus, offer support for favoring MI
over HI. The most important factor Iseminger cites in favor of MI is the fact that we have a conversational
interest towards literary works, and this interest is, in his opinion, satisfied only by a grasp of the author’s actual
intention, not by the best hypothesis made by an appropriate reader. Iseminger concludes, “our conversational
interests in literature will not be satisfied by anything less than the actual semantic intention of the author”  (ibid.
325). Robert Stecker produces a similar kind of argument in favor of MI, or “the unified view”  as Stecker calls
his position. He singles out two factors which have been seen to motivate HI, one of which is precisely the
supposition that HI is able overcome the problem of Humpty Dumpty more effortlessly than MI, that is, the fact
that “work meaning can diverge from actually intended meaning”  (Stecker 2003, 42). However, Stecker argues
that neither factor cited by him undermines MI, for MI is, after all, able to accommodate those same factors. Like
in Iseminger’s account, the result at this point is a stalemate between MI and HI. Stecker then frames the debate
between MI and HI in terms of their capacity to produce an appropriate account of utterance meaning, that is,
“what someone says on an occasion of utterance,”  and produces various counterexamples to the effect that, in
many cases, HI fails to give an interpretation of utterance meaning which we intuitively regard as most plausible.
(Ibid. 44-47.)
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the problem of Humpty Dumpty within this approach. I shall then move on to assess the
strength of the replies offered by modest intentionalists to Humpty Dumpty-ism by comparing
those replies to Davidson’s way of coping with this specific problem introduced earlier. It is,
in fact, my belief that Davidson’s analysis of the case is in many ways more successful than
those found in the work of modest intentionalists. This conclusion is important for this study
as a whole, for it indicates one way in which Davidson’s views manage to increase the general
credibility of the modest intentionalist position on interpretation.
There’s a Nice Knockdown Argument for You: Donald Davidson and Modest
Intentionalism
Paisley Livingston has formulated the core of the modest intentionalist position aptly:
Very generally, moderate intentionalism is the view that often
the actual maker(s)’  attitudes and doings are responsible for
some of a work’s content, and as such are a legitimate target of
interpretive claims; more specifically, some (but not all) artist’s
semantic and other intentions are relevant, even necessary, to
some (but not all) valuable interpretive insights because such
intentions are sometimes constitutive of the work’s content.188
Since MI gives this kind of role to the actual intention of the author, it must provide some
means  for  blocking  Humpty  Dumpty-ism,  i.e.,  leave  room  for  the  possibility  that  the  work
does not mean what its author’s actual intention was. Modest intentionalists are convinced
that their version of intentionalism is capable of formulating an adequate response to this
problem. The content of the replies modest intentionalists have given to the problem of
Humpty Dumpty overlap with each other in significant ways. Although utterance meaning,
that is, the meaning of the work, should be identified with the actual intention of the author,
Humpty’s  claim  to  be  able  to  mean  whatever  he  likes  is  pre-empted  by  setting  certain
boundaries on what it is possible to mean. Humpty is seen to have failed in meaning what he
intended precisely because he went beyond these boundaries.
Livingston formulates the content of these boundaries by maintaining that successful
intentions have to be “within natural and logical limits,”  while Robert Stecker expresses a
similar idea by saying that the intention has to receive an uptake, that is, the intention has to
be supported by the structure of the text or work.189 If these requirements are not met, the
work does not mean what the author intended the work to mean. Noël Carroll has most
explicitly denied that modest intentionalism falls into the problem of Humpty Dumpty:
188 Livingston (1996, 627).
189 Ibid. (628), Stecker (2003, 14-17), Stecker (2006, 429-430).
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Modest actual intentionalism blocks Humpty Dumpty-ism
because even if Humpty Dumpty intends “glory”  to mean
“knockdown argument”, that is not a meaning that the textual
unit (“glory”) can have. The intentions of authors that the
modest  actual  intentionalist  takes  seriously  are  only  those
intentions of the author that the linguistic/literary unit can
support (given the conventions of language and literature).190
Now, at first sight, this short exposition of the disclaimers modest intentionalists have
introduced for blocking that view from slipping into Humpty Dumpty-ism seems to show
that modest intentionalist reactions to the problem of Humpty Dumpty involves an attitude to
the problem similar to that present in Davidson’s views, that is, while the actual intention is
indeed the most essential factor in determining meaning, there must, nevertheless, be certain
constraints on what can be meant, and if the author goes beyond these limits he has failed to
mean what he intended. However, once a deeper account of Davidson’s analysis of the case
of Humpty Dumpty has been provided, some significant differences begin to emerge.
Davidson’s account of the case of Humpty Dumpty shows insufficiencies especially in
Noël Carroll’s attempt to accommodate the morals of Humpty Dumpty-ism within the modest
intentionalist position. That is, if the skepticism towards the role of conventions adopted by
Davidson in his later philosophy of language is accepted, conventions cannot pose such limits
on intentions as are invoked by Carroll in his response to the threat of Humpty Dumpty-ism.
By arguing that Humpty’s utterance did not mean what he intended Carroll does arrive at the
right conclusion. However, he ultimately arrives at it for the wrong reasons, for the ultimate
reason for the shortfall of Humpty’s intended meaning is neither that he broke the conventions
of language nor that “the textual unit”  does not support the intended meaning given the
conventions of language, but because Humpty did not conform to the requirement of
interpretability, i.e., he did not give Alice the required clues for gearing her passing theory.
For this reason, Humpty’s intention cannot be considered reasonable and, thus, on the
Davidsonian account, his utterance does not mean what he intended it to mean. In this respect,
Carroll’s mistake is similar to that of Searle’s. With a different kind of stage setting on
Humpty’s part which would have provided Alice with a sufficient number of clues for
reaching understanding, his utterance could truly have managed to mean what he intended.
That kind of situation is possible even in the case where the conventions of language would
not have undergone any kinds of significant transformations.
Livingston’s answer to the case of Humpty Dumpty does not appear that successful either.
The insufficiencies apparent in it are pretty much the same as those troubling Carroll’s
account. Its shortage is even enhanced by the fact that the contents of those limits Livingston
describes as natural and logical remain unclear. What does it mean for an intention to be
190 Carroll (2001/2000, 198).
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within natural limits? Are there some kinds of standards for what it is natural to mean? Now,
be that as it may, it nevertheless seems that the restrictions Livingston is after are similar in
kind  to  those  Carroll  introduces.  That,  in  turn,  suggests  that  the  perspective  on  the  case  of
Humpty provided by Davidson is able to reveal shortcomings similar to those brought to light
in the case of Carroll. That is, in both cases it is overlooked how multifarious those factors are
that come into play when the success of intention is considered.
One shortcoming in the replies Livingston and Carroll have presented to the case of
Humpty  Dumpty  is  that  they  fail  to  take  into  account  the  possibility  that  “there’s  glory  for
you”  could, in fact, mean “there’s a nice knockdown argument for you.”  Especially Carroll’s
answer to this question seems definitive. Since the conventions of language cannot give that
textual unit the meaning of the latter, this does not seem possible, or at least that would
require a substantial transformation in our linguistic practices. However, the Davidsonian
position shows that for “there’s glory for you”  to mean “there’s a nice knockdown argument
for you”  our linguistic conventions need not undergo any substantial revolutions. Support for
this claim is provided by Samuel Wheeler’s assessment of the situation. In his discussion on
the relevance of Davidson’s ideas for the case of Humpty Dumpty, Wheeler imagines a
scenario where Humpty can be considered to have succeeded in meaning what he intended,
that is, equating “knockdown argument”  with “glory.”  From a Davidsonian standpoint this
kind of conclusion may be allowed in cases where it is possible to consider the intention to
make “knockdown argument”  mean “glory”  reasonable. In Wheeler’s opinion, this may even
be allowed in cases where the receivers fail to catch the intended meaning.
The case imagined by Wheeler is different from the original case in that in this case
Humpty, in fact, does believe for specific reasons that the actual audience has the ability to
grasp his intention to make “knockdown argument”  mean “glory.”  Yet, despite Humpty
having this belief his audience, ultimately, fails to do so. The important difference to the
original case, however, is that in this case, Humpty’s intention can, for a variety of reasons, be
considered reasonable, and thus there is no point in denying that Humpty’s utterance meant
what he intended. Wheeler argues for this conclusion as follows:
[Even] if Humpty was deluded about his audience, and had some
unusual correlation in mind –  for instance, that in his favourite novel,
“glory”  occurred in the same position as “knockdown argument”  but
on a verso of the page, and this seemed to Humpty something
everyone would notice –  then we could say that Humpty’s
communication attempt was meaningful, but unsuccessful.191
Although the attempt to communicate was in this case unsuccessful, this does not deprive
Humpty’s  utterance  from  the  meaning  he  intended  it  have,  for  in  the  case  imagined  by
191 Wheeler (2003, 201).
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Wheeler, Humpty’s linguistic behavior can be said to have conformed to the requirement of
interpretability.
The important conclusion this discussion implies is that for Humpty to succeed in making
“knockdown argument”  mean “glory”  requires no transformations either in linguistic
conventions or in the natural and logical limits the language involves. It may only require a
transformation on some particular, individual and perhaps unique feature on the basis of
which the intended meaning may be considered reasonable, encompassing such elements that
are perhaps shared only by those who make up the linguistic situation in which a particular
novel meaning for an old linguistic item is intended. It is precisely this aspect involved in
Davidson’s  analysis  of  the  case  of  Humpty  Dumpty  which  sets  it  apart  from  the  replies
offered by Carroll and Livingston respectively.
The way in which Davidson’s account of the relationship between conventions and
meaning departs from the analyses offered by Livingston and Carroll may be further
illuminated by observing certain factors coming up in those texts by Davidson, in which the
problems of literary language and interpretation are explicitly considered. Given the way in
which his later philosophy of language functions in the background of the ideas Davidson
puts forward in these texts, it is not surprising that Davidson does not see a substantial
discontinuity between literary language and ordinary uses of language. Both are characterized
by the specific kind of dialectics between prior and passing theory presented previously in this
chapter, the only difference being that the distances between the different points of the
interaction are lengthened. That is, while in ordinary discourse speakers are able to form a
picture of how their interlocutors are prepared to interpret their utterances relatively easily,
authors can only make more or less accurate hunches about how their readers are equipped to
interpret. Nevertheless, the differences between the two ways of using language are more
matters of degree than of kind.
Most importantly for my purposes, Davidson maintains that the requirement of
interpretability must have a force in the case of literature similar to the one he assumes it has
in the case of more mundane uses of language. Since “we cannot intend what we know to be
impossible,”  literary uses of language require a specific kind of interaction between the author
and reader.192 Authors cannot ignore how their readers are prepared to interpret their
utterances, for the intention to mean something must be formed through the possibility that it
can be interpreted in the intended way. Moreover, since the reasonableness of the intended
meaning, and its success thereof, involves this kind of relationship to the reader’s prospects of
understanding, intending a specific, novel meaning for a familiar utterance or inventing a
completely new one can be a highly fine-grained and delicate process. That is, its success
requires  that  the  author  has  the  ability  to  create  the  kind  of  stage  setting  against  which  the
reader can recognize the intended meaning. Otherwise, the attempt at novelty falls short. The
192 Davidson (2005/1989, 147).
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discussion  above,  however,  implies  that  reference  to  conventions  or  to  some  other  sorts  of
limits with a specified content cannot inexhaustibly explain what this sort of reasonability
ultimately involves.
The decisive factors serving to separate Davidson’s views from those of Livingston’s and
Carroll’s emerge well from Davidson’s example concerning the prose of James Joyce. For
Davidson, Joyce is a primary example of what the interaction between author and reader can,
in the end, involve. Davidson writes:
Joyce draws on every resource his readers command (or that he
hopes they command, or thinks they should command), every
linguistic resource, knowledge of history, geography, past writers,
and  styles.  He  forces  us  both  to  look  at  and  listen  to  his  words  to
find the puns and fathom the references.193
Davidson, in fact, draws a connection between James Joyce and the case of Humpty
Dumpty. Since Humpty tried to form novel meanings for familiar utterances, he resembles
Joyce in this respect. However, while they both sought to be innovators of language, only
Joyce succeeded. This is because unlike the latter, Joyce gave subtle, often hard to crack clues
as  to  how  his  utterances  should  be  interpreted.  Humpty,  on  the  other  hand,  was  an
unsuccessful innovator, because he did not provide the required clues. He was not an
innovator because his utterances were not, ultimately, meaningful language. But, “it’s clear
that when Joyce was flying by the net of language, he did not intend to leave us entangled.”194
As the longer quote from Davidson shows, the disentanglement from the web weaved by
Joyce can involve highly delicate and unique pieces of knowledge. However, since these clues
are hard to dig up “as much is demanded from the reader as of the author.”  “By fragmentating
familiar languages and recycling the raw material Joyce provokes the reader into involuntary
collaboration….”195
Joyce’s works shoot us into a “verbal exile,”  but if it is accepted that the result of the
collaboration is meaningful language, it is strange what Livingston means by his contention
that the intention has to be “in natural and logical limits.”  Is Joyce’s language in these limits?
And if it is, what does this mean? On what is the assessment of naturalness and logicalness
based? But it is even more likely that Carroll’s insistence on the Humpty Dumpty case cannot
be an adequate one because if we believe Davidson, the reason why Humpty could not have
meant what he intended was not the reason given by Carroll. Conventions do not play an
indispensable role in judgments concerning the success of intentions, but rather that process
may ultimately involve such unique features not accounted for by the sorts of features
invoked by Carroll and Livingston respectively.
193 Ibid.
194 Ibid. (153).
195 Ibid. (156-157).
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Now, if the problem of Humpty Dumpty truly occupies the kind of place within the
intentionalist debate currently carried out in analytic aesthetics as was suggested above,
Davidson’s ability to embrace that case in a more satisfactory way than the foremost modest
intentionalists are able to can be seen to have some interesting impacts not only on that
discussion, but on analytic philosophy of interpretation in general. If Davidson provides the
most convincing account of how to accommodate the case of Humpty Dumpty to the modest
intentionalist position, it seems that it is worth exploring whether Davidson’s views can make
an even more wide-ranging contribution to this approach to interpretation. In the brief last
section of this chapter, I shall draw attention to another aspect of Davidson’s philosophy,
which, in my view, proves valuable for an intentionalist theory of interpretation.
3. Conclusions: Why Davidson?
Given how important a role modest intentionalists ascribe to authorial intention in
interpretation, it is strange to observe how seldom they have tried to analyze that mental
phenomenon in more detail. Rather, modest intentionalists usually back up their views on
interpretation only with such brief comments as “an intention is made up of beliefs and
desires,”196 and that they are “psychological states having both a representational and an
attitudinal dimension.”197 Intentions have also been considered to be “mental states having
semantic contents, various psychological functions, and practical consequences.”198
Davidson’s views prove valuable for the modest intentionalist position for it provides a
whole new framework in which to consider the author’s intentions. That is, the holistic view
of human mentality which underlie various parts of Davidson’s work and which he was
considered to have gradually developed into a full-fledged account of the relationship
between mind and world in the previous parts of this chapter. While it is hard to disagree
with the formulations with which modest intentionalists have described intentions, the
framework they provide, nevertheless, falls short of the framework in which Davidson’s
holism  inserts  intention  into  and  the  issues  it  allows  the  question  regarding  the  role  of
authorial intentions in interpretation to be connected with.
On a basic level, the novel supplementation which holism provides for an intentionalist
outlook on interpretation is that it indicates the way intentions are intertwined with other
mental states and propositional attitudes of an agent. That is, holism maintains that there are
“no beliefs without many related beliefs, no beliefs without desires, no desires without
196 Carroll (2001/1992, 176).
197 Livingston (1996, 619).
198 Livingston (1998, 831). Livingston (2005, chapter 1) is one notable exception.
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beliefs, no intentions without both beliefs and desires.”199  Now,  the  reason  why I  believe
this aspect of Davidson’s views is significant for the modest intentionalist position on
interpretation is that it reveals how many influential criticisms of intentionalism rest on some
sturdy and wrong-headed prejudices about this mental phenomenon. This is, to my mind,
especially the case with hermeneutic criticisms of that interpretive position which I shall
consider in the following chapter.
That Davidson’s holism may make precisely this kind of contribution to the philosophy
of interpretation has not escaped everybody’s notice. Samuel Wheeler, for example,
maintains that the decisive difference between the intentionalism involved in E.D. Hirsch’s
literary theory and in Davidson’s views is that the holistic conception of the mind formulated
by Davidson is an essential element of the more general theory of interpretation and
understanding offered by him. Wheeler locates the significance of this view in the same
place  as  I  did  above.  That  is,  for  Wheeler  the  view  of  intention  involved  in  Davidson’s
account implies that it is wrong to construe this mental phenomenon as a “logoi,”  a phrase
Wheeler adopts from contemporary French philosophy, which is assumed to be something
lying behind words and other mental states and to which other people have no assured and
direct access. Holism challenges this view by maintaining that intentions are “ascribed along
with beliefs, desires, and meanings of utterances,”  which emphasizes the impossibility of
explicating the content of one mental state without reference to others and the way “no one
notion is the bedrock from which the other notions are constructed or understood.”200
While most current intentionalists of any bent have sought to distance themselves from
Hirsch, they have not done so in relation to the difference invoked by Wheeler. The
criticisms contemporary intentionalists have addressed to Hirsch have concerned the way in
which the relationship between meaning and intention is drawn in his theory. In fact, the
criticism that has appeared has been strangely conflictive; for some Hirsch’s intentionalism
is too extreme, while for others it is not extreme enough. In other words, Hirsch is either seen
not to leave enough room for the distinction between what was intended and what the work
ends up meaning or to leave too much room between the two.201
Nevertheless, the important thing for my argument is that the ultimate relevance of the
difference drawn attention to by Wheeler for the intentionalist position has not been
extensively investigated. This is what I intend to do in the two following chapters. There the
prospects of a form of intentionalism drawing on Davidson’s holism are weighed in relation
to the intentionalist skepticisms Hans-Georg Gadamer’s hermeneutics and Richard Rorty’s
work on interpretation and on the place of literature in our contemporary world embody. It is
my belief that precisely the form of intentionalism built upon Davidson’s views on language
199 Davidson (2001, 126).
200 Wheeler (2003, 189).
201 Criticism of the former kind see Tolhurst (1979), Levinson (1996), and for the latter see Juhl (1980), Knapp
& Michaels (1985), Irwin (1999).
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and mind manages to serve as a highly convincing response to the critical tone the work of
these two philosophers have taken towards intentionalist accounts of interpretation, and this
is in part due to the holistic outlook on the human mind and interpretation Davidson
provides.
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What is characteristic of philosophy is
the piercing of that dead crust of tradition
and convention, the breaking of those fetters
which bind us to inherited preconceptions,
so as to attain a new and broader way of looking at things.
Waismann “How I see Philosophy”  (1956)
III Understanding Meaning, Experiencing Significance:
Towards a Critique of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s
Hermeneutics
E.D. Hirsch’s position within literary theory and philosophy of interpretation is hardly
enviable. From the account of the current intentionalist debate of analytic aesthetics presented
at the end of the previous chapter, it becomes apparent that most of the intentionalist theories
currently supported in it are formulated as a critical response to Hirsch’s views. In
contemporary hermeneutics the critical tone towards Hirsch’s theory has, in turn, been even
stronger. While especially modest intentionalists in analytic aesthetics agree with Hirsch’s
main theoretical point regarding the position of the author’s intentions in interpretation,
followers of Hans-Georg Gadamer’s thinking tend to adopt a much more unfavorable attitude
towards his theory and the ideas it supports.202
The disapproving tone characterizing the relationship of Gadamer’s followers to Hirsch’s
literary theory may be connected with the transformation philosophical hermeneutics has been
considered to have undergone especially due to the influence that Gadamer’s views have had
on the development of this tradition. While hermeneutists working in the age of Romanticism
took as their goal the formation of rigorous methodological procedures with which to ground
the objectivity of the human sciences, Gadamer, following his teacher Martin Heidegger,
insisted that this aim concealed much more fundamental questions. For these two,
hermeneutics was not primarily a methodological discipline. Instead, it concerned the
conditions of understanding as such; that is, in their hands hermeneutics became a discipline
that sought to uncover the conditional factors lying beneath the individual acts interpreters
take. The reason why the readdressing of the focus of hermeneutics apparent in Gadamer’s
approach has been considered so fundamental is that the factors drawn attention to in it, such
as the historically conditioned nature of our understanding, by no means leave the
methodological approach unaffected, but, ultimately, undermine its foundations, for example
by challenging the view of meaning the methodological school assumes.203 Hirsch was
202 For example, Richard Palmer writes that “the ease with which Hirsch ignores the implications of
understanding theory and philosophy of language suggests that the specialization he proposes for hermeneutics is
inadvisable”  (1969, 63-65). My italics.
203 For example, Gadamer himself considers Heidegger’s work “a decisive turning point”  in hermeneutic theory.
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primarily concerned with questions related to the grounds of validity in understanding similar
to those Schleiermacher and Dilthey were preoccupied with. As a consequence his approach
to hermeneutics was considered to be in danger of turning the hands of hermeneutics back in
time to Romanticism, from whose untenable tenets Gadamer was simultaneously seen to
redeem the discipline.204
Another factor that could explain the unsympathetic character of the relationship
contemporary hermeneutists have adopted towards Hirsch’s literary theory is that it includes
as an essential element a substantial critique of Gadamer’s hermeneutics. In 1965, Hirsch
published a review of Gadamer’s magnum opus Wahrheit und Methode in The Review of
Metaphysics, which was perhaps among the first of its kind in English. There he presents a
detailed account of Gadamer’s work, criticizing it, for example, for failing to deal with the
problem of the grounds of validity in interpretation in a successful manner and for
overlooking a crucial distinction between the meaning and significance of a work.
Both  criticisms  are  related  to  the  central  tenets  of  Hirsch’s  own  literary  theory.  His
primary interest concerns the validity of interpretations, that is, what could serve as a standard
against which the comparative validity of different interpretations may be assessed. Hirsch
finds the question of validity particularly important for he believes that the very
meaningfulness of criticism and interpretation rests on the assumption that a comparative
judgment between different interpretations is possible. As noted in the introduction, Hirsch
thinks that his period was characterized by “a heavy and largely victorious assault on the
sensible belief that a text means what its author meant.”  While Hirsch considers it “a task for
the historian of culture”  to uncover the reasons that led to this situation,205 from a more
theoretical point of view it meant that the question regarding the grounds of validity was no
longer considered a pressing one. This is because “once the author had been ruthlessly
banished as the determiner of his text’s meaning, it very gradually appeared that no adequate
principle existed for judging the validity of an interpretation.”206 For  Hirsch,  this  change  in
attitude had especially burning implications, for, as we saw, in his opinion, without any kind
of sense of what the validity of interpretations ultimately amounts to, the very meaningfulness
of interpretation is in danger of being undercut.207
Hirsch singles out Gadamer’s theory as a prime example of an approach to interpretation
that is incapable of accounting for the issue of validity in a successful manner. By denying
that the meaning of a work could exhibit any kind of determinacy or permanency,208 Hirsch
believes that Gadamer is unable to provide a firm enough principle for comparing and
Wahrheit und Methode with the abbreviation TM, and to the German edition I have used with WM. See also
Palmer (1969, 33-34, 64-65), Warnke (1987, 1-3).
204 Palmer (1969, 46-47).
205 Hirsch (1967, 1).
206 Ibid. (3).
207 Ibid. (26).
208 TM, 296; WM, 280.
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assessing the validity of different, possibly conflicting interpretations. Thus, Gadamer’s views
are ultimately at variance with the factors on which the meaningfulness of interpretation, in
Hirsch’s opinion, rest.209
In the second case, Hirsch claims that Gadamer’s theory is plagued by a conceptual
confusion. This is the distinction between meaning and significance that is of the utmost
importance for Hirsch.210 He explains this difference as follows:
Meaning is that which is represented by a text; it is what the author
meant  by  his  use  of  a  particular  sign  sequence;  it  is  what  the  signs
represent. Significance, on the other hand, names a relationship
between that meaning and a person, or a conception, or a situation, or
indeed anything imaginable.211
In other words, when Gadamer describes understanding as a process where the horizons of the
text and that of the interpreter fuse he should not, in Hirsch’s opinion, have drawn the
conclusion that as a result of this activity the meaning of the text under interpretation is
inevitably transformed, but that rather this transformation concerns its significance. For
Hirsch, meaning is determined by the author’s intentions, and is thus permanent, while the
significance of the text is essentially “boundless,”  changing as different relationships to that
meaning are formed.212 In  Hirsch’s  opinion,  “failure  to  consider  this  simple  and  essential
distinction has been the source of enormous confusion in hermeneutic theory.”213
Now, there are two reasons why I have decided to take up Hirsch’s criticism of Gadamer
in this thesis. The first is that Gadamer’s theory is one of the most powerful criticisms of the
approach to understanding and interpretation this study in general defends, that is,
intentionalism. It should thus be included in any work that tries to defend an intentionalist
approach to interpretation in as substantial a manner as I attempt to do here. Hirsch’s literary
theory has also been the main representative of an intentionalist approach to interpretation and
understanding against which some contemporary hermeneutists have formulated their critical
stance towards intentionalist views.
The second reason for choosing Hirsch’s criticism as a touchstone from which Gadamer’s
hermeneutics is approached in this chapter is simple: it is my belief that Hirsch’s criticism is
mostly insightful, and that it manages to uncover real problems in Gadamer’s hermeneutics.
However, rather than recapitulating the points Hirsch’s criticism makes, the strength of
Gadamer’s theory will be considered by investigating the critical replies Gadamer’s followers
and commentators have presented to Hirsch’s criticism. These are introduced in the first
section, while in the two sections following it, these replies are first connected with a
fundamental element of Gadamer’s hermeneutics, the concept of play, and they are then
209 Hirsch (1967, 249-254).
210 Ibid. (255).
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assessed in relation to a concrete example, Thomas Adés’ America: A Prophecy. The reason
why this particular piece of music serves as an illuminating example for assessing Gadamer’s
views on the conditions of understanding, as well as the replies his followers have made to
Hirsch’s  criticism,  is  that  it  is  a  work  on  which  history  has  had  a  fundamental  effect.  The
question that becomes relevant with regard to the strength of Gadamer’s position is whether
that effect should also be considered to condition our understanding of the piece in a way that
it is irreversibly transformed. The question concerning the accuracy of Gadamer’s analysis of
the conditions of understanding is addressed in the two following sections as well, however,
this time from different angles. In these sections a critical conclusion will be presented similar
to the one emerging from the analysis of Adés’ America offered. Our understanding should
not be considered to be historically conditioned in the way Gadamer and his followers have
presumed.
This conclusion is an important element in the defense of intentionalism which emerges
through the critical discussion of Gadamer’s views in this chapter. This is because, as the
replies made by Hirsch’s critics show, the claim that our understanding is historically
structured in the way Gadamer’s hermeneutics depicts has served as the foundational premise
of the criticism hermeneutics in general has addressed to intentionalist views of interpretation.
This interrelatedness between the two issues implies that the criticism of intentionalism
hermeneutics involves becomes weaker the less convincing Gadamer’s account of
understanding can be shown to be, and this is something I attempt to demonstrate in the first
parts of this chapter. Although one might succeed in undermining this part of Gadamer’s
hermeneutics, one obstacle, nevertheless, remains in place. It seems that another reason why
intentionalist approaches to interpretation have not found their supporters within
contemporary hermeneutics is because that view is still tightly associated in the minds of
hermeneutists taking their inspiration from Gadamer’s work with forms of hermeneutics
reigning at the age of Romanticism and with their “pantheistic”  undercurrents.214
The critical account of Gadamer’s hermeneutics presented in the first parts of this chapter
will not draw extensively on Donald Davidson’s views, that account being more based on an
elaboration of Hirsch’s criticism of Gadamer. However, the holistic view of meaning and
interpretation provided in Davidson’s later texts will be highly relevant for the concluding
parts of this chapter, where I discuss the assumptions hermeneutists have assumed that
intentionalist approaches to interpretation involve. It is my belief that the connection between
holism and intentionalism which may be drawn on the basis of Davidson’s work reveals some
decisive shortcomings in the critical stance towards intentionalism which underlies a large
part of hermeneutics. To introduce Davidson’s views to the context of hermeneutics is
nothing new, for there is a growing literature where parts of Davidson’s work, such as the
rationality assumptions involved in the principle of charity and the dialogical character of
214 TM, 337, WM, 324.
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understanding, are connected with Gadamer’s views on similar topics.215 In time Davidson in
particular came to acknowledge the affinities between his views and those of Gadamer.216
Yet, in this literature the relevance of Davidson’s views concerning the role of authorial
intention in interpretation has not been considered that thoroughly. This omission is
particularly significant, for it is my belief that an intentionalist theory built on the view of the
human mind inherent in Davidson’s texts manages to overcome precisely those problematic
assumptions some contemporary hermeneutists have thought intentionalist approaches to
interpretation involve.
1. Hermeneutic Replies to E.D. Hirsch’s Criticism of Gadamer’s
Hermeneutics
The critical responses made by Gadamer’s followers and commentators to Hirsch’s criticism
have taken two forms. The first aims to question its validity by pointing out certain
insufficiencies  in  Hirsch’s  interpretation  of  Gadamer,  while  the  second  argues  that  it  is  not
Hirsch’s theory that succeeds in uncovering problems in Gadamer’s theory, but rather the
other way around.
As noted above, Gadamer’s hermeneutics tries to distance itself from the romantic
hermeneutics of Friedrich Schleiermacher and Wilhelm Dilthey that were concerned with
establishing a methodological foundation for the human and interpretive sciences. Although
Gadamer does see a kind of “narrowness”  in the attempt to construct methodological
principles for interpretation, he does not find the endeavor wholly pointless.217 Gadamer’s
argument is rather that too much focus on methodological questions with regard to the human
sciences runs the risk of concealing more fundamental questions related to interpretation and
understanding that need to be reflected upon.218
This demand for opening up a new approach to interpretation and understanding has its
origin in the effect that Heidegger’s thinking had on Gadamer’s approach to interpretation and
understanding. For one thing, Heidegger criticizes hermeneutical theories that are concerned
with methodological questions. Interpretation and understanding should not be primarily
viewed as particular acts that people take towards objects possessing meaning, as
methodological approaches assume. Rather, the task of hermeneutics, as Heidegger sees it, is
to reveal the way in which interpretation and understanding are much more fundamental
elements of the being-in-the-world of human beings.219
215 Föllesdal (1979); Ramberg (1989, 138-142), Taylor (2002); McDowell (2002); Malpas (2002); Ramberg
(2003), Brandom (2004); Child (2006).
216 Davidson (2005/1997).
217 TM, 16, 158-159; WM, 15, 158-159. Compare Palmer (1969, 67, 164).
218 TM, xxv-xvii; WM, xv-xix,
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This is a component of Heidegger’s work that Gadamer’s hermeneutics seeks to expand
and what, ultimately, has been seen to set it apart from methodological accounts of
hermeneutics.220 That is, its primary goal is to reveal the ontological conditions of
understanding, what makes individual acts of understanding possible and what thus precedes
every such individual act.
Gadamer’s way of readdressing the focus of hermeneutics is precisely that feature of
Gadamer’s thinking which Hirsch has been considered to have overlooked. Drawing attention
to this kind of insufficiency in Hirsch’s criticism is especially important for Richard Palmer’s
response. According to him, by focusing on establishing norms for valid interpretation, and by
addressing Gadamer’s views from this viewpoint, Hirsch precisely fails to notice that he is not
concerned with the same question, which is important for the strand of hermeneutics taking its
inspiration from Heidegger and Gadamer. This misapprehension is one of the reasons why
Hirsch’s criticism ultimately falls short. That is, Hirsch’s critical points are off the mark, for
they approach Gadamer’s theory in false terms.221
In a letter to Emilio Betti, who raises critical points against Gadamer’s theory similar to
those  Hirsch  puts  an  emphasis  on,  Gadamer  replies  that  his  hermeneutics  is  not  concerned
with finding a method with which the validity and objectivity of interpretation may be
assured, but to “describe what is.”222 Here, Gadamer makes the same claim against Betti that
Palmer addresses to Hirsch. Because the leading theme of Gadamer’s work is not concerned
with  the  problem  of  validity  at  all,  it  is  erroneous  to  approach  Gadamer’s  theory  from  this
angle. Joel Weinsheimer makes similar points with respect to the status of Hirsch’s criticism
as well. He summarizes its drawbacks by saying that because of the differences characterizing
the respective concerns of Gadamer and Hirsch, Gadamer’s philosophical hermeneutics is left
“untouched”  by the latter’s critical points.223
The replies to Hirsch’s criticism also raise some important theoretical issues for
consideration. Gadamer’s followers and commentators are not merely satisfied with pointing
out  that  Hirsch  ends  up  barking  up  the  wrong  tree.  They  also  argue  that  the  aspect  of
Gadamer’s project which Hirsch overlooks undermines the possibility of establishing validity
on the kind of foundation Hirsch’s theory seeks. In particular, it calls into question the idea
that the meaning of a text could be as determinate as Hirsch’s intentionalism assumes. As
Gadamer emphasizes, understanding never happens in a vacuum, but always against the
backdrop of a certain tradition and historical setting. This backdrop forms the horizon for
understanding, that is, the basis where it begins, as well as underdetermining the course it can
ultimately take. The meaning of a text cannot possess such determinacy as is presumed in
Hirsch’s literary theory, for that meaning cannot be determined in isolation from the setting
220 Palmer (1969, 42).
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the interpreter inhabits. Rather, the effect tradition and history has had on the interpreter’s
consciousness forms the horizon through which the meaning of the text under interpretation is
determined. As Gadamer himself explains, “not just occasionally but always, the meaning of a
text goes beyond its author. That is why understanding is not merely a reproductive but
always productive activity as well.”224
The mistakes allegedly inherent in Hirsch’s criticism of Gadamer also indicate the
relationship which has been seen to hold between the different forms of hermeneutics. Palmer
thinks, for example, that there is no reason why the different forms of hermeneutics could not
be thought to bring “to light different, but legitimate sides of the act of interpretation.”
Moreover, the factors uncovered by the ontological approach, such as the historically
conditioned nature of understanding, have been widely considered to call into question
various assumptions that the methodological approach rests on, such as the view of meaning it
involves, Gadamer himself argues that with Heidegger “the whole idea of grounding itself
underwent a total reversal.”225
The second response to Hirsch’s theory concerns the distinction between the meaning and
significance of a text. Gadamer’s emphasis on the historical nature of understanding yet again
serves as a starting point for this response. Georgia Warnke has in particular considered the
implications that Gadamer’s account has for the distinction Hirsch claims Gadamer has
overlooked. She turns the issue upside down. The fact that Gadamer’s hermeneutics does not
involve a distinction between meaning and significance should not be considered a drawback
of the theory. Rather, when approached through the emphasis that Gadamer lays on the
historical nature of understanding, it is Hirsch’s theory and the distinction it involves which is
called into question. As Warnke puts it, “it is important to note here that Gadamer’s position
does not merely overlook a distinction between understanding meaning and understanding
significance; it denies one. On his view, we understand the meaning of a text, work of art,
historical event only in relation to our own situation…. In other words we understand it only
in light of its significance….”226
As an example to defend the claim that the distinction between meaning and significance
cannot, indeed, be sustained, Warnke draws attention to the differences in the reception of
Huckleberry Finn between readers in Twain’s time and readers today. She argues that because
of the growth in awareness of sexual minorities and racial stereotyping since Twain’s time,
present-day readers are bound to be more struck than readers of earlier times by certain
features of the work related to these issues, such as the homosexual features apparent in the
relationship between Jim and Huck depicted in the novel.227 Because those elements that
emerge from the work for the reader to consider have changed over time, the work will also
224 TM, 296; WM, 280.
225 TM, 247; WM, 243.
226 Warnke (1987, 68). Italics Warnke.
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be understood differently due to this change in horizon through which the work is approached.
It  is  precisely  due  to  this  sort  of  transformation  in  readers’  conceptual  powers  that  the
meaning of the work can only be understood through its significance, that is, the current
situation of the reader “enters into the interpretation of meaning itself… into what the work
‘really’  says.”228 In other words, the horizonal character of interpretation makes the
distinction between meaning and significance impossible to hold.
Now, the factors which come up in Warnke’s Gadamerian response to the distinction
between meaning and significance are the very same that are supposed to undermine the kind
of presumption of determinacy and objectivity that methodological and intentionalist
approaches to interpretation, such as the one offered by Hirsch, assume. Warnke summarizes
these as follows:
On this analysis, then, the understanding of a work of art involves
participation in its meaning…. Aesthetic experience, like historical
understanding, involves a mediation of meaning with one’s own
situation,  or  what  Gadamer  calls  a  “fusion  of  horizons”.  By  this  he
means  the  integration  of  one’s  understanding  of  a  text  or  historical
event with its relevance to one’s own circumstances in such a way that
an ‘original’  or ‘intended’  meaning cannot be differentiated from the
meaning of the text or event for oneself. The meaning an object has it
has as a fusion of the interpreter’s perspective and the object.229
The  problems  in  Hirsch’s  criticism  are  in  the  end  twofold.  Firstly,  it  suffers  from  a
misguided understanding of the character of Gadamer’s hermeneutic project. Secondly,
because of this oversight, Hirsch also fails to apprehend how significant a challenge the
readdressing of the focus of hermeneutics apparent in Gadamer’s approach sets for his own
literary theory and for any account, for that matter, highlighting the role of the author’s
intentions in interpretation.
2. Spiel, Erfahrung, and the Conditions of Understanding
A peculiar thing worth noting in the responses Gadamer’s followers and commentators have
made to Hirsch’s criticism is that in a way they stack the cards against Hirsch. It is of course
true that if Gadamer’s account of the conditions of understanding is accurate, not only
Hirsch’s criticism of Gadamer is undermined, but the fundamentals of his own literary theory
as well. The question regarding the truthfulness of the analysis of understanding Gadamer’s
hermeneutics involves, however, still remains undecided. For example, Hirsch himself does
not share the kind of emphasis that is laid on the historical nature of understanding by
Gadamer. Hirsch, in fact, claims that that view “contains inner conflicts and inconsistencies”
228 Ibid.
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which none of the “masters”  preceding Gadamer “would have allowed to pass into print.”230
For Hirsch, “the doctrine of radical historicity is ultimately a dogma, an idea of reason, an act
of faith.”231
The account of Thomas Adés’ America: A Prophecy presented in the third section of this
chapter will be the first of three reflections which are intended to support Hirsch’s
assessement of the problems troubling Gadamer’s account of understanding. In this part, the
basis especially for this first critical investigation will be laid by raising another fundamental
element  of  Gadamer’s  theory,  the  concept  of  play,  with  a  focus  on  how  that  part  of  his
hermeneutics is connected with the analysis of understanding it involves. For example,
Flemming Lebech situates the analysis of the experience of art  as a form of play offered by
Gadamer at the very heart of Gadamer’s thinking. In his opinion, it “not only grounds
Gadamer’s concept of experience; it is also one of the most important preconditions for his
conception of the principle of the history of effect…. Thus, if one misunderstands the concept
of play, one runs the risk of misunderstanding not only Gadamer’s concept of historicity, but
also his concept of subject.”232
Both Gadamer’s concept of experience to which he refers with the German term
Erfahrung and his principle of the history of effect belong to the most important ideas with
which he seeks to track the conditions of our understanding. The way these are connected to
Gadamer’s concept of play by Lebech suggests that through a more careful analysis of the
structural similarities which Gadamer sees obtaining between the experience of art and
playing it is possible to achieve a more detailed picture of how the conditions of
understanding are, according to Gadamer, formed.
Gadamer’s motivation for describing the experience of art as a form of play stems from
his critique of an approach to art which he thinks is dominated by an attitude of “aesthetic
consciousness,”  and which he finds unable to embrace certain features important for the
experience of art. Gadamer claims that the dreariness of this approach follows from the
subjectivist elements it involves which, ultimately, disconnects a work from everything in
which that work “is rooted.”233 Gadamer continues, “it practically defines aesthetic
consciousness to say that it differentiates what is aesthetically intended from everything that is
outside the aesthetic sphere…. The sovereignty of aesthetic consciousness consists in its
capacity to make this aesthetic differentiation everywhere and to see everything
aesthetically.”234 Gadamer’s reason for finding this approach to art unsatisfactory is that it
fails to account for “the historical nature of the human condition,”  as well as for the “binding
quality of the experience (Erfahrung) of art”  in which “we learn to understand ourselves”  and
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in which “the discontinuity and atomism of isolated experiences”  is sublated “in the
continuity of our own existence.”235
In place of this attitude that Gadamer finds typical for theories of art reigning in his time,
he offers an analysis in which the experience of art is seen to have a similar structure to play.
What Gadamer finds especially fruitful in this analogy is that it manages to overcome the
subjective implications the approach to art guided by aesthetic consciousness falls into. It
might initially seem that a comparison to play does not appear to be the most adequate way to
overcome the subjective elements of aesthetic experience, for the concept of play carries with
it  connotations  of  an  active  subject,  that  is,  somebody  plays  with  something  or  something.
Gadamer thinks that a more detailed phenomenological account of playing, however, reveals
that this alleged subjectivist nature of play turns out to be an illusion. That is, once we have
grasped the specific way in which play exists independently of the consciousnesses of those
who play it, we will also have arrived at a more satisfactory account of  “the mode of being of
the  work  of  art  itself”  than  a  framework  dominated  by  aesthetic  consciousness  is  able  to
provide.236
In Gadamer’s opinion, those who are engaged in play are not the real subjects of play, but
“play has its own essence, independent of the consciousness of those who play.”237 Rather,
the actions taken by individual players during the course of play make up the process through
which play reaches presentation.238 Gadamer thinks that the essential features of play may be
uncovered by observing how the concept of play is metaphorically used in different contexts.
For example, we speak of the play of light and the play of waves. What Gadamer thinks unites
these metaphorical uses is a particular “to-and-fro movement”  that “renews itself in constant
repetition.”  For Gadamer, this linguistic observation serves as “an indirect indication that play
is  not  to  be  understood  as  something  a  person  does… the  actual  subject  of  the  play  is
obviously not the subjectivity of the individual… but the play itself.”239
While it is indeed necessary in order to make play wholly play that the player approaches
it with an attitude of seriousness, thus requiring an element of subjectivity, ultimately, “the
structure of play absorbs the player into itself, and thus frees him from the burden of taking
the initiative….”240 The to-and-fro movement that Gadamer regards as essential for play
defines  the  “spirit”  of  each  particular  act  of  play  that  is  in  turn  embodied  differently  in  the
case  of  different  acts  of  play.  In  other  words,  the  rules  of  a  particular  play,  as  well  as  the
actions of one’s opponents and playmates creates a space in which play happens, and which
determine a field of possible actions for the player to undertake. Precisely in this respect play
exists independently of the consciousnesses of those who play it, that independence
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simultaneously indicating the specific primacy play has over its players. For Gadamer, the
ultimate implication of this primacy is that “whoever ‘tries’  is in fact the one who is tried. The
real subject of the game… is not the player but instead the game itself. What holds the player
in its spell, draws him into play, and keeps him there is the game itself.”241
Now, even though Gadamer does not come back to his analysis of the experience of art as
play in the rest of Truth and Method, it may, nevertheless, be seen to occupy a vital position
within his theory, as for example Lebech’s reading suggests. The ultimate position of the
concept of play within Gadamer’s hermeneutics is revealed by observing the way Gadamer
dissociates the concept of experience he favors, that is, Erfahrung, from another form to
which Gadamer refers with the German term Erlebnis. With the latter term Gadamer means
precisely that form of experience which shares some crucial features with experiences guided
by aesthetic consciousness, Gadamer, in fact, calling that approach “the aesthetics of
Erlebnis.”242 When Lebech claims that the concept of play “grounds Gadamer’s concept of
experience”  he is referring to the sense expressed by Erfahrung.  Now,  if  experience  in  the
sense of Erlebnis is  contrasted  with  that  form  of  experience  Gadamer  tries  to  capture  with
Erfahrung,  and  if  Gadamer’s  account  of  the  experience  of  art  as  play  is,  in  turn,  meant  to
overcome the aesthetics of Erlebnis dominated by aesthetic consciousness, then Erfahrung
and the concept of play indeed seem to become closely associated with each other. In
particular, it seems that Erfahrung is intended to draw attention to those aspects of experience
whose origins are found in the way tradition addresses the interpreter, and the concept of play
tries to track the structure of that effect.
The centrality of Erfahrung for Gadamer’s hermeneutics is also amongst those elements
of his theory that sets it apart from methodological approaches. Methodological forms of
hermeneutics,  in  Gadamer’s  opinion,  assume  tradition  and  the  effect  history  has  on  our
thinking to be a kind of obstacle that must be overcome so that interpretive objectivity may be
guaranteed. But Gadamer thinks, moreover, that this sort of approach to human sciences not
only overlooks the fact that the effect of history cannot be removed, but also that the attitude
embodied in methodological thinking fails to consider the way in which we, in actual fact, do
encounter tradition and the effect this encounter may in turn have on the course our
understanding takes. That is to say, methodological forms of hermeneutics “treat the problem
of understanding in a way that is far too one-sided,”  because they fail to account for the way
in which tradition addresses the interpreter.243 Gadamer continues: “The truth is that historical
understanding always implies that the tradition reaching us speaks into the present and must
be understood in this mediation –  indeed, as this mediation.”244 Thus, it is not a surprise that
241 TM, 107; WM, 101-102.
242 TM, 70; WM, 77.
243 TM, 309; WM, 294.
244 TM, 325; WM, 311. Italics Gadamer.
83
Gadamer claims that when analyzing historically effected consciousness, “we have to keep in
mind… [that] it has the structure of experience (Erfahrung).”245
Now, if the concept of play truly has the kind of relationship with Erfahrung as suggested
above, the analysis of the experience of art as a form of play offered by Gadamer may be seen
to illuminate the way in which Gadamer presumes experience and historically effected
consciousness to condition our understanding. Lebech’s reading of Gadamer’s theory yet
again offers support for this kind of construal, for he claims that “in the same way as the rules
of a game establish a field for the players, and provide instructions for the way in which they
may behave and act while playing… the history of effect establishes a field within which
historical individuals are orientated….”246 In other words, tradition and history open up a
space for the formation of understanding and interpretation, that space thus conditioning the
form understanding can ultimately take. Since these structuring elements have a primacy over
the consciousness of an individual interpreter, the position she occupies, as well as the
horizon through which her understanding is formed, has a structure similar to the one
characterizing the place the experiencer of art occupies in the case of Gadamer’s concept of
play.
3. Is Our Understanding Truly Historically Conditioned?
The connection between Gadamer’s concept of play and the analysis tracking the conditions
of understanding offered by him not only gives a more detailed picture of the problems
Hirsch’s  criticism  of  Gadamer  is  thought  to  involve,  but  it  also  brings  out  those  factors  of
Gadamer’s thinking which have challenged Hirsch’s literary theory. First, the concept of play
has a fundamental role within Gadamer’s hermeneutics. This indicates that its primary
concern is not to provide a detailed analysis of the grounds of validity, but to reveal the
structure of understanding and the origins and character of those elements which are involved
in its  formation. Second, the meaning of a text cannot possess the kind of determinacy as is
presumed by Hirsh. This is because that meaning cannot be construed independently of the
historical context the interpreter inhabits and the horizon of understanding that gets formed
through certain factors. It is the structure of these factors which Gadamer tries to capture with
his concept of play. This is also the reason why the kind of distinction between meaning and
significance offered by Hirsch cannot be sustained. In Georgia Warnke’s words, “the point is
that historical experience changes the meaning historical events can have for us. Such
experience is dialectical in Hegel’s sense in that both the object and our knowledge of it are
transformed….”247
245 TM, 341; WM, 329.
246 Lebech (2006, 230).
247 Warnke (1987, 27).
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In the three following sections,  I  shall  offer readings of certain phenomena which to my
mind undermine the view that our understanding is historically conditioned to the degree
Gadamer claims. While not lending direct support for an intentionalist approach to
interpretation, those critical investigations can, nevertheless, be seen to call for a
reconsideration of the position of intentionalism within hermeneutics. This is because the
historically conditioned nature of our understanding is not only a factor intentionalist theories
have been assumed to have overlooked, but acknowledging this feature as essential to our
understanding has been seen to undermine the kind of foundationalism apparent in
intentionalism. Now, if the analysis of understanding apparent in Gadamer’s hermeneutics
ultimately overemphasizes the role that history and tradition occupies in its formation, a
fundamental pillar of the hermeneutic criticism of intentionalism crumbles.
Understanding and Experiencing Thomas Adés’  America: A Prophecy after 9/11
Thomas Adés’ America: A Prophecy serves as a highly illuminating example by which to
examine the view of interpretation and understanding in Gadamer’s hermeneutics. It raises the
question of the relationship Gadamer draws between the model of play and the analysis of the
conditions of understanding offered by him. America is a work on which history has had a
deep effect. That is, the form the play between the hearer and the work nowadays takes is very
different from the form it took at the time of its premiere. It is my belief that a more detailed
analysis of America raises the question whether the transformations characterizing the to-and-
fro movement this play exhibits should be considered to have an effect on the conditions of
our understanding in the way Gadamer’s analysis implies.
Thomas Adés is among the foremost contemporary composers. Although still relatively
young, Adés has already achieved a high reputation and great success, ranging from a
commission for an opera from the Royal Opera House, to composing a work to celebrate the
beginning of Sir Simon Rattle’s tenure as the musical director of the Berlin Philharmonic.
Together with his activities as a conductor and as a pianist, it is expected that Adés will one
day to hold a position in British music life similar to the one Benjamin Britten once occupied.
At the end of the 1990s the New York Philharmonic Orchestra commissioned “messages
for the millennium”  from six contemporary composers, Adés among them. His contribution to
this project of exploring the future of mankind at the next millennium through musical means
was a piece called America: A Prophecy, composed for a large orchestra, chorus, and mezzo-
soprano soloist, and set to ancient Spanish and Mayan texts, the latter appearing in English
translations.
The piece is not that long, the recording conducted by the composer himself taking a little
over 15 minutes. The piece is in two movements, the first containing music “full of incident,
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full of violent contrasts”  that portray the conflict between the peaceful Mayan culture and the
Spanish invaders, while the shorter second movement can be viewed as an “elegiac coda”  to
the more extensive first movement, and to the clash between cultures depicted in it.
America begins with a “blissfully simple”  rotating pattern of notes played by the flutes
which serve as representations of Mayan music in the piece, although, in actual fact, no
Mayan music has survived to be quoted. Very soon, the whole orchestra joins in with violent
strikes from the wood wind, strings, and piano above which the brass play tense, scream-like
noises. After 17 bars, the orchestra falls silent and the soloist makes her first entry with a long
note “O my nation!”  The musical material introduced in the beginning is then repeated and
developed for some time with the soloist repeating her proclamation “O my nation! Prepare!”
The music, then, becomes more restful while the same rotating series of notes may be heard
on the flute as at the beginning set against a calm musical background created by the strings.
This music accompanies the soloist who tells about the coming enemies (the Spanish), and as
the music starts to gradually become nervous and violent she once more predicts that “they
will burn all the land”  and that the cities of the culture to be attacked will fall. The music is
transformed into a grandiose climax in which the whole orchestra takes part with musical
textures heard at the beginning battling against each other, eventually resulting in a
“hyperalive”  music. This music stands in stark contrast to the Mayan music of the beginning,
thus bringing out the different attitudes characteristic of the two cultures whose clash the
piece describes.
The beginning of the second movement is dominated by the soloist’s repeated lines “we
shall burn.”  Musically it is simpler compared to the music of the first movement. About three
minutes from the beginning of the movement the music rises to “a cataclysmic climax.”  After
this, the music slowly fades away with the mezzo-soprano soloist repeating a single sentence
“but know this, ash feels no pain.”  The piece ends with the “chilling of ember to ash in four
final chords.”248
It might still seem unclear what this description of America’s music has to contribute to an
assessment of Gadamer’s account of understanding, the above description perhaps just
indicating that describing music in words is one of the most difficult and even silliest things
one can do. However, the interesting thing about the piece with regard to Gadamer’s position
on understanding is really the text to which it is set. The thing is that it composes a story in
which a course of events is depicted that in significant respects resembles the terrorist attack
on the  Twin  Towers  of  the  World  Trade  Center  on  11  September  2001.  One  does  not  even
have to bend the text in any way to see the connection between the two. First  of all,  just  to
draw attention to some similarities, at the beginning of America it is told that the enemy
comes from the East, as was the case with 9/11 and they are, moreover, predicted to “burn all
248 Not being musically trained, I have had to rely on some external sources in the above account of Adés’  piece.
Besides my own experience, the description is derived from two sources in particular, Fox (2004) and Griffiths
(2004).
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the land”  and “all the sky,”  which will ultimately lead to the “fall”  of the cities of the culture
to be attacked. These predictions are followed by battle music marking the preparation of the
attack by the Spanish invaders that is set to the words “all the good soldiers who enlist in this
war do not seek for rest. If they emerge victorious their pay will be eternal glory in heaven.”
These lines bear an interesting similarity to 9/11, for the kind of after life promised for the
Spanish soldiers exhibits an assurance similar to the reported motivation for the terrorists who
crashed  the  abducted  airplanes  into  the  Twin  Towers.  In  the  second movement,  in  turn,  the
frightened soloist foresees that “we shall burn,”  and above the chilling of ember to ash with
which the piece ends, the chorus representing the invaders is heard singing “this is the victory
by which our faith conquers the world.”
Now, the intriguing connections between the text of America and 9/11 bring out the
reasons why the experience the piece elicits in a contemporary viewer has a different form
from the one characterizing the experience the piece gave rise to in its premiere. Those factors
which have acquired a role in structuring the hearer’s experience due to the terrorist attack
and the disconcerting situation to which the world has fallen mostly because of it could not
have shaped the character the premiere audience’s relationship to America took for the simple
reason that these historical events were still in the future. In Gadamer’s terms, the to-and-fro
movement which the play between the work and the hearer comprises has undergone a
significant change due to these historical events.
However, it seems that Gadamer’s views imply an even more fundamental consequence.
This is because if the model of play truly has such a relationship to Gadamer’s account of the
conditions of understanding as was suggested above, Gadamer could argue that these
historical events have altered the contemporary audience’s relationship to America so
extensively that they will inevitably understand the piece in a different way than its premiere
audience. Support for this sort of assessement may be found, for example, from his claim that
“every age has to understand a transmitted text in its own way.”249 If that truly is the case and
if  the  meaning  of  the  work is “always co-determined… by the historical situation of the
interpreter and hence by the totality of the objective course of history,”250 as Gadamer claims,
then given the effect that 9/11 has had on our situation, it is arguable that Gadamer would also
hold  the  conclusion  that  the  meaning  of America and our understanding of it has indeed
changed.
Some reflections on the case of America do not, however, lend support for this kind of
Gadamerian stance on the situation. While, for example, Christopher Fox acknowledges the
fact that after the terrorist attacks, the text of America “has come to seem horribly
prescient…,”  his approach to the piece does not imply that the objective course of history
would have coloured our relationship to the piece in a way that it would no longer be possible
to understand the piece, for example, in the way Adés intended. By writing that “Adés’
249 TM, 296; WM, 280. My italics.
250 Ibid.
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intention was not to foretell, [but] rather to remind the inhabitants of the USA that they were
not the first Americans, nor are they the only ones,”251 and by considering this an essential
element for the piece’s understanding, Fox’s approach does not seem to assume that the new
light to which 9/11 has put the text of America would in some ways have had an irreversible
effect on the horizon through which the piece and its text is nowadays understood.
America is not only a topical piece because of the connection between its text and 9/11,
but also because it addresses issues that are in many ways significant for our present
condition, none the least because of the terrorist attack itself. For example, in Paul Griffiths’
opinion, America has “to do with conflicts and balances between what is natural and
primitive,  elementary  and  what  is  highly  developed.  They  are  conflicts  that  involve  anyone
dancing to a beat delivered by electronic machines or worshipping a 2000 year-old god to
polyphony….”252 While Griffiths indeed thinks that a growth in the significance of America
has occurred as a result of changes in the factors which constitute our contemporary
condition, his approach too does not lend support for the view that due to this growth in
significance, the conditions of understanding America would have significantly changed. Like
Fox, he does acknowledge that America gained “unanticipated and disturbing actuality
precisely 22 months”  after its first performance. Yet, by claiming that the “prophetic
anxieties”  of the piece “are wider”  than those that immediately concern 9/11 and the
subsequent events it caused, his account of America does not support the conclusion that the
effect of 9/11 on the reception of America would have been so extensive that our
understanding of the piece would have undergone a substantial transformation.
The accounts of the case of America offered by Fox and Griffiths are important, for they
may both be used to undermine the view of the effect a Gadamerian position would arguably
hold  9/11  to  pose  on  the  interpreter’s  horizon.  They seem to  achieve  this  ultimately  in  two
ways. In their accounts the effect of history is in no way denied. On the contrary, both
Griffiths and Fox acknowledge that certain historical events have significantly changed the
character a contemporary listener’s relationship to America takes. The offered analyses,
however, simultaneously deny that these changes should be thought to extend to concern our
understanding  of  the  piece.  In  other  words,  they  offer  support  for  rejecting  the  kind  of
connection between the model of play and the factors conditioning our understanding
Lebech’s reading of Gadamer’s hermeneutics suggests. That is, every change occurring in the
field where the play between the hearer and work happens should not be taken to result in a
change in understanding.
Second, Fox’s and Griffith’s approaches to America call into question the Gadamerian
view on the role of the interpreter’s horizon in constructing the meaning of the piece. In both
accounts, it is assumed that such distinctions can be made which the Gadamerian position
does not allow room for. These distinctions especially concern the ways in which it is possible
251 Fox (2004).
252 Griffiths (2004, 6).
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for the work under interpretation to open up for the interpreter. A strict, but nevertheless often
heard formulation of the hermeneutic view on the conditions of understanding maintains that
the interpreter “cannot escape his own understanding.”253 At least in the case of America this
description contains a view in which history is ascribed too strong an effect on the horizon of
the interpreter and the course her understanding can take. The object of interpretation is not as
directly determined from the horizon of the interpreter as is assumed in this description.
Fox’s and Griffith’s accounts rather seem to lend support for making distinctions similar
to those Hirsch is trying to capture with his distinction between the meaning and significance
of  a  work.  Hirsch  in  no  way  denies  the  effect  of  history  and  the  possibility  of  change,  but
simply insists that that change should be thought to concern the significance of the piece, not
its meaning. Do not the changes characterizing a present relationship to America precisely
concern changes in its significance? That is, due to certain historical events, contemporary
audience’s relationship to the meaning of America has undergone a transformation, which in
turn explains differences in the significance America has for a contemporary audience and the
significance it had for the audience attending its premiere. The possibility for making the
distinction whose importance Hirsch emphasizes receives support from the fact that we can in
general explain why a change should have occurred in the significance of America.  Or  as
Hirsch himself puts it, “it is precisely because the meaning of the text is always the same that
its relationship to a different situation is a different relationship.”254 Does not the possibility
for this kind of explanation imply that there is something independent in the work which is
not determined by a contemporary interpreter’s horizon? The relationship that independent
element  has  to  the  historical  events  which  the  piece  owes  the  transformations  in  its
significance to, not only explains why that transformation took place, but also why the
significance  of  the  piece  underwent  the  kinds  of  transformations  it,  in  actual  fact,  did.  It  is
evident that the significance of America would nowadays be significantly different had 9/11
not taken place. This observation implies that it is in no way arbitrary what sort of
significance a given artwork may acquire. In other words, since it is possible to point out
those factors that explain the character America’s significance has nowadays taken, the
piece’s identity must be more independent of the interpreter’s horizon than the Gadamerian
analysis assumes. This conclusion in turn suggests that the distinction between meaning and
significance drawn by Hirsh is much more warranted than Gadamer’s commentators and
followers have thought.
This  is  the  first  step  in  the  more  substantial  criticism  of  Gadamer’s  account  of
understanding to be presented in this part of the chapter. That the distinction between meaning
and significance proposed by Hirsch can survive the criticism Gadamer’s followers have
addressed to it simultaneously undermines the view of understanding Gadamer’s
hermeneutics embodies, for that criticism is based on the assumption of the superiority of
253 Palmer (1969, 51).
254 Hirsch (1967, 255).
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Gadamer’s approach to hermeneutics over Hirsch’s. The core of the criticism emerging from
the case of America is that the model of play should not be thought to have the kind of
relationship to understanding Gadamer assumes. It may indeed be the case that history has a
deep effect on our encounters with artworks, but it is far from being clear that changes
occurring as a result of it should be considered to condition our understanding in the kind of
way the Gadamerian position assumes. However, other kinds of arguments have been
presented for the view of understanding Gadamer’s hermeneutics supports than those
appealing to the connection drawn between the model of play and the conditions of
understanding in it. I shall now turn to those arguments.
Art, Understanding, and the Modalities of History
While in the hermeneutic literature, the relevance of Gadamer’s account of history and
tradition has been primarily considered with regard to the question of understanding, in
Georgia Warnke’s opinion, it has some important consequences for a host of other issues. She
draws attention, for example, to the fact that Gadamer’s analysis on the historicity of human
nature does not merely pertain to the way the interpreter’s horizon is constructed, but it may
also be used to capture the constituent factors involved in an artist’s activity. That is, like the
interpreter, the artist’s activity is inherently contextual by nature, having its roots in history
and tradition in the sense that the past development of art forms a space in which an artist
works, providing opportunities for certain kinds of artistic choices, while making others
unattainable. Historical developments within the different arts pose a limit on the meanings
that works may embody at a certain time and place, as well as on the factors through which
their aesthetic character is formed. With this sort of view on the historicity of art as a basis
Warnke, for example, argues that the radical nature often attributed to much contemporary art
is partly an illusion. This is because the shocking character associated with some
contemporary pieces is dependent on the art preceding those pieces, these kinds of works
hence preserving a connection to past art after all. In other words, even though much
contemporary art strives to disconnect itself from the history of art it, nevertheless, remains
“part of the tradition since it depends upon the assumptions of the tradition for its effect.”255
Despite this different emphasis, Warnke nevertheless sees the conditional factors involved
in both activities to have a common origin. They are both good examples of what Gadamer
calls “effective history”  (Wirkungsgeschichte), that is, “the operative force of the tradition
over those that belong to it….”256 In  the  case  of  the  artist,  history  and  the  tradition  of  art
constitute a field for the artist in which she can pursue her artistic goals, while for the
255 Warnke (1987, 78).
256 Ibid.
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interpreter this embeddedness means that her approach to a particular work is conditioned by
the  tradition  which  she  belongs  to,  as  well  as  on  what  sorts  of  interpretations  of  the  work
under interpretation have been offered within that tradition.257
Warnke’s way of extending Gadamer’s notion of effective history reveals the ultimate
scope of this phenomenon. By doing so, the extension offered by her is simultaneously
intended to support the view of understanding Gadamer holds. That is, the more convincing
Warnke’s  observations  on  the  role  of  effective  history  in  forming  the  setting  for  an  artist’s
work  is  considered  to  be,  the  more  convinced  we should  become of  the  truth  of  Gadamer’s
analysis regarding understanding.
The problem with Warnke’s argument is not really that it contains an unconvincing
description  of  the  artist’s  activity.  On  the  contrary,  that  part  of  the  argument  seems  highly
plausible. Rather, the problem with Warnke’s way of drawing support for the Gadamerian
stance on interpretation is that there is not, in fact, the kind of connection between the issues
invoked in  it  as  the  argument  assumes,  that  is,  the  artist’s  activity  and  the  formation  of  the
interpreter’s horizon. One may, in other words, find Warnke’s account of the historical
conditions involved in the artist’s work wholly acceptable, without this in any way
committing one to the view that one’s understanding is similarly conditioned.
An examination  of  art  that  undermines  precisely  the  connection  between the  two issues
invoked by Warnke in her argument may be found in Arthur Danto’s philosophy of art. In
fact, Danto’s approach to art involves a view of the artist’s embeddedness similar to the one
Warnke draws from Gadamer’s hermeneutic tenets. This view may be seen to receive a
felicitous expression in the Wölfflinian slogan “not everything is possible at every time,”
which often appears in Danto’s work, and which is elaborated in the account of the art world
his philosophy of art contains.258
For Danto, art is essentially historical in the sense that it is possible to regard certain kinds
of objects as artworks only at particular times. It required a specific development in the
theoretical atmosphere of the artworld before it became possible to see, for example, Andy
Warhol’s Brillo Box as a work of art. While highly unlikely, a visually indiscernible object
with Warhol’s work could have existed in 15th century Florence, but, in Danto’s account, it
could not have been a work of art, for the history of art had by that time not developed to a
point which would have allowed an object like the Brillo Box to be constituted as an artwork.
Danto’s discussion of an era in the history of art  he calls “posthistorical  art”  serves as a
good example of the nature of the conditional factors Danto thinks are at play in the artist’s
work.259 In Danto’s view, a characteristic feature of contemporary art, or “art after the end of
art,”  is that it is marked by an unparallel plurality in the sense that there are no perceptual
criteria on what an artwork must look like. As Danto himself notes, this observation would, at
257 Ibid. (79-80).
258 Danto (1981, 44, 113).
259 Danto (1986, 111).
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first  glance,  seem  to  undermine  the  scope  of  Wölfflin’s  claim,  for  in  an  art  world  where
plurality reigns there no longer seems to be the kinds of limits for art making implied by that
claim. However, this, in fact, is not so, for while everything is, indeed, possible in the sense
that there are no perceptual constraints on what an artwork may look like, there, nevertheless,
remains a specific sense in which not everything is possible. The decisive factor which the
artist  does not have power over is  the way in which his relationship to past  history of art  is
formed. That still remains constituted by the artist’s contemporary condition, the artist, thus,
ultimately being unable to escape the conditional factors that Wölfflin’s claim “not everything
is possible at every time”  attributes to his activity. That is, even in a contemporary art world
marked by an unparallel plurality, specific boundaries remain in place which the artist cannot
transgress.
Danto finds the art of Russell Connor an especially rewarding example for illuminating
what sorts of constraints are at work in the contemporary artist’s activity. The reason for this
is that Connor is an artist who often recycles art historical material in his works. For example,
his work The Kidnapping of Modern Art by the New Yorkers (1985) unites two famous
paintings of the history of art, Rubens’  the Rape of the Daughters of Leucippus and Picasso’s
Les demoiselles d’Avignon, Connor’s painting depicting a scene where the riding savages of
the former abduct the female figures depicted in the latter. In this respect, Connor’s paintings
make use of past art historical material, Connor’s way of making art, thus, speaking against
precisely the kind of conception of art implied by Wölfflin’s claim.260
To illuminate how everything is not possible even for artists such as Connor, Danto relies
on a distinction commonly made in philosophy of language between the use and mention of a
word. When uttering the sentence “Gadamer was Heidegger’s pupil,”  I use the proper name
“Gadamer,”  but  when I  say  “Gadamer”  consists  of  seven  letters,  I  am not  using  that  proper
name, but mentioning it. The insight that Danto draws from this distinction is that while it is
nowadays possible to incorporate past art historical material of any kind in one’s work, that
material cannot be used in a sense similar to the use they were put in the contexts where they
originally appeared. That is to say, when Connor incorporates the female figures of Les
demoiselles, which some have regarded as the first cubist painting, into his work, he is not
using the style Picasso used, but mentioning that style. As a consequence, the appearance of
cubist style has a different meaning in the respective contexts and contributes differently to
the aesthetic character of the paintings in which it appears.
Now,  this  example  points  out  how  even  the  contemporary  artist  remains  subject  to
Wölfflin’s claim that not everything is possible at every time, or, as Danto puts it, even in a
posthistorical era of art, the artist cannot escape “the modalities of history.”  Even though an
artist may, indeed, incorporate any art historical style he wishes within his work, the character
of his relationship to the art historical factor he decides to make use of is dependent on his
260 Danto (1997, 197-198).
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contemporary condition. In other words, it is no longer possible to use past art historical styles
as  they  were  in  the  past,  but  they  are  ours  to  mention  only,  and  consequently  they  have  a
different position in contemporary paintings than in the works in which they originally
appeared.261
This exposition of Danto’s account of the art world reveals that he shares with Warnke a
similar picture of the factors which condition the artist’s activity. On both accounts, art is
essentially historical in the sense that the tradition of art forms boundaries for the artist
beyond which he can never completely go. Connor can only mention the style that Picasso
and Braque developed, but never use it in his paintings in an identical sense with the way it
was employed by these two great predecessors of his.
That it is possible to draw a similar view regarding the finiteness and historical nature of
the artist’s existence from Danto’s and Gadamer’s ideas may be regarded as a paradoxical
result, given the brief, sarcastic comments Danto has made about hermeneutics in some parts
of his work. For example, while discussing the notion of deep interpretation –  a view of
interpretation that he loathes and that Danto thinks shares some essential features with
hermeneutic accounts –  Danto formulates his critical goals by saying that “I wish to show
how easy it is to avoid the dread Hermeneutic Circle, namely by refusing to step into it….”262
Now,  even  though  this  remark  is  admittedly  overhasty  and  fails  to  do  justice  to  the
complexities involved, it, nevertheless, may be used to reveal an insufficiency in the argument
Warnke offers in support of Gadamer. This is the fact that while Danto’s account of the art
world implies a view of the artist’s condition similar to the one involved in Warnke’s
argument, Danto by no means shares the view of interpretation and understanding that
hermeneutics supports and for which Warnke believes her argument offers support. In fact,
Danto’s approach to art’s historical nature turns the issue upside down. This is because for
Danto, the fact that art is historical in the way his philosophy of art describes serves as one of
the key reasons for him to reject the kinds of views on interpretation that, for example, a large
part of hermeneutics is committed to. As Danto puts this idea “we have the artist’s limits as
special constraints when interpreting works of art.”263 That interpretations have these
constraints follows directly from the Wölfflinian claim that not everything is possible at every
time. That is, there are historical constraints on what meanings works of art may embody and,
as a consequence, for interpretations that seek to track what those meanings are.264
Now, this discussion of Danto’s account of the constraints at play in the artist’s work and
the implications that this kind of view has for the foundations of interpretation may be used to
call into question the argument offered by Warnke. This is because Danto’s views imply that
there isn’t the kind of relationship between the two issues Warnke relies on in her argument.
261 Ibid. (205-209).
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263 Danto (1981, 130).
264 Danto (1986, 45-46).
93
Danto’s views, in other words, show that one can see the artist’s work as being constrained by
various historical factors, without holding the view that the interpreter’s horizon is similarly
conditioned. Warnke defends the Gadamerian position on understanding by drawing attention
to the conditional factors entering into the artist’s activity and by claiming that if one finds
that account convincing, one should also hold the view that our understanding is conditioned
in  a  similar  way.  This  is  precisely  the  connection  that  Danto’s  philosophy  of  art  calls  into
question,  and  it  is  ultimately  the  reason  for  the  failure  of  Warnke’s  defense  of  the  view  of
understanding Gadamer’s hermeneutics involves.
The argument against Gadamer presented in this section shows a structural similarity with
the argument presented in the previous section. That is, in both cases, the effect of history is
in no way denied, but it is argued that acknowledging its effect on certain factors does not
mean that our understanding and interpretation is conditioned by history in a way similar to
the way these activities and phenomena are. Both of these conclusions I think call for further
analysis of the kinds of factors the effect of tradition and history do, ultimately, extend and
whether understanding should be considered to be among them.
Effective History, Tradition, and Interpretive Disagreements
Although it must be pretty clear by now what Gadamer means by his claim that understanding
is conditioned by history and tradition, as well as what consequences he and his followers
think this view has for methodological hermeneutics and the question regarding the
objectivity of the human sciences as a whole, let me begin this section with a few quotations
which summarize Gadamer’s points so that we do not lose sight of the fundamental tenet of
Gadamer’s hermeneutics. As we can see, Gadamer’s views are not construed that differently
today than they were 40 years ago, these quotations, therefore, in a way themselves indicate
that  history  does  not  condition  our  understanding  in  the  way Gadamer  assumes.  Or  perhaps
the similarity between these readings is due to the fact that people do not change. However,
both conclusions would, in fact, undermine Gadamer’s account. Be that as it may, in 1969,
Richard Palmer summarized Gadamer’s views as follows:
There is no pure seeing and understanding of history without reference to
the present. On the contrary, history is seen and understood only and
always through consciousness standing in the present… The present is
seen and understood only through the intentions, ways of seeing, and
preoccupations bequeathed from the past… [the past being] a stream in
which we move and participate, in every act of understanding. Tradition,
then, is not over against us but something in which we stand and through
which we exist; for the most part it is so transparent a medium that it is
invisible to us….265
265 Palmer (1969, 178). My italics.
94
In 2006, Flemming Lebech, in turn, expresses Gadamer’s ideas in the following way:
The  meaning  of  the  text,  rather  is  not  given  once  and  for  all,  [but]
historically conditioned for us within the present. An understanding of
the text is and remains one’s own, its meaning, the meaning that one finds
in it. As a historical being, one understands the text in the light of the
conditions of the present, differently from the author, who will have
understood it in the light of the conditions of their time…  Each historical
period has its own pre-understanding, and presents alternative conditions
for understanding which allow the text to be considered in a new light.266
Now, these excerpts embody a fairly traditional way of understanding Gadamer’s
hermeneutics,  as  well  as  its  implications.  However,  as  we  saw,  E.D.  Hirsch  claims  that
Gadamer simply inherits this view of the human condition from Heidegger without critically
reflecting on the problematic assumptions that it, in his opinion, involves. Here, I shall take
my cue from Hirsch’s brief remark by drawing attention to a particular phenomenon which I
think calls into question the effect history and tradition are thought to pose on understanding
in these passages.
The phenomenon I have in mind is a very mundane one. Yet, I believe that it is precisely
its comprehensiveness that Gadamer’s theory fails to explain and account for. Its insufficiency
with regard to this issue implies that history and tradition cannot be held to condition our
understanding in the way Gadamer thinks.
The  phenomenon  I  am  here  referring  to  is  simply  the  disagreements  that  exist  between
historians and art researchers living in the same age and who belong to the same traditions.
The reason why this observation may be used to undermine Gadamer’s account of
understanding is that it questions the idea that each historical period would have “its own pre-
understanding”  which forms the horizon within which past historical events and artworks are
understood in “their time”  (Lebech). How can this be regarded as an accurate description of
the structure of our understanding if there are lively disputes and disagreements between
people living in the same age over how a particular historical phenomenon or artwork should
be understood? That is, if Gadamer’s account is accurate, how can people understand a given
artwork in so many different ways, as some contemporary interpretive disputes for example
indicate? In other words, how much disagreement can Gadamer’s approach to interpretation
and understanding allow before the whole idea that our understanding is historically
conditioned, which serves as its fundamental tenet, is deprived of substantial content?
For example, some recent interpretations of Wagner’s Ring show that interpretations that
are almost contradictory with one another are truly presented by persons living at the same
266 Lebech (2006, 228-229) My italics.
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age with a similar cultural and historical background.267 If  these  sorts  of  disagreements  do
indeed occur, how can this fact be accounted for by appealing to a tradition that, in this case,
may be said to be shared by those who have offered the respective interpretations of The
Ring? And moreover, how can their respective interpretations differ so much from one
another if the interpreters share a common tradition, and if that tradition is supposed to have
as fundamental an effect on their understanding as Gadamer claims?
The  problem that  Gadamer’s  theory  ultimately  faces  once  the  presence  of  these  sorts  of
disagreements is observed, is that the more widely they are acknowledged to prevail, the less
content there seems to be left in the idea that understanding always happens “in the light of
the conditions of the present,”  as Lebech summarizes the fundamental tenet of Gadamer’s
hermeneutics. How can there be “conditions of the present”  that form the shared horizon for a
group of interpreters in which their “thought is tied to its finite determinacy,”268 if at a given
time there can be interpretations of The Ring, for example, that embody wholly different
understandings of the piece? What can the effect of these conditions amount to if these kinds
of cases are possible?
This argument may merely give rise to shrugs from Gadamer’s followers, since its force
pales when compared to the position that Gadamer’s hermeneutics elevates tradition to and
the ambitious defense of the role of tradition against the Enlightenment’s “prejudice against
prejudice itself”  it involves.269 However, I am not alone in my claim here, for E.D. Hirsch has
presented similar critical remarks to Gadamer. Hirsch hits Gadamer where it must hurt him
most. While observing the important position that the concept of tradition occupies in
Gadamer’s thinking and how strongly Gadamer’s theory has become associated with it, in
Hirsch’s opinion, the account of tradition Gadamer’s hermeneutics involves is, nevertheless,
“vaguely adumbrated and weakly defended”  in Truth and Method and that it is questionable
whether it can ultimately survive “close empirical and historical examination.”270 In support
of his claim Hirsch refers to Edward Shils’  book Tradition and argues that the account of
tradition presented there is in many ways incompatible with Gadamer’s approach and,
moreover, is much more accurate. What Shils’  approach to tradition, in Hirsch’s opinion,
indicates is that it should not be construed as such “a monolithic”  entity as the role given to it
by Gadamer.
However, the ultimate problem that Hirsch thinks Gadamer’s approach to tradition
involves  is  precisely  that  it  is  hard  to  reconcile  with  the  fact  that  “members  of  the  same
tradition… disagree so persistently about textual meaning.”271 This is precisely the point I
made above; the interpretations of The Ring, which diverge from each other severely on some
267 Here I am referring to the disagreement apparent in Roger Scruton’s and Philip Kitcher’s and Richard
Schacht’s interpretations of The Ring which I considered in chapter one.
268 TM 301; WM, 286.
269 TM, 273; WM, 255.
270 Hirsch (1984, 213).
271 Ibid. (214).
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points,  are  formulated  by  people  who  arguably  belong  to  the  same  tradition.  How  can  this
observation be accounted for by a conception of tradition that construes its effect on the
interpreter’s horizon in as fundamental a way as Gadamer’s hermeneutics does?
Now, if disagreement between interpreters indeed is as widespread a phenomenon as is
assumed above, and this seems to me hard to deny, then it follows that tradition can no longer
be considered to hold such a position in the formation of understanding as is assumed by
Gadamer. Too much emphasis on the conditional effect of tradition renders the theory
incapable of explaining how people belonging to the same tradition are able to produce
interpretations of, say, The Ring that might even be contradictory. If this possibility is
accepted, does any substantial content really remain in the idea that our understanding is
conditioned by history and tradition in the way Gadamer describes? How can it be possible
for incompatible interpretations to appear if Gadamer’s account accurately depicts the process
through which our understanding is formed? It seems that the more disagreement one allows
within one’s approach to interpretation, the less one is able to incorporate the kinds of factors
that are important for Gadamer’s hermeneutics within one’s approach. This includes, for
example, such claims as “as a historical being, one understands the text in the light of the
conditions of the present”  (Lebech). Since interpretations of The Ring which are almost
incompatible with each other currently exist, I cannot see what content there can any longer
be in the idea that our understanding is structured by “the conditions of the present,”  and the
less content there is to this idea, the less tradition can be held to condition our understanding.
To be sure, the hermeneutist need not remain unarmed in the face of this criticism, for he
could reply that such criticism is plagued by problems similar to those Hirsch’s criticism of
Gadamer involves. In other words, it is not fair to criticize Gadamer for factors arising from
the phenomenon of disagreement, for that question concerns individual acts of understanding.
This kind of criticism thus overlooks precisely how Gadamer’s interests lie elsewhere. That
is, instead of attempting to provide an account of how to reconcile conflicting interpretation it
seeks “to discover what is common to all modes of understanding and to show that
understanding is never a subjective relation to a given object but to the history of its
effect….”272 Noting  this  aspect  of  Gadamer’s  hermeneutics  allows  it  to  embrace  the
phenomenon of disagreement, because it has not been shown that similarity with regard to the
kinds of underlying conditional factors it brings to light would rule out the possibility of
disagreement on the methodological level.
By drawing attention to this aspect of Gadamer’s thinking the defender of the hermeneutic
position on understanding and interpretation is able to extend his critical response, for he
could yet again point out that not only is the above criticism underlain by a misguided
understanding of Gadamer’s hermeneutic project, but it also neglects the challenge that the
ontological strand of hermeneutics has been presumed to pose for methodological approaches,
272 TM, xxviii; WM, xix.
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such  as  different  forms  of  intentionalism.  That  is,  Gadamer’s  analysis  reveals  the  way
individual acts of understanding are always prestructured, and since the factors involved in
their prestructuring do change in the drift of history, understanding remains historically
conditioned after all.
What sorts of factors these conditions might include and the sort of effect they have been
considered to have on individual acts of understanding can be addressed through Jean
Grondin’s account of “the hermeneutic as.”  With this concept Grondin tries to explicate
Heidegger’s idea that human existence is projective and that understanding is always
forestructured, an account that had a profound effect on Gadamer’s hermeneutics, and
especially concerning the point that there is no presuppositionless understanding which it
seeks to emphasize. The notion of “the hermeneutic as”  is intended to capture the aspect of
human existence that underlying all forms of theoretical knowledge and methodological acts
of understanding there is a more fundamental level at work which structures our engagement
with the world. While it indeed continually directs our lives and is present in structuring
various aspects of our activities, most of the time the effect of this level proceeds
unreflectively and usually we are hardly aware of how substantially it, in fact, molds our lives
and the encounters which take place in it. That is, the world does not unfold to a human being
as it does to a theoretical gaze, but we always encounter the world as something, that is, as
something prestructured. This level is fundamental in the sense that it conditions our
individual acts by determining a certain range of possibilities concerning how a given object
may be studied and what sorts of approaches may be adopted to it, as well as the purposes to
which it may be further applied. These individual questions are, of course, different with
respect to different objects, but, nevertheless, in every case a similar structure is at work;
individual acts like these do not function independently or without presuppositions, but they
are dependent on how the world has already unfolded around us.
It is precisely this level of understanding whose fundamental character Heidegger tries to
disclose,  and  whose  relevance  for  the  human  sciences  Gadamer’s  hermeneutics  seeks  to
underline. The structure of this level conditions individual acts of understanding in the sense
that,  as  Gadamer  himself  puts  it,  “it  determines  in  advance  both  what  seems  to  us  worth
inquiring about and what will appear as an object of investigation….”273 Interpreters are, in
other words, “thrown”  into a tradition which always prestructures the field in which
individual acts of understanding proceed and, thus, ultimately shape their character.274
The shortcoming of methodological forms of hermeneutics is precisely that it neglects the
way in which our understanding is prestructured by the kinds of factors Grondin tries to
capture with the concept of “the hermeneutic as.”  Richard Palmer expresses the relevance of
these conditional factors for interpretation and understanding by maintaining that:
273 TM, 300; WM, 284.
274 Grondin (1994, 95, 101).
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[T]he ‘understanding’  that serves as the foundation for interpretation is
itself already shaping and conditioning interpretation –  it is a preliminary
interpretation, but one that can make all the difference because it sets the
stage for subsequent interpretation. Even when a literary interpreter turns
toward a poem and, in effect, says, ‘This is a poem; I shall understand it
by doing thus and thus’  –  he has already interpreted his task and by
extension shaped his seeing of the poem. And he has already, with his
method, shaped the meaning of the object. Indeed, method and object
cannot be separated: method has already delimited what we shall  see.  It
has told us what the object is as object.275
That is, each horizon discloses a space that determines how understanding proceeds, thus
underdetermining what sorts of interpretations may be offered within that horizon. This is
precisely the aspect of understanding methodological forms of hermeneutics overlook.
The  problem in  the  reply  which  tries  to  accommodate  the  phenomenon of  disagreement
through a deeper understanding of Gadamer’s hermeneutic project and the position which
“the hermeneutic as”  elements occupy in it is that it includes an overemphasized view of the
effect of “the hermeneutic as”  elements on individual acts of understanding. This shortcoming
in the reply is, in fact, revealed by a phenomenon which the reply was supposed to overcome,
that is, interpretive disagreements. If the factors raised by Grondin in his explication of
Gadamer’s views would truly hold the kind of position that is assumed in the counter-
argument, that is, delimiting “what we shall see,”  how can interpretive disagreements,
nevertheless, occur? Or to put the matter differently, if interpretive disagreements are allowed,
it becomes hard to ascertain the effect of “the hermeneutic as”  elements on individual acts of
understanding. The reply to the criticism arising from the presence of interpretive
disagreements essentially consisted of showing how sharing similar conditional factors does
not rule out the possibility of disagreement between individual interpreters. It was further
argued that the unavoidable presence of these factors in every individual act of understanding
showed the way in which they are always prestructured to a certain degree, and how this
prestructuring shapes individual acts interpreters make at a certain point in time. That is, in
the above reply “the hermeneutic as”  elements are shared in the sense that they determine
what those belonging to the same tradition and whose understanding proceeds under the same
horizon will see.
However, if the effect of the conditional factors Grondin’s explication reveals do not rule
out the possibility of interpretive disagreements, how extensive can their conditional force on
individual acts be considered? In other words, if they truly conditioned the character
individual acts can take in as fundamental way as is assumed in the ontological criticism of
methodology, how can interpretive disagreements between people living in the same age, who
presumably share a horizon involving similar factors with each other, still occur? The kind of
force they are assumed to pose on individual acts for example in Palmer’s account, would
275 Palmer (1969, 22-23). Italics Palmer.
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seem to rule out the possibility for the kinds of discrepancies which current interpretations of
Wagner’s Ring,  for  example,  exemplify.  That  is,  if  “the  hermeneutic  as”  elements  truly  set
“the stage for subsequent interpretation”  and by doing so delimit “what we shall see,”  thus
presumably shaping the character of the individual interpretations offered within that horizon,
it is hard to explain the presence of interpretive disagreements. This conclusion, in turn,
implies that if the presence of interpretive disagreements is accepted, “the hermeneutic as”
elements can no longer be thought to condition our individual acts of understanding in the
assumed way.  Now, once it is shown that they cannot condition our understanding in the
sense of delimiting what we shall see, transformations in “the hermeneutic as”  elements can
no  longer  be  held  to  pose  the  kind  of  effect  on  our  understanding  as  presumed  in  the
hermeneutic  response  outlined  above  either.  This  is  so  for  a  simple  reason.  If  “the
hermeneutic as”  elements do not condition the character of our individual acts of
understanding in a fundamental manner, arguably changes in these conditional factors cannot
either.
4. The Return of the Question of Validity
The three preceding sections have tried to undermine the conception of understanding
inherent in Gadamer’s hermeneutics from different angles. What the reflections presented in
them share is that they together call into question the idea that understanding and
interpretation would be as historically conditioned as Gadamer’s hermeneutics claims. If
those accounts are considered accurate, they indirectly serve as defenses for intentionalist
approaches to interpretation, for, as shown above, the claim that our understanding is
historically conditioned in the way Gadamer describes forms the core of the hermeneutic
criticism of intentionalism.
The approach to Gadamer’s views adopted in these criticisms, however, may be
considered uncharitable to a certain extent, for they may be argued to give the impression that
Gadamer’s hermeneutics would render the human subject a mere instrument of tradition, and
that the interpreter would have no possibility of rising above those conditional factors which
she has inherited from the tradition she belongs to. A more careful reading of Gadamer’s
hermeneutics indicates that to attribute this sort of view of tradition to Gadamer in some ways
misrepresents its ultimate content. This is because while Gadamer does indeed emphasize the
role of tradition in the formation of understanding, he by no means maintains that we are
inevitably confined within the boundaries it sets for us. To be sure, for Gadamer,
understanding always involves prejudgments (Vorurteil).  However,  this  does  not  mean  that
we could  not  overcome or  replace  those  prejudgments  that  structure  our  understanding  at  a
given time, or that it would not be possible to discriminate between better and worse ones. In
fact, the question of how to discriminate those prejudgments “by which we understand, from
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the false ones, by which we misunderstand”276 becomes one of the most important issues for
Gadamer’s hermeneutics.
The question regarding the position of prejudgments in understanding is also connected to
the issue of relativism, for that may be construed as the problem of how it is possible to
discriminate between more and less valid prejudgments. Georgia Warnke formulates the
problem of discriminating between more and less valid prejudgments which the hermeneutist
must ultimately face as the problem of subjectivism. Since it is admitted that certain
prejudgments only distort the object of understanding, there must be some sort of foundation
for evaluating certain kinds of prejudgments as being of such a kind. Moreover, Gadamer
must  formulate  an  account  of  how  they  can  be  distinguished  from  those  which  allow  us  to
understand truthfully, and that do not rise from mere personal preferences and idiosyncrasies,
but have a claim to more general validity. Or as Warnke succinctly puts the problem at issue
here: “In short, can hermeneutics distinguish between distortion and situated interpretation or
must it ultimately sanction the subjectivism to which the emphasis on ‘situatedness’  seems to
lead?”277
Now, drawing attention to the fact that Gadamer acknowledges that we can rise above the
prejudgments tradition has equipped us with and that the problem of separating true
prejudgments from false ones is a pressing one for his hermeneutics is not really interesting
because it can be argued to reveal certain insufficiencies in the reading of Gadamer’s theory
the above criticism was underlain by. What is more interesting is another consequence that
may be drawn from it. What Gadamer’s readiness to take the problem of subjectivism
seriously implies is that his hermeneutics must, after all, give attention to the issue of validity
in interpretation. Now, the reason why this is an intriguing conclusion is that it calls for a re-
evaluation of the relationship that Hirsch’s critics have seen to hold between Gadamer’s and
Hirsch’s views. That is, if “it is quite right for the interpreter not to approach the text directly,
relying solely on the fore-meaning already available to him, but rather explicitly to examine
the legitimacy –  i.e.,  the  origin  and validity –  of the fore-meanings dwelling in him,”278 as
Gadamer insists, then I cannot see how it could any longer be claimed that the concerns of
Hirsch’s and Gadamer’s respective accounts of interpretation are as remote from each other as
some contemporary hermeneutists have assumed.
That the problem of validity in understanding has a position in Gadamer’s hermeneutics is
also indicated by the fact that his work does contain investigations of how true prejudgments
may be separated from false ones. Here, I shall take up two replies to the problem of the
validity of prejudgments that may be found in Gadamer’s work. First, Gadamer insists that
assessing the validity of those prejudgments with which the interpreter approaches a text at a
certain time requires that the interpreter takes a specific attitude towards the work under
276 TM, 298; WM, 282. My italics.
277 Warnke (1987, 72).
278 TM, 270; WM, 252. My italics.
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scrutiny. According to him, the interpreter should “foreground”  his prejudices so that the
work under interpretation receives a normative authority over the interpreter, and has thus a
possibility of making a claim to him.279 In other words, “for Gadamer… it is essential to grant
the text one is studying a certain normative authority, for it is only by doing so that one can
test the adequacy of one’s view about either the text or the issues on which it focuses.”280
Now, it is of course very desirable that the interpreter takes the kind of attitude towards
the object under interpretation that Gadamer describes as a form of foregrounding. Yet, I
cannot see how on the basis of adopting this attitude alone the sort of foundation can be
established which the discrimination between different prejudgments requires. Its inability to
serve such a function becomes all the more likely if one agrees with Arthur Danto, and with a
host of other philosophers for that matter, that two indiscernible texts, may, nevertheless, have
very different properties. One of the most famous cases which have led philosophers of art to
hold this kind of view of work constitution is the case described by Jorge Louis Borges in his
Pierre Menard. Symbolist Poet.281 That story depicts a case where some parts of Cervantes’
Don Quixote are reproduced in another literary work, i.e., in the one composed by Menard in
the story. The moral which philosophers such as Danto have drawn from this case is that the
nature of a literary work of art is ultimately constituted by other factors than its discernible
properties. That is, despite their indiscernibility Menard’s Don Quixote is  reported  to  be
“infinitely more subtle than that of Cervantes,”  and while Cervantes “opposes to the fiction of
chivalry the tawdry provincial reality of his country,”  this is far from the concerns that occupy
Menard in his work.282
The case of Pierre Menard calls into question the kind of position which the text acquires
in Gadamer’s attempt to separate false prejudgments from true ones. In other words, if the
respective works of Menard and Cervantes truly have different properties, while being
identical on a textual level, why should any kind of normative authority be given to the text
when critically examining the validity of one’s prejudgments with which one approaches the
respective works? To be sure, it might well be so that “hermeneutically schooled
consciousness must be sensitive to the otherness of the text from the beginning”  and we may
even applaud the hermeneutist for insisting on the importance of this sort of attitude.
However, if this maxim is intended to provide a firm enough ground to solve the problem of
subjectivism as it is formulated by Warnke, then it can hardly be regarded as a proper solution
to that problem.
Another factor that Gadamer thinks may be relied on in the attempt to distinguish true
prejudgments from false ones is temporal distance. That is, in his opinion, in the course of
time not only do “local and limited prejudices die away, but [it] allows those that bring about
279 TM, 298; WM, 282.
280 Warnke (1987, 87).
281 Danto (1981, ch. 2).
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102
genuine understanding to emerge clearly as such.”283 Jean Grondin points out that Gadamer’s
views on this issue slightly changed during his career. While in the first edition of Truth and
Method Gadamer writes that “it is only temporal distance that can solve”  this question, in the
fifth edition, Gadamer, in turn, maintains that temporal distance is “often”  the factor that
serves this function. Grondin continues that “Gadamer’s revision nicely illustrates a
distinctive characteristic of hermeneutics, namely, that it remains continually ready to alter its
opinion when better insight comes along.”284
Now, first of all this sort of flaunting with openmindedness is just silly, for if a
willingness to revise one’s views in the face of criticism is considered the mark of a
philosopher who has absorbed the hermeneutic spirit, then Bertrand Russell should be
counted as an exemplary figure of what it means to be a hermeneutist. Second, and of course
more importantly, I just cannot see how reliance on temporal distance alone can give the kind
of normative bite to Gadamer’s theory that it, ultimately, is in need of. To be sure, in many
cases temporal distance does lead to the dying away of “local and limited”  prejudgments. This
development, however, does not merely occur because time flies by, but in many cases, a lot
of work needs to be done so that false prejudgments may be identified, and for uncovering the
reasons for judging them to be distortive of understanding.
It seems that no other artist has encountered such widespread and deep rooted
prejudgments and prejudices as Richard Wagner. In his book, Wagner and Philosophy Bryan
Magee draws attention to their origin, as well as points out the effect these prejudices have, in
his opinion, had on the way people approach Wagner’s works. Here is his assessement of the
situation:
I sometimes think there are two Wagners in our culture, almost
unrecognizably different from one another: the Wagner possessed by
those who know his work, and the Wagner imagined by those who know
him only by name and reputation. [People of the latter kind] create
misunderstanding not only of their fellows but, more importantly, of
Wagner and his works. I have innumerable times heard well-meaning
people say in minatory tones such things as ‘After all, one can’t ignore
the  ideas  behind  these  works’,  as  if  the  ideas  were  quite  different  from
what they are. Such people seem to think they know that the ideas are of
a dictatorial and chauvinistic nature.285
Magee thinks that this sort of attitude towards Wagner’s works has its origins in the political
developments of the 20th century, that is, “the most serious damage ever done to Wagner’s
image, the factor that has distorted and deformed it more than any other, is his posthumous
283 TM 298; WM, 282.
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relationship with Adolf Hitler.”286 The firmness of this association in people’s minds has had
the result that:
Many people nowadays write and talk as if Wagner provided a sort of
sound-track to the Third Reich, and that the history of the Nazis took
place to a musical accompaniment composed by Wagner; and that on
organized party occasions there was always, or usually, Wagner. This
conception has become a cliché on film and television, where it is usual
for  any  depiction  of  the  Nazis  to  be  literally  accompanied  by  Wagner’s
music, for preference at its most brassy and bombastic, as in the Ride of
the Valkyries or Prelude of Act III of Lohengrin, and played very loud.287
Now, here we have a perfect case which illustrates the kinds of factors through which
prejudgments emerge and the kind of effect they may, ultimately, have on one’s reception of a
work of art. By being so prejudicially loaded, the case of Wagner also serves as a good
example by which to consider the question of how certain prejudgments can be considered
invalid. As the above quotations already suggest, Magee finds these widespread prejudices
about  Wagner  and  his  works  distortive,  or  as  Gadamer  might  put  it,  false.  For  Magee  the
claim that, for example, Wagner’s Ring would give “expression to an overweening and
bombastic German nationalism”  is “from start to finish, poppycock.”288
Since at least to me it seems that Wagner’s works are nowadays less frequently associated
with anti-Semitism than before, the case indeed appears to be as Gadamer claims it to be, that
is, that temporal distance allows “local and limited prejudices [to] die away.”  However, as
already suggested, that certain deep-rooted prejudices ultimately die away does not happen
merely because of the passage of time, but often this involves such factors as the appearance
of new evidence, presenting detailed arguments that call the prejudices into question, as well
as weighing the comparative strength of different pieces of evidence. For example, the anti-
Semitic interpretations of Wagner’s works have been opposed by noting the fact that while
Wagner spent so much ink on explaining his works in writing, he nowhere hints that his
music dramas would involve anti-Semitic undercurrents or that certain characters, such as
Mime and Alberich in The Ring, would have been intended as caricatures of the Jewish
people. Yet, if it indeed is so that these sorts of factors form an essential part of the activity
through which we become aware of those prejudices which merely distort our possibility to
understand, then it seems that a mere reliance on temporal distance does not manage to
provide what is needed. A more rigorous account of the grounds of validity is, instead, called
for.
Now, if Gadamer’s theory has troubles of providing an appropriate account of how false
prejudgments which only distort understanding may be discriminated from true ones, it
indeed is in danger of slipping the slope to a form of relativism, as Joseph Margolis has, in
286 Ibid. (78).
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fact, also suggested.289 However, Warnke proposes a third option with the help of which it is
possible for Gadamer to overcome the problem of subjectivism. In her opinion, Gadamer
could, yet again, appeal to the fact that understanding necessarily proceeds as a part of a
tradition,  tradition  thus  having  a  claim  to  a  specific  kind  of  normative  authority  over  the
individual interpreter. According to Warnke, this maneuver allows Gadamer to meet the
challenge arising from the problem of subjectivism, for in this case Gadamer could maintain
that “an adequate understanding of an object is rather a question of appropriating a tradition of
interpretation as a general normative framework and the tradition is thus supposed to provide
some kind of normative limit to the free range of interpretation.”290
While this kind of appeal to tradition does indeed seem like a reasonable option for
Gadamer to take to overcome the problem of subjectivism, ultimately it does not work. We
saw that even Gadamer must accept the presence of interpretive disagreements between
people whom his theory counts as belonging to the same tradition. Now, if this possibility is
accepted, then tradition can hardly exhibit the kind of uniformity of views and approaches to
pose a firm enough “normative limit to the free range of interpretation.”  That is, if a tradition
can give rise to interpretations which are significantly different from one another, as was
indicated above, how can that kind of tradition be appealed to when considering which
interpretations  are  more  valid  than  others?  It  seems  that  only  a  highly  monolithic  view  of
tradition could provide the kind of normative force Gadamer is in need of in this context.
However, as Hirsch points out, this view can hardly survive closer examination, and thus
normativity cannot be founded upon such a view of tradition.
Moreover, the claim that tradition poses a limit on interpretations seems to reformulate the
role of tradition within Gadamer’s hermeneutics in a way that the character of Gadamer’s
hermeneutics as a whole undergoes a transformation. As noted above, Gadamer replies to
Emilio Betti that their concerns are different in the respect that he is not interested in the
grounds for justification, but to “describe what is,”  that  is,  to  give  a  phenomenological
account of understanding which reveals the way in which it is always affected by tradition and
history. However, if tradition is meant to create boundaries on the sorts of interpretations that
may be considered valid, as Warnke suggests, does not this mean that Gadamer after all
ascribes a normative role to that notion. If that indeed is the case, doesn’t this imply that
Gadamer’s hermeneutics no longer involves a description of the way tradition does participate
in the formation of our understanding, but, instead, how it should participate in it.
Now, the interesting point is not really that the appeal to tradition cannot provide the kind
of foundation for discriminating true prejudgments from distortive ones Gadamer is in need
of, but that the role ascribed to tradition by Warnke in the reply she offers lends further
support to the claim that normative questions related to the grounds of validity do indeed have
a  position  in  Gadamer’s  hermeneutics.  This  being  so,  it  is  hard  to  see  how Gadamer  is  any
289 Margolis (1995b, ch. 2).
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longer able to hold on to the description of his theory according to which his “real concern
was and is philosophic: not what we do or what we ought to do, but what happens to us over
and above our wanting.”291 Rather, it seems to be the case that the concerns of Gadamer’s and
Hirsch’s approaches to interpretation and understanding overlap much more significantly with
each other than some contemporary hermeneutists have assumed.
Yet, the most pressing problem that Gadamer now faces is that the answers he gives to the
problem of validity, i.e., the problem of subjectivism, are not that successful, and neither does
Warnke’s proposition formulated in Gadamer’s footsteps seem to fare much better. That is,
while acknowledging that our understanding may be guided by false prejudices and by
insisting on the need to dissociate them from those prejudgments which allow us to
understand truthfully, Gadamer’s hermeneutics is, nevertheless, unable to provide the sort of
normativity required by these tasks. Neither the insistence on the normative authority of the
text nor the role that is attributed to temporal distance by Gadamer manage to provide what is
required, that is, a foundation for discriminating between more and less truthful prejudgments.
That  is  to  say,  Gadamer  must,  after  all,  take  some  sort  of  stand  on  the  issue  of  validity  of
interpretation, but the answers found in his work are far from satisfactory. Both claims may,
in fact, yet again, be found in Hirsch’s criticism.292
Overcoming Bizarre Metaphors: Donald Davidson and Hermeneutic Criticisms of
Intentionalism
Given that formulating an adequate response to the problem of validity in interpretation
motivates intentionalist approaches to interpretation, as is indicated, for example, by Hirsch’s
literary theory, the above account of Gadamer’s hermeneutics gives strong grounds for giving
a new hearing to intentionalist approaches. The revival of intentionalist theories within
hermeneutics, however, still faces one severe obstacle. They have not only been rejected
because of their neglect of the historical nature of understanding, but also because they have
thought to presuppose views of human subjectivity which after the decay of Romanticism can
no longer be held. That is, some remarks found in hermeneutic literature suggest that
contemporary hermeneutists still strongly associate an intentionalist approach with accounts
of hermeneutics formulated by Schleiermacher and Dilthey, and with the view of human
subjectivity they have been assumed to be underlain by, a view that Gadamer calls a form of
“pantheistic metaphysics of individuality.”293 Moreover, the view of successful interpretation
they involve has been assumed to require from the interpreter undertakings which are
291 TM, xxv-xxvi; WM, xvi.
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impossible to carry out. Some descriptions used in connection with these critiques indicate
what they have been assumed to be like. For example, Gadamer himself claims that
Schleiermacher’s account of the “divinatory act,”  which lies at the heart of his methodological
approach to understanding and which has been considered a forefather of intentionalism,
requires that “one places oneself entirely within the writer’s mind…,”  and that the romantic
movement as a whole involves “the naïve assumption… that we must transpose ourselves into
the spirit of the age….”294 Richard Palmer, in turn, claims that in the divinatory method, “one
transforms oneself into the other person in order to grasp his individuality directly”  and that in
“this moment of interpretation, one goes out of himself and transforms himself into the author
so that he can grasp in full immediacy, the latter’s mental process.”295
Now, if intentionalist theories of interpretation are truly thought to involve a view of the
procedures required in successful interpretation similar to those receiving descriptions in these
quotations, no wonder intentionalism has had a hard time in gaining support within recent
hermeneutic  theory.  Taking  up  these  assumptions  reveals  that  contemporary  criticisms  of
intentionalism within hermeneutics have been heavily prejudiced in the sense that the bar for
their success has been raised to a disproportionate level. This may be seen from the fact that it
is hard even to begin to make sense of what these procedures ultimately might consist of and
when they would have been successfully carried out.
Here is where Donald Davidson’s ideas prove relevant, for they provide an opportunity
for formulating an intentionalist theory of interpretation which manages to overcome the
hermeneutic criticisms of that view stemming from the above kind assumptions. To introduce
Davidson’s views in the context of hermeneutics is nothing new, of course. On the contrary,
there is a growing literature where different parts of Davidson’s work, such as the rationality
assumptions contained in the principle of charity, the dialogic character of understanding, and
the holistic account of the mind, are considered in relation to Gadamer’s views on similar
topics, and in many cases they are seen to bear striking similarities with one another.
Although Davidson’s views have already raised interest within hermeneutics, there,
nevertheless, is a particular daringness involved in the attempt to set the approach to
understanding and interpretation they involve alongside hermeneutic accounts. This is
because even in those readings where Davidson’s and Gadamer’s philosophies have been seen
to share various elements, Gadamer and hermeneutics at large have nevertheless been
considered to ultimately come out ahead; they are able to provide a deeper picture of the
complexities involved in understanding and interpretation than Davidson.296 For example, Jeff
Malpas claims that “only by adopting a more hermeneutical approach… can the Davidsonian
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project be properly developed and its full implications realized,”297 the need for this sort of
expansion following for example from the fact that while “the basic idea that interpretation
and understanding is a matter of unification between differing ‘horizons’”  seems to be
common to both Gadamer and Davidson, this kind of approach appears “in a less explicit and
developed way”  in the latter.298
Now, the view of the relationship between Davidson and Gadamer offered by Malpas is
challenging for my concerns not only because it sides with Gadamer, but because in Malpas’
opinion the standpoint on these issues, which appears in an undeveloped form in Davidson’s
writings, and whose full implications may be uncovered by giving them a hermeneutic twist,
is incompatible with the approach to interpretation and understanding this study tries to
develop on the basis of Davidson’s views. In fact, by saying that “the Davidsonian position
cannot allow that the speaker’s intentions have any privileged role to play in constituting
meaning,”299 Malpas’  reading is totally at odds with the one developed by me, and if accurate,
would severely undermine my approach. Now, just as one thinks that Malpas’  approach to the
issue regarding the relationship between Davidson and Gadamer could not be more
challenging, he makes an observation which is in danger of calling into question the very idea
of  this  chapter.  Since  Malpas  believes  that  Davidson’s  holism embodies  a  skeptical  attitude
towards the position of intentions in interpretation and understanding similar to the one found
in Gadamer’s hermeneutics, he believes that Davidson’s ideas may be used in supplementing
the hermeneutic attempt to throw a wrench in the works of Hirsch’s literary theory.300
The relationship that Malpas draws between Davidson’s and Gadamer’s views, as well as
the implications he draws from Davidson’s holism for interpretation are, however, by no
means unproblematic. First, the claim that Davidson could not construe a close relationship
between intention and meaning is already problematic on a textual level, for in many places
Davidson does build such a relationship between the two. Davidson, for example, at one point
observes that “the Gricean element in my formulation is the dependence of meaning on
intention.”301 Moreover, in the few texts in which Davidson deals with the problem of literary
interpretation explicitly, he supports a view on meaning constitution and the grounds of
validity similar to the one Hirsch supports.
Yet, the problem of using this statement as counterevidence for Malpas’  interpretation
might be considered uncharitable, for this statement by Davidson appears in an article which
was published in 1994, that is, two years after Malpas’  book on Davidson The Mirror of
Meaning appeared. Nevertheless, I do not believe that one must take recourse to hindsight to
reveal problems in Malpas’  account. This is because at the end of the 1980s articles appeared
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where Davidson expresses an intentionalist attitude towards meaning.302 To be sure,  Malpas
does refer to the 1986 article “A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs,”  which has sometimes been
considered to mark the beginning of Davidson’s later philosophy of language. In this article,
the speaker’s intentions acquire a role in explaining meaning that they did not previously
occupy in Davidson’s earlier writings. This is an observation that Malpas makes as well, but
he nevertheless thinks that intentions cannot play such “a foundational role”  in Davidson’s
views, as they do in Paul Grice’s account, for example.303
Now, the ultimate assessment of Malpas’  interpretation of Davidson depends on how one
understands the notions of “foundational role”  and “privileged role.”  As we saw in the
previous chapter, Davidson wants to avoid falling into the Humpty Dumpty view of meaning,
that is, the view that the meaning of an utterance is in every case identical with what the
speaker  intended  by  it.  So,  it  is  true  that  in  this  sense  Davidson  cannot  allow  intentions  to
have a foundational role. However, if certain conditions are met, the utterance does, in
Davidson’s account, mean what the speaker intended. In this respect, the Davidsonian
position can allow intentions a much more important role in determining meaning than
Malpas’  reading implies. For this reason Malpas’  hermeneutic approach to Davidson does not
rule out the possibility of constructing an intentionalist theory of interpretation with
Davidson’s views as a touchstone.
Another factor which, in Malpas’  opinion, renders the relationship between Davidson’s
views and an intentionalist approach to meaning problematic is the holism of the mental
underlying various parts of Davidson’s work, for that kind of outlook is, in his opinion, hard
to reconcile with the kind of “atomistic”  and “reductive”  explanations of meaning that, in
Malpas’  opinion, characterize intentionalist accounts, such as Grice’s.304 In Malpas’
description, “on such accounts, meaning would be reduced to a combination of belief and
intention, rather than being seen as one element in a more complex holistic structure.”305
Now,  while  this  is  an  accurate  assessment  of  the  implications  of  Davidson’s  views,  the
more general conclusion drawn by Malpas may, nevertheless, be questioned, for he does not
consider the possibility that an intentionalist theory of interpretation could, in fact,
accommodate this kind of view of the mental. That is, some existing intentionalist approaches
to interpretation may not involve the holistic view of the human mind Davidson supports, but
this does not imply that such a theory could not be developed.
Support for a view that it is possible to formulate an intentionalist theory of interpretation
upon Davidson’s holism is offered by Samuel Wheeler. Like Malpas, Wheeler contrasts
Davidson’s approach to interpretation with that of Hirsch. However, he locates the significant
difference between their views in a different place than Malpas. In Wheeler’s opinion, the fact
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that Davidson’s approach emphasizes the holistic character of the mental does not mean it
could not ascribe the author’s intention a position similar to the one it occupies within
Hirsch’s literary theory. Rather, the decisive factor which for Wheeler serves to separate the
approaches from one another is that in them intentions are construed through a different
conception of the human mind. Hirsch’s intentionalism precisely lacks the sort of holism of
the mind which is fundamental for a Davidsonian version of intentionalism. That is to say,
“Davidson’s theory does not suppose that intentions are made up of some version of ‘logoi’
that lie behind words.”  In contrast to this sort of outlook, Davidson’s account, instead,
maintains that “intentions are ascribed along with beliefs, desires, and meanings of utterances
in a holistic way.”306
Now, according to Malpas’  reading of Davidson, it is precisely this kind of holistic
outlook on meaning and the mental found in various parts of Davidson’s work which connects
Davidson’s approach to interpretation and understanding with Gadamer’s. However, what the
account of Davidson’s and Hirsch’s views offered by Wheeler indicates is that intentionalist
approaches to interpretation need not be incongruent with this kind of outlook. In other words,
it is true that holism emphasizes the fact that “speakers’  intentions cannot be understood
independently of the holistic structure of which they are a part,”307 as  Malpas  claims.  Yet,
Malpas  does  not  manage  to  show  why  an  intentionalist  theory  could  not  be  built  upon  this
kind of assumption. At least Davidson’s own views do not suggest that there would be the
sort of incongruence between the two views invoked by Malpas. Now, if there is no such
incongruence, it seems that we are in a position to see why the negative stance towards
intentionalism a large part of contemporary hermeneutics involves rests on some overhasty
conclusions. The connection between holism and intentionalism that Davidson’s views give
the possibility of drawing implies that an intentionalist approach to interpretation and
understanding can be built on a foundation which shares certain fundamental elements with
the tradition of hermeneutics. To be sure, what this kind of holistic intentionalism ultimately
looks like is still rather unclear. What the connection between an intentionalist theory and a
holistic account of interpretation drawn here, however, does already show is that an
intentionalist  approach  does  not  have  to  involve  the  assumption  that  “the  miracle  of
understanding”  is made possible by “the fact that all individuality is pantheistically embraced
within the absolute,”  which Gadamer thinks is implied by the tenets of Schleiermacher and
Dilthey.308 In fact, the structure which is attributed to interpretation in this approach overlaps
in significant ways with the hermeneutic circle. However, there are also some crucial
differences. More importantly, the differences in question allow the Davidsonian position to
provide something Gadamer’s hermeneutics was accused of lacking above, that is, a detailed
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and resourceful framework for considering what sorts of prejudgments should not, ultimately,
be a part of our understanding.
Hypothetico-Deductive Method and the Hermeneutic Circle
The analysis of the hermeneutic method as the hypothetico-deductive method applied to
meaningful material offered by Dagfinn Föllesdal gives some initial indication of how
interpretation proceeds in the account of interpretation outlined in terms of Davidson’s
holism, as well as what sort of foundation it provides for separating true prejudgments from
false ones. Like Malpas, Föllesdal draws attention to the similarities between Davidson’s
views and the assumptions involved in hermeneutic accounts of understanding, Föllesdal
ultimately claiming that “philosophers belonging to very different traditions… have much to
learn from one another.”309 His assessment of the relationship between Davidson’s views and
those of hermeneutists is, however, different from the one suggested by Malpas above, for
Föllesdal thinks that the more refined analysis of understanding, especially as that question
concerns the place of rationality assumptions within it, is to be found in Davidson.310
Now, the reason why Föllesdal’s analysis is, ultimately, so revealing in this context is that
it keeps the idea that interpretation proceeds in a circular manner, that is, as a reconciliation
between general hypotheses and individual parts of a work, and always under certain
presumptions, here understood as hypotheses, both aspects of that process it is important for
Gadamer to emphasize. Simultaneously, however, the view provided by Föllesdal suggests
that to hold this sort of view does not imply a consequence which has usually been attributed
to it in the hermeneutic literature, that is, that the circular nature of interpretation between part
and whole would never achieve a point of termination, interpretation, thus, essentially being a
never-ending process. Föllesdal’s account of the circular nature of interpretation, in other
words, implies a far less mysterious reading of the fact that understanding proceeds in a
circular manner than the one present in the hermeneutic literature.311
The hermeneutist should not, however, greet this demystification with too much
opposition. This is because while indeed depriving the idea of the hermeneutic circle from the
kind of depth it has been assumed to possess in hermeneutics, Föllesdal’s account of the
hermeneutic method as the hypothetico-deductive method applied to meaningful material
simultaneously provides the hermeneutist with something he has been argued to be in need of
above, that is, a more rigid foundation for assessing validity in interpretation and
understanding. In other words, the analysis of the grounds of justification offered by Föllesdal
allows the Gadamerian hermeneutist to keep various fundamental elements of his views,
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while simultaneously providing him with something his forefather has failed to provide him
with.
Föllesdal insists that one of the reasons why philosophers associated with the hermeneutic
tradition, such as Jürgen Habermas, have failed to see the connection between the method
they believe the human sciences employ and the hypothetico-method they associate with the
natural and experimental sciences is that the conception of the hypothetico-deductive method
underlying their views has, in Föllesdal’s opinion, been rather vague and ultimately somewhat
distortive of what that belief formation system ultimately amounts to.
By the hypothetico-method Föllesdal understands a system in which beliefs are formed as
a result of the following operations: consequences are deduced from a set of hypotheses, and
the better the deduced consequences may be shown to “fit with our experiences and with our
other well-supported beliefs,”  the more justified we are in believing in those hypotheses the
system contains.312 In other words, a set of beliefs which make up a given hypothetico-
deductive system is more justified than a rival one the better the consequences deduced from
its  hypotheses  manage  to  survive  the  stream  of  empirical  data,  and  the  better  they  fit  with
beliefs and conceptions we have strong reasons for keeping.
Now, Föllesdal thinks that a method with a structure similar to the hypothetico-deductive
one is not only used in the case of literary interpretation, but in fact he argues that “the
hypothetico-deductive method is used wherever interpretation takes place.”313 That is, a given
interpretation has a set of consequences and the validity of the proposed interpretation is
assessed in regard to how those consequences fit with a set of data and with other beliefs and
theories we at a particular point hold. If the consequences deduced from a given hypothesis
cannot, for example, be reconciled with the data offered or if they are incompatible with
theories and conceptions we are reluctant to give up, there are good reasons for abandoning
the proposed interpretation altogether.314
As an example to elucidate how the hypothetico-deductive method ultimately works in the
case of literary interpretation Föllesdal introduces five different interpretations concerning the
character of the Stranger in Ibsen’s Peer Gynt. I shall not present a deep examination of the
details these interpretations involve, but just use them as an illumination of how the
hypothetico-deductive method is, in Föllesdal’s view, employed in the case of interpretation,
and  to  indicate  the  structural  similarities  it  shares  with  the  hermeneutic  circle.   The  oldest
interpretation of this character has been that the stranger “represents anxiety.”  This
interpretation has been supported by two pieces of evidence in particular, the first one
referring to the fact that “the stranger invariably appears in situations where Peer is anxious,”
while the other points out the influence that Sören Kierkegaard, that is, “the philosopher of
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anxiety,”  had on Ibsen.315 Föllesdal thinks that while apparently reasonable, this interpretation
of  the  stranger  may  be  objected  to  on  the  grounds  that  it  is,  ultimately,  a  rather  weak
explanation in the sense that the interpretation “accounts for very little of what is said about
the stranger in the play, and that there are other interpretations that do better than this one.”316
The third interpretation of the stranger considered by Föllesdal is one offered by Martin
Svendsen in 1922, which involves a hypothesis that the stranger is Ibsen himself. Svendsen
lists eight considerations which, in his opinion, speak in favor of the interpretation he
proposes, ranging from the claim that while the stranger has a craving to become Peer’s moral
guide, Ibsen had a similar desire with regard to the Norwegian people, to the observation that
the stranger and Ibsen have similar attitudes towards certain issues, such as the relationship
between time and change.317
I think there is no need to go into more detail, for these examples already point to those
factors of the hypothetico-deductive method which for Föllesdal explains its similarity with
the hermeneutic circle. In this model, interpretation involves a hypothesis, for example that
the stranger is Ibsen, from which a set of consequences is deduced, which spells out what
should be the case for the hypothesis to be believable. The hypothesis is then weighed against
individual parts of the work, the hypothesis becoming more justified as the set of data which
fit with the consequences grows larger. For example, the fact that the stranger possesses views
similar to those Ibsen holds is in this case meant to lend support to the hypothesis that the
stranger is Ibsen, for the fact that they should hold similar views on certain topics is a
consequence which may be deduced from the original hypothesis. This being so, it would to a
certain degree undermine the hypothesis that the stranger is Ibsen if their beliefs would not
overlap.
In addition to how the consequences deduced from the hypothesis fit with certain pieces
of evidence, the strength of the hypothesis is also based on what sort of information, theories,
and rules of inference have been relied on in deducing the consequences. That is, do the
consequences reasonably follow from the hypothesis? If the theories, beliefs etc. which have
been made use of when deducing the consequences from the hypothesis are themselves
questionable, the ability of the consequences to fit with certain pieces of evidence no longer
speaks  in  favor  of  the  hypothesis.  In  other  words,  it  can  be  asked  is  the  inference  from the
hypothesis that the stranger is Ibsen to the consequence that the stranger and Ibsen should
hold similar views in regard to certain topics for this to be the case a reasonable one? If the
answer to this question is negative, the fact that the views of the stranger overlap with those of
Ibsen no longer gives support to the view that the stranger is Ibsen.318
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The fact that the hypothetico-deductive method is used both in the natural sciences and in
the humanities does not, however, mean that there would be no differences between these two
areas of research. In Föllesdal’s view, one distinguishing factor between the two is the way in
which the relevant data is constituted. While it is indeed the case that even in the natural
sciences observation is theory-laden in the sense that the observations through which the data
is collected are influenced by our theories, in Föllesdal’s opinion, this is the case with the
humanities to a much larger extent. For example, in the case of ethics, our theories influence
our  ethical  intuitions  on  the  basis  of  which  the  relevant  data  is  collected,  the  kind  of  data
considered relevant thus changing as our theories change.319
That theories have a stronger effect on data collection in the case of the humanities is
precisely the factor which for Föllesdal brings out the similarities between the hypothetico-
deductive method and the hermeneutic circle. That is, in a way similar to how our theories
have an influence on our ethical intuitions, in the case of literary interpretation the
interpretation of individual words and parts of the work is influenced by our interpretation of
the whole work and the prejudgments with which we initially set out to interpret the work in
question. On the other hand, the way we interpret the individual parts of the work has an
effect on the way we begin to see the whole work. In Föllesdal’s opinion, this peculiar “back
and forth movement”  between part and whole characterizes the way inquiry proceeds both in
the case of the hypothetico-deductive method and in the hermeneutic circle.320
Now, the understanding of the hermeneutic circle apparent in Föllesdal’s account
corresponds to the way in which the core of that principle is usually formulated in the
hermeneutic literature. The similarity between Föllesdal’s and Gadamer’s approaches to
interpretation is that in them interpretation is always considered to proceed under certain
hypotheses or, as Gadamer would put it, under certain prejudgments. For Gadamer, these
prejudgments form the horizon through which the work under interpretation is constituted,
that horizon thus simultaneously determining a field “beyond which one cannot see,”321 while
for Föllesdal, the hypotheses single out from the stream of experience the data which is
relevant. The decisive difference between the two approaches to the circular nature of
interpretation, however, is that Föllesdal’s views imply that the different parts which make up
the system of hypotheses and consequences, are not as intertwined with each other as
Gadamer’s description of the hermeneutic circle assumes. The initial hypotheses do not
determine the interpretation process in as fundamental a way as prejudgments are considered
to in Gadamer’s hermeneutics. There is, in other words, much more room for considering the
validity of individual hypotheses, i.e., prejudgments, with which the work under interpretation
is initially approached than Gadamer’s approach allows. The effect of the initial prejudgments
on  the  interpretation  process,  as  well  as  on  the  assessment  whether  those  prejudgments  are
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valid or not and how they fit with the individual parts of the work, is much less extensive than
Gadamer’s description of the hermeneutic circle implies.
While Föllesdal’s account of the circular nature of interpretation ultimately departs from
Gadamer’s reading in certain respects, those features in Föllesdal’s analysis that serve to
distinguish it from the one offered by Gadamer can be seen to supplement Gadamer’s theory
precisely in the way it was considered to be in need of above. That is, while acknowledging
the importance of providing an adequate account of what validity in interpretation amounts to,
Gadamer was, nevertheless, shown to fail in providing such an account.
Now, it seems that Föllesdal’s account of the hermeneutic method as the hypothetico-
deductive method applied to meaningful material has at least an initial promise of faring
better, and this is mostly because of the looser understanding it involves of the relationship
holding between the different parts making up the circle of interpretation. In the last section of
this chapter, I shall investigate the kind of contribution that Davidson’s holistic account of
interpretation is able to make for the outlook on interpretation sketched by Föllesdahl,
especially concerning the question what sorts of factors may be relied on in the attempt to
separate true prejudgments from false ones.
Holism and the Circular Nature of Interpretation
Another factor that, in Föllesdal’s opinion, explains the differences between the humanities
and the natural sciences is the fact that rationality assumptions concerning the subject of
inquiry have a vital role in applications of the hypothetico-deductive method to the human
sciences, whereas in the natural sciences they have no role. This observation points out the
potential relevance that Davidson’s holistic account of interpretation may have for the issues
at hand. As seen in the previous chapter, the core of that view maintains that mental states
come as “a matched set,”  having logical and other kinds of relationships with each other. This
implies  that  the  attribution  of  one  mental  state  involves  locating  it  within  a  web  of  mental
states and propositional attitudes. It is precisely in this picture where Davidson’s contribution
to the issue at hand lies, for the holistic conception of interpretation apparent in his work
shows how every interpretation carries with itself assumptions about the person’s mental web
whose actions and products are under interpretation. What is now needed is a framework for
considering whether the mental web assumed in a particular interpretation is convincing or
not.
For Davidson, at a basic level, interpretation is an activity that consists of the continuous
formation of interpretive hypotheses, testing how those fit with bits of experience, and
altering one’s hypotheses and assumptions when they fail to fit with the relevant data. That is,
the prior theory with which the interpreter arrives at a particular speech or other kind of
interpretive situation may prove insufficient for achieving understanding in that case, for
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example because it is proven to contain false assumptions about the subject of interpretation.
It is also possible that the interpreter is compelled to alter his prior theory not because it
contains false assumptions, but because it is otherwise proven insufficient. For example, one
reason for the incapacity of the interpreter’s prior theory to provide the interpretation the
speaker intends his utterance to possess is that by relying on certain clues and other sorts of
contextual factors the speaker deliberately calls the interpreter to alter his prior theory so that
his passing theory ultimately manages to provide the interpretation the speaker intends his
utterance to possess.
Now, the supplementation that Davidson’s holistic picture of interpretation manages to
provide for Föllesdal’s analysis is that it contains a highly detailed picture of what sorts of
factors are relevant when assessing the strength of a particular set of evidence. That is, it
manages to establish a foundation for considering such questions as, why certain kinds of
factors lend support for a certain kind of interpretation while speaking against others, and
what sorts of factors are important in evaluating the validity of the assumptions which have
been relied on in the formation of a particular interpretive hypothesis. It achieves this by
inserting the interpretive hypothesis into a complex account of human mentality. By doing so,
Davidson’s holistic account can provide an explanation of why, for example, a certain
perceptual feature of an artwork serves as evidence for a particular interpretation about that
work,  that  is,  what  the  presence  of  a  particular  feature  may  be  an  indication  of.  Every
interpretation involves assumptions about the mentality of the person whose actions, words,
and products are under interpretation, and Davidson’s holism provides a framework for
considering whether those assumptions are reasonable or not. To take an example I used
earlier, the interpretation of the ending of Shostakovich’s fifth symphony as an apotheosis of
an empty triumph is supported by referring to the tempo of the ending, which is markedly
slower than in the case of other triumphant symphonies in the Western symphonic tradition.
That is, the interpretation that Shostakovich intended the symphony’s ending to represent an
empty triumph may be supported by referring to its considerably slow tempo, for it could be
argued that the composer believed that by choosing that kind of tempo for the ending a person
with proper background knowledge is able to understand the ending in that way, and
fortunately the members of the Politburo were not among them. One can, of course, hold a
wholly different interpretation of the symphony’s ending, while acknowledging that the
tempo marking is indeed slow. However, what Davidson’s holistic view of interpretation
shows is that that interpretation would mean attributing a completely different kind of mental
web for Shostakovich. It, in other words, would have to explain the presence of the slow
tempo marking by other means. Or one can, of course, ignore the slow tempo as irrelevant in
the way Toscanini did, that is, by claiming that Shostakovich just simply failed.
Now, the overlap between Föllesdal’s account of the hypothetico-deductive method
applied to meaningful material and Davidson’s holistic view of interpretation is precisely
shown in the way they both see interpretation to involve a particular kind of back and forth
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movement between individual hypotheses and the evidence supposed to support them. In this
respect, they attribute to interpretation a structure similar to the one which it is seen to possess
in the hermeneutic circle. However, the significant point which emerges from Föllesdal’s and
Davidson’s  accounts  is  that  they  show how in  hermeneutics  too  deterministic  a  relationship
tends to be attributed between the initial assumptions interpretation springs from and the
course interpretation is able to take, as well as to what sorts of hypotheses the interpretation
process is ultimately able to arrive at. The cautionary factors which Georgia Warnke raises in
her investigation of the hermeneutic circle, for example, reveal the structure that interpretation
is seen to possess in this kind of view. In her opinion, a view of interpretation that otherwise
emphasizes its situated nature, must, nevertheless, construe the circular nature of
interpretation in a way that the circle does not become “a vicious one.”  That is, even though
the interpreter cannot escape her prejudgments, their role in the interpretation process must
not be construed in such a way as to become merely “self-confirming”  in character.322 This
possible  trouble  with  the  hermeneutic  circle  also  relates  to  the  problem  of  subjectivism
Warnke sees Gadamer’s hermeneutics to face, that is, how one separates true understanding
from distortive cases, while keeping to the essential circular and situated character of
interpretation. In sum, how does one avoid the conclusion that the interpretation process does
not merely end up confirming the validity of those prejudgments with which the interpreter
initially approaches the work?
The way the holistic character of interpretation is construed in Föllesdal’s and Davidson’s
accounts  allows  one  to  avoid  this  conclusion.  In  fact,  from  their  point  of  view,  testing  the
validity of interpretations, as well as the assumptions lying behind them, is a task that does
not need extraordinary effort. On the contrary, if the validity of a given interpretive
hypothesis depends on the consequences which may be drawn from it, these consequences
stating what must be the case for the hypothesis to be believable, judging the interpretive
hypothesis primarily consists of seeing whether these states of affairs obtain or not, and
whether the consequences, which are supposed to lend support for the hypothesis, may be said
to reasonably follow from the hypothesis. In other words, does the realization of a particular
state of affairs offer support for the hypothesis? The less convincingly the consequences are
considered to follow from the hypothesis,  the less their  realization offers support  for it.  It  is
precisely this field of problems to which the holistic view of interpretation offered by
Davidson provides a substantial contribution.
Although in this scenario interpretation is essentially seen to proceed in a circular motion
involving continuous efforts to make and match, it is hardly likely that the circular motion
becomes a vicious circle, at least in the sense that the interpretation process would become so
heavily guided by the initial hypotheses as to merely confirm them. In Gadamer’s opinion, the
fact that interpretation always involves prejudgments implies that “a person who is trying to
322 Warnke (1987, 87).
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understand a text is always projecting,”  which, in turn, has the consequence that “the initial
meaning emerges only because he is reading the text with particular expectations in regard to
a certain meaning.”323 The holistic character of interpretation assumed in this view is
precisely the factor which connects Gadamer’s approach to those developed by Föllesdal and
Davidson. However, what their views simultaneously indicate is that hermeneutists tend to go
too far in their assessement of what acknowledging the circular character of interpretation
implies. In other words, while interpretation indeed always involves presuppositions, that
does not mean there is a danger for those presuppositions to become merely self-confirmed by
the interpretation, for though the interpreter is, indeed, always “projecting”  in the sense that
her activity is always guided by certain initial assumptions, the holistic picture of
interpretation developed on the basis of Föllesdal’s and Davidson’s views above shows that it
is  possible  to  establish  considerations  concerning  the  validity  of  those  assumptions  guiding
interpretation on a rigid foundation, while still holding on to the essential holistic character of
interpretation.
5. Conclusions
The defense of intentionalism carried out in this chapter can be divided into two stages. In the
first case, by undermining the view on the historically conditioned nature of understanding
Gadamer’s hermeneutics involves, the investigations presented in the first parts of this chapter
lend indirect support to an intentionalist view of interpretation, for the critical stance a large
part of contemporary hermeneutics has taken towards intentionalism has assumed that
Gadamer’s hermeneutics manages to successfully describe the formation of our
understanding. Now, if that is not the case, a major premise in the hermeneutic argument
against intentionalism founders.
Above, it was claimed that in addition to the alleged superiority of Gadamer’s analysis of
understanding and interpretation over intentionalist accounts, another important cause for the
neglect of intentionalist approaches to interpretation within contemporary hermeneutics is the
way they are still tightly associated with forms of hermeneutics reigning during the age of
Romanticism and with the problematic views of human subjectivity those have been assumed
to involve. I argued that Donald Davidson’s holistic account of interpretation, meaning, and
the mental gives a possibility for formulating a view of interpretation stressing the importance
of the author’s intentions on a philosophical foundation, which shares some crucial elements
with hermeneutic views on interpretation and understanding. It is thus arguable that that kind
of intentionalist theory does not involve those problematic assumptions which contemporary
hermeneutists have attributed to the theories of Schleiermacher and Dilthey.
323 TM, 269; WM, 251.
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The defense of intentionalism presented in the latter parts of this chapter took a different
form. It was argued that views of interpretation which attribute a vital role to the author’s
intentions should undergo a revival in hermeneutic theory not because hermeneutic criticisms
of  intentionalism rest  on  shaky ground,  but  because  of  a  particular  insufficiency  Gadamer’s
hermeneutics was seen to be troubled by. While acknowledging the need to separate true
prejudgments from false ones, Gadamer’s hermeneutics was seen to be unable to provide
ample resources for such a separation. This conclusion was not only taken to show that the
differences between Hirsch’s literary theory and Gadamer’s hermeneutics are not as severe as
some of Gadamer’s followers have made them out to be, it also provides strong grounds for
granting intentionalist views on interpretation a new hearing within hermeneutics, for the
question regarding the foundations of validity in interpretation forms the core of that
approach.
This conclusion led to a discussion of Föllesdal’s reading of the hermeneutic method as
the hypothetico-deductive method applied to meaningful material, which was then
supplemented by Davidson’s ideas on the holistic nature of interpretation. That investigation
proved  relevant,  for  it  showed  how  one  is  able  to  hold  on  to  the  view  that  interpretation
essentially proceeds in a circular manner, that is, as a form of making and matching between
parts and wholes, without letting the circular motion involved become a vicious one. This is
precisely the trouble Warnke saw lurking behind the view of interpretation involved in the
hermeneutic circle, and which, in her opinion, compels Gadamer to provide a more rigid
foundation for assessing which prejudgments allow us to understand truthfully and which
merely distort understanding. However, at least the means offered by Gadamer in Truth and
Method for meeting this challenge were considered unsuccessful. It is precisely this defect in
Gadamer’s hermeneutic account of interpretation which Föllesdal’s and Davidson’s views
were considered to be able to fill. So, it seems that, in the end, everybody wins.
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Jaufré
Have you recited my poems to her?
The Pilgrim
My memory is not good enough, I merely hummed.
Jaufré (almost shouting with rage)
Merely! What do you mean by merely? I spend my days and
nights composing my songs, each not and each rhyme of which
must pass the sternest test. I undress and dress twenty times, thirty
times, before I find the precise word that has been hanging in the
sky for all eternity, awaiting its destination. And you, you merely
recited them? You merely hummed them? You wretch! You
wretch! How could you betray me thus and go on to pretending to
be my friend?
Kaija Saariaho, L’amour du loin, act three, libretto  Amin Maalouf
IV Richard Rorty’s Pragmatist Challenge to Intentionalism
Although Donald Davidson’s philosophical views did not have a substantial effect on the
critical reading of modern philosophy which Richard Rorty presents in his Philosophy and the
Mirror of Nature (1979), in time Rorty received his most significant analytic influences from
Davidson. In particular, Davidson’s views on language, as well as the way Davidson sees the
relationship between mind and world to be constructed, signified for Rorty “the culmination
of the holist and pragmatist strains in contemporary analytic philosophy.”324 Given the
influence that these elements of Davidson’s philosophy have had on Rorty, it is strange what
different views their respective theories of interpretation exemplify and, furthermore, how
seldom these differences have been observed, let alone carefully considered in the
literature.325 While  Davidson’s  texts  on  literature  and  interpretation  support  a  form  of
intentionalism, as has become apparent already in this thesis, in Rorty’s pragmatist theory, the
author’s intentions have virtually no position at all, but Rorty, instead, insists on a radical
form of interpretive pluralism.
In this chapter, the two main topics of this thesis –  the strength of intentionalist accounts
of interpretation and relativism in interpretation –  are addressed as they arise in Rorty’s views
on interpretation and the cultural position set for literature in his work. Rorty’s approach to
these issues is connected with the different strands of his general pragmatist philosophy.
According to Björn Ramberg, Rorty’s philosophy as a whole is divided into a negative and a
positive side. The former consists of Rorty’s metaphilosophical project of undermining what
he takes to be the defining project of modern philosophy, which gave rise to the conception of
324 Rorty (1991, 117).
325 For example, there are no references to Rorty’s views in the articles Dasenbrock (2002), Stroud-Drinkwater
(2002), and Hagberg (2002) that comprise the symposium “Davidson and Literary Understanding”  in Philosophy
and Literature vol. 26 (2002).
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the human mind in which it was likened to a mirror of nature, and which saw philosophy as a
discipline whose task it was to uncover the conditions under which that mirror could be said
to represent reality most accurately. The positive side, in turn, outlines an intellectual culture
in which the metaphors resulting from the traditional problems of epistemology no longer
serve as guiding principles, but instead Rorty explores the ways in which philosophy can
make a fuller and more wide-ranging contribution to the edification of human culture.326
Especially in analytic circles Rorty’s views on interpretation have not been that
extensively discussed. It has also gone largely unnoticed that Rorty’s work on interpretation
and literature poses a serious challenge to intentionalist approaches to interpretation and that
they raise issues which have not been previously examined in depth. The account of Rorty’s
philosophical views offered by Ramberg gives a possibility for looking at Rorty’s criticism of
intentionalism from two sides. In the first case, an intentionalist approach is seen to involve
assumptions similar to those which make a large part of modern philosophy suspect in Rorty’s
eyes. The intentionalist at least implicitly commits himself to a distinction between what
properties a work of art has in itself and what it acquires as a result of our changing needs and
practices. For Rorty, Hirsch’s distinction between meaning and significance demonstrates that
intentionalist views truly involve this kind of assumption. On the other hand, the pragmatist-
oriented philosopher calls precisely this sort of distinction into question. From the emphasis
that the pragmatist puts on practices and contextuality it follows that the question regarding
the validity of interpretation becomes a practice-internal question as well, which is to say that
it always happens against the backdrop of a certain cultural or historical setting and the norms
and values it involves. For these reasons, the author’s intentions cannot serve as a basis for
grounding the validity of interpretations as the intentionalist assumes.327
In the second case, which I shall here dub the Postmetaphysical Critique for sake of
convenience, Rorty’s reasons for finding intentionalism an impoverished approach follows
from the position Rorty outlines for literature and literary theory in his postmetaphysical
culture sketched on the ruins of epistemology-centered philosophy. The importance of
literature for this kind of culture follows from the emphasis that is laid on the enhancement of
solidarity in the approach to ethics it adopts. In a postmetaphysical period, “moral philosophy
takes the form of historical narration and utopian speculation rather than of a search for
general principles.”328 Thus, through their narrative form literary works become important
modes of moral investigation and possible sources of the kind of attentiveness which, in
Rorty’s opinion, is a desirable capacity in a society founded on the importance of solidarity.
Uncovering the elements that make literary works significant for Rorty’s postmetaphysical
view  of  ethics,  however,  requires  a  specific  kind  of  approach  to  them,  and  Rorty  does  not
consider an intentionalist theory to be such an approach.
326 Ramberg (2001).
327 Rorty (1992, 93-94).
328 Rorty (1989, 60).
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Now, both sides of the intentionalist critique which may be drawn from Rorty’s work
raise  issues  which  have  not  been  taken  into  proper  consideration  before.  As  pointed  out  in
chapter two, modest versions of intentionalism currently supported in analytic philosophy of
art are very rarely formulated against the backdrop of a systematic philosophical account of
the human mind. Rorty’s approach to philosophy of mind not only criticizes certain answers
to individual philosophical problems, but, ultimately, questions the very soundness of a
particular, and, in Rorty’s opinion dominant framework in which the mind has been
philosophically thought about. Consequently, taking up Rorty’s critique stemming from his
critique of modern philosophy, here referred to as the Inner Eye Critique, may be said to steer
the issue of intentionalism towards more fundamental waters than has previously been the
case.
Rorty’s Postmetaphysical Critique, in turn, connects philosophy of interpretation with a
wholly  different  kind  of  question.  In  this  case,  it  raises  issues  similar  to  those  which  have
motivated some philosophers to ascribe an important role to literature in moral philosophy.
The challenge this aspect of Rorty’s work poses for intentionalist approaches is that it
suggests that theories of interpretation should take the ethical significance of literature into
account and that intentionalism is a view which does not manage this in a successful manner.
In the previous chapter, Davidson’s ideas initially introduced in chapter two proved
relevant, for the intentionalist theory developed there on the basis of them managed to show
that some of the criticisms of that interpretative position which have appeared in
contemporary hermeneutics rested on certain misguided and outdated assumptions. The
contribution of Davidson’s views on an intentionalist theory of interpretation, however, is not
exhausted by the use they were put in the previous chapter, but they prove highly relevant for
assessing the ultimate standing of the intentionalist critique Rorty’s work involves. In fact, it
is my belief, that Davidson’s work contains elements which call into question both sides of
Rorty’s intentionalist critique.
1. The Inner Eye Critique of Intentionalism
Rorty’s work does not contain extensive discussions in which he would connect the view of
the human mind he opposes with the standing of intentionalist theories of interpretation.
However, some comments made by Rorty suggest that he does indeed hold the view that the
kind of primacy given to the author’s intentions in this approach assumes a relationship
between mind and world similar to the one the metaphor mirror of nature is intended to
capture. The only version of intentionalism which Rorty discusses at length is E.D. Hirsch’s
literary  theory.  One  of  the  elements  which  Rorty  sees  as  problematic  is  the  philosophical
background of Hirsch’s theory. Although his theory can hardly be considered a simple
application of a philosophical theory of meaning to the field of literary theory, it,
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nevertheless, draws heavily at times on Edmund Husserl’s phenomenological account of
meaning.329 However, it is precisely the Husserlian undercurrents of Hirsch’s views which
render them suspect in Rorty’s eyes,330 and he, in fact, explicitly contrasts the kind of
“building block”  view of the mind Rorty thinks this approach is committed to with the
holistic outlook he supports, and with which he tries to dethrone the dominance of the
representationalist paradigm.331
This strand of Rorty’s critique of intentionalism is interesting, for it immediately points
out the relevance of Davidson’s views. This is because while Davidson and Rorty share a
holistic conception of the human mind, and, for example, attack a form of philosophy in
which epistemological problems are considered to form the core problems of philosophy
from this viewpoint, they, nevertheless, draw different conclusions from this kind of holistic
emphasis for interpretation. Rorty’s brief comments overlook the possibility that an
intentionalist theory of interpretation could, in fact, be formulated on a very different kind of
view of the human mind than the one he believes underpins Hirsch’s theory. It is precisely
this possibility that Davidson’s work reveals. As we saw in chapter two, Rorty has been
highly inspired by the holistic conception of the human mind found in Davidson’s work, and
in Rorty’s view, the implications of Davidson’s ideas, in fact, become one of the most
important formulations with which to undermine the representationalist conception of the
human mind. According to Rorty, the ultimate moral that should be drawn from Davidson’s
holism is that we should “think of the collection of those things [mental states] as being the
self rather than as something which the self has. The latter notion is a leftover of the
traditional Western temptation to model thinking on vision, to postulate an ‘inner eye’  which
inspects inner states.”332
Rorty, moreover, thinks that because of the scattered nature of Davidson’s publication
record “it falls to his admirers to attempt a synoptic view of his work,”  as well as to consider
its implications for certain age-old philosophical questions, like skepticism, for example.333
However, as pointed out in chapter two, in the later phases of his philosophical career
Davidson began to consider the wider relevance of his views for the same questions that
Rorty concentrated. In both cases the result was, in Marc Joseph’s words, “a critique of
traditional idea about truth, scepticism and relativism, and the relation of subjectivity and
objectivity.”334 In  this  respect,  it  is  not  a  surprise  that,  like  Rorty,  Davidson  sees  his  own
philosophy a part of a more general philosophical development in which “a revised view of
the relation of mind and the world”  is insisted upon.335
329 See, for example, Hirsch (1984, 203-204).
330 Rorty (1991, 88).
331 Ibid. (150n61).
332 Ibid. (123).
333 Ibid. (113).
334 Joseph (2004, 102).
335 Davidson (2001, 43).
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Now, observing these similarities between Davidson’s and Rorty’s thinking do not
merely serve exegetical purposes, but the above account, in fact, shows problems in the
assumptions on which Rorty’s Inner Eye Critique of intentionalism rest. That is, the kind of
connection that may be drawn between holism and intentionalism on the basis of Davidson’s
views suggests that an intentionalist theory of interpretation does not have to involve the sort
of view of the human mind found deplorable by Rorty in any kind of inevitable way, but that
it can, ultimately, be built upon a similar view of the mind that Rorty holds. This, in turn,
implies that even if Rorty’s criticism of Hirsch’s literary theory were accurate, it,
nevertheless, fails to evolve into a general criticism of an intentionalist approach to
interpretation, eventually covering every possible formulation of the view. For both Rorty
and Davidson, holism marks “a distrust of the whole epistemological enterprise.”336
However, the way Davidson combines holism with an intentionalist view of interpretation
shows that that distrust need not imply a similar assessment in philosophy of interpretation.
That  is,  commitment  to  holism does  not  entail  a  need  to  give  up  on  the  attempt  to  form a
foundation for assessing the validity of interpretations and neither does it compel one to
abandon intentionalist conceptions of interpretation.
2. The Postmetaphysical Critique of Intentionalism
This  reply  to  Rorty’s  Inner  Eye  Critique  is  as  short  as  are  Rorty’s  comments  on  the  larger
philosophical background assumptions he believes intentionalist views of interpretation
involve. However, it is rather in the Postmetaphysical Critique where the full thrust of the
critical view of intentionalism involved in Rorty’s pragmatism becomes apparent, for it is
tightly connected to different parts of his philosophical work. Together these form a highly
powerful and interesting critique of intentionalism which raises issues into consideration in
relation  to  which  the  standing  of  intentionalist  views  have  not  been  examined  in  depth
before.
Rorty’s Postmetaphysical Critique challenges intentionalist theories of interpretation by
drawing attention to features of literary works which make them valuable in relation to
certain ethico-societal issues that have a fundamental position in Rorty’s liberal culture. The
core of the Postmetaphysical Critique maintains that intentionalist theories are ill-equipped
to meet those challenges Rorty’s postmetaphysical culture sets for literature. One of the
central values holding this kind of society together is the feeling of solidarity between human
beings.  Rorty  does  not,  however,  believe  that  its  centrality  follows  from  some  kind  of
metaphysical ground, but, rather, its crucial nature should be understood in more pragmatic
terms. That is, “the right way to take the slogan ‘We have obligations to human beings
336 Rorty (1979, 181). Compare with Davidson (2001, 47).
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simply as such’  is as a means of reminding ourselves to keep trying to expand our sense of
‘us’  as far as we can…, to create a more expansive sense of solidarity than we presently
have.”337
Because of the central position reserved for solidarity, Rorty thinks that moral reflection
characteristic of his postmetaphysical culture should be guided by an attitude “against theory,
toward[s] narrative.”  Here narrative is understood as a form of discourse which gives up the
attempt to establish the binding nature of vocabularies and moral intuitions on a connection
between reality lying beyond human traditions and practices. Instead, it focuses on
contemplating the variety of aspects involved in human encounters.338 While narrative
investigations embrace the contingent and creative features of human life, thus taking the side
of poetry in the age-old debate between poetry and philosophy over their bearing on human
life, theory strives “to achieve universality by the transcendence of contingency.”339 Even
though the acceptance of contingency becomes the favored attitude this does not, in Rorty’s
opinion, remove the importance of solidarity, but just the terms in which it should be
understood; “solidarity has to be constructed out of little pieces, rather than found already
waiting….”340 Solidarity is, therefore, for Rorty an inherently local phenomenon, which is to
say that it must be constructed out of different elements in different contexts, rather than
something to be explained in terms of a common human nature people share.
Rorty’s belief in literature’s capacity to serve an important function in his
postmetaphysical, liberal culture follows from the central place that solidarity occupies in it,
as  well  as  from  what  Rorty  takes  its  enhancement  to  require.341 By  providing  their  readers
with descriptions of “strange people (Alcibiades, Julien Sorel), [and] strange families (the
Karamazovs, the Casaubons),”  literary works provide descriptions of encounters between
human beings which the reader may not previously have had to face, thus enabling him to
reflect on the problems and challenges these unfamiliar situations pose for human beings, as
well as the ways in which the different values and interests coming into conflict in them can
be connected with one another.342 These features, in turn, may give rise to more refined
descriptions for people’s conceptual armory with which they relate to other human beings and
groups. This is the reason why Rorty finds literature an important mode of discourse in his
postmetaphysical culture. That is, since for Rorty the enhancement of solidarity essentially
involves the creation of descriptions on the basis of which it is possible to discern salient
features between human groups, and to see certain differences as irrelevant when compared to
these features, literature can ultimately increase its presence.343
337 Rorty (1989, 196).
338 Ibid. (xvi).
339 Ibid. (25).
340 Ibid. (94).
341 Ibid. (60).
342 Ibid. (80).
343 Ibid. (107).
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The fulfillment of those needs Rorty’s postmetaphysical culture sets for literature,
however, requires a particular approach. That Rorty finds intentionalist theories of
interpretation insufficient with regard to these challenges may be seen from the position Rorty
assigns for a person he calls “the liberal ironist”  in his postmetaphysical culture. Since this
sort of person holds an utterly skeptical attitude towards the existence of intrinsic natures, she
believes that there is no privileged way in which objects should be approached. This depends,
instead, on the changing desires of our culture, as well as on the specific needs a particular
situation may call for. Redescriptions of objects and events serve as the primary tool with
which the ironist pursues those transformations she finds her culture to be in need of. In
Rorty’s words, “ironists specialize in redescribing ranges of objects or events in partially
neologistic jargon, in the hope of inciting people to adopt and extend that jargon.”344
Since Rorty considers “literary criticism”  a more up-to-date name with which to capture
the characteristic features of the liberal ironist’s activity, Rorty’s views on interpretation
become intimately connected with his account of this individual.345 In  particular,  that  Rorty
draws this kind of connection between the two indicates that a theory guided by intentionalist
principles is a long way from being an approach, which is able to provide those tools for the
ironist that the position sketched for her by Rorty require. Rather, the liberal ironist takes her
inspiration from such interpreters as Harold Bloom, that is, from a critic who asks “neither the
author nor the text about their intentions but simply beats the text into a shape which will
serve his own purpose. He does this by imposing a vocabulary… on the text which may have
nothing to do with any vocabulary used in the text or by its author, and seeing what
happens.”346
3. Rorty’s Theory of Interpretation and the Problem of Relativism
The approach to literature Rorty’s sketch of a postmetaphysical culture involves could be
considered admirable in the context of philosophy of art since it attaches a value to literature
which  is  exceptional  in  philosophy.  Nevertheless,  that  view also  comes  with  a  price,  for  it
raises certain problems for Rorty’s account of interpretation which may ultimately be
damaging to its general credibility. The problem Rorty is now in danger of confronting is a
difficulty which his general pragmatist philosophy has frequently had to face. The claim is
that Rorty’s philosophical views embody conceptions of truth, knowledge, and reality that
make his theory as a whole no different from some form of relativism. That Rorty’s views
ultimately lead to this conclusion is seen to follow from his way of abandoning realistic
344 Ibid. (78).
345 Ibid.
346 Rorty (1982, 151).
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conceptions of truth and from his denial that the justification of beliefs, conceptions, and
values could be built on a firm basis once the idea of this kind of truth has been relinquished.
Arguments against relativistic ideas with a form similar to the one addressed to Rorty
have also appeared in philosophy of interpretation. In this case, relativism has been opposed
by arguing that commitment to relativism is in danger of putting the very meaningfulness of
criticism in doubt. This is an assumption which is shared by theorists who otherwise support
significantly  opposing  views  on  interpretation,  such  as  E.D.  Hirsch  and  Monroe  C.
Beardsley. They both see a shared standard against which the comparative validity of
interpretations can be assessed as the prerequisite of the meaningfulness of criticism and
interpretation.347 Their disagreement precisely concerns the question what sort of entity can
serve such a purpose. Since Rorty does not feel the need to posit the kind of standard whose
acknowledgment both Beardsley and Hirsch have considered underpins the meaningfulness
of criticism, it would seem possible to undermine the view of interpretation Rorty supports
by relying on factors similar to those that have come up in the criticisms addressed to his
more general philosophical views.
In fact, a substantial part of the commentary literature on Rorty’s pragmatism focuses
precisely on the question whether the theory does involve relativistic implications, and
whether  this  conclusion  would  have  substantial  consequences  for  its  general  validity.  The
recurrence of the charge of relativism did not, however, weaken Rorty’s trust in the ability of
his theory to overcome the problem of relativism.348 For example, a decisive reason that, in
Rorty’s opinion, speaks against his theory being considered a form of relativism is that it
offers  no  positive  account  of  truth.  To  be  sure,  one  of  its  chief  goals  is  to  replace  realistic
conceptions of truth with a view in which the validity and justification of theories can only
be assessed on the basis of our current beliefs, not on the basis of how they correspond to a
reality independent of them. However, to embrace this kind of outlook on justification does
not lead to the view that truth is defined relative  to  those  beliefs  and  conceptions  we  at  a
certain point of time hold. What this observation, in Rorty’s opinion, shows is that the view
does not involve the relativistic conception according to which truth is defined relative  to
something, be that a culture, a conceptual scheme or some other kind of vocabulary.349
Despite Rorty’s numerous replies, skeptical voices still prevail which do not see Rorty’s
way of overcoming the problem of relativism as convincing.350 Now, although the relativistic
consequences of Rorty’s pragmatism have been considered many times before, I shall
nevertheless take the issue up again here. My primary motivation for doing so is that it is my
belief that the factors which appear with regard to the Postmetaphysical Critique of
intentionalism provide a novel framework in which to consider it. In particular, this approach
347 Hirsch (1967, 26); Beardsley (1970).
348 See, for example, Rorty (1979, 373-379), (1991, 23-24, 30, 66-67), (1993), (1999, xvi-xxxii), (2000).
349 Rorty (1991, 50).
350 See for example, Baghramian (2004, 144-151); Blackburn (2005).
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to the issue gives a possibility for considering whether the metaphilosophical factors Rorty
has relied on in his attempt to overcome the charge of relativism are convincing. Rorty’s
response may be characterized as metaphilosophical in character, for it seeks to move the
whole issue onto a different level. In other words, Rorty ultimately refuses to meet his critics
on  their  own  turf,  but  rather  he  tries  to  undermine  the  authority  of  the  philosophical
framework which, in Rorty’s opinion, gives fuel to the argument presented by those who
oppose his views.
It is worthwhile to take up Rorty’s metaphilosophical argument in this context, for in
philosophy of art a similar kind of argument has been presented in favour of relativistic
accounts of interpretation. While discussing the standing of intentionalist theories of
interpretation, Noël Carroll invents an argument which is intended to explore whether reliance
on factors  which  Carroll  collects  under  the  heading  “reasons  of  art”  would  lend  support  for
relativistic theories of interpretation with implications similar to those Rorty’s theory
involves. The core of this argument insists that while it is indeed the case that intentionalist
theories of interpretation manage to overcome certain problems to which theories of a more
relativistic bent have been seen to fall into, this still does not give sufficient reasons for
favoring intentionalism over a view of interpretation embodying a relativistic attitude towards
justification. This is because the view of engagement with artworks implied by an
intentionalist approach is characterized by features which may be argued to be inconsistent
with a widely held conception regarding the origins of art’s value. For example, such factors
which are linked with art’s capacity to be thought provoking and a source of aesthetic
experience well after a given artwork has been completed. The “reasons of art”  argument
invented  by  Carroll  draws  attention  to  the  possibility  that  by  setting  boundaries  on  how
artworks are to be approached derived from the author’s intentions intentionalist views may in
some ways be incompatible with the supposed inexhaustible nature of art. Since it is arguable
that theories of interpretation should at least to a certain extent try to accommodate these
features within their approach, the issue between intentionalism and relativism involves more
complicated factors than figures such as Beardsley and Hirsch have presumed.351
Now, although Carroll does not explicitly refer to Rorty’s pragmatism while developing
“the reasons of art”  argument against intentionalism, the factors which emerge in it are
similar in kind to the metaphilosophical reasons on which Rorty seeks to ground his
postmetaphysical approach to literature. For example, Rorty claims that the pragmatist view
of interpretation he develops does not receive its justification from traditional metaphysical
and epistemological backup, but rather from the inspiring examples, i.e., creative
interpretations, that it encourages and for which it clears a space.352 This way of defending
his interpretive approach is connected with the metaphilosophical factors Rorty relies on in
support of his general pragmatism. These metaphilosophical reasons, in Rorty’s opinion, call
351 Carroll (2001/1992, 170).
352 Rorty (1982, 154).
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for a reevaluation of the charge of relativism, for it undermines the philosophical framework
on which the argument’s power rests, that is, the sort of framework which is structured
according to various Platonic dualisms. Instead of “relativists,”  Rorty maintains that a more
accurate name for philosophers such as himself would be “anti-Platonists.”  That is, “we anti-
Platonists cannot permit ourselves to be called ‘relativists,’  since that description begs the
central  question.  That  central  question  is  about  the  utility  of  the  vocabulary  which  we
inherited from Plato and Aristotle.”353
Hilary Putnam has perhaps most persistently argued that Rorty’s pragmatism ultimately
falls into an unacceptable form of relativism. In one of his many replies to Putnam, Rorty
again refuses to accept what his theory is being accused of, because he thinks that the very
terms must be altered with which the merits of a given conception or theory is to be judged.
That is, rather than seeing this as a metaphysical question regarding how our theories and
vocabularies correspond to an independent reality, justification should be considered an issue
that concerns the “convenience”  of our theories and vocabularies.354 For  Rorty,  this
transformation precisely means that philosophical debates are modulated from “a
methodological key”  into an “ethico-political key,”  in the sense that “now one is debating
what purposes are worth bothering to fulfill….”355
Now, once Rorty’s argument against intentionalism is framed in these terms, it becomes
apparent that his criticism of intentionalism does not merely consist of showing that the thesis
presupposes certain dubious conceptions of the human mind, but rather it aims to question the
very convenience of such theories. Once Rorty’s theory of interpretation is set up against his
social goals it turns out to be manifestly “a recommendation.”  In other words, it suggests that
certain topics have become unprofitable, and that they should be abandoned in favor of
questions which are more relevant in the light of those needs and concerns that emerge in
Rorty’s postmetaphysical culture.356 In this respect, Rorty’s account of interpretation and his
societal  goals  meet.  At  the  end,  his  theory  of  interpretation  may  be  seen  as  “just  one  more
terminological suggestion made on behalf of the same cause, the cause of providing
contemporary liberal culture with a vocabulary which is all its own, cleansing it of the
residues of a vocabulary which was suited to the needs of former days.”357 Evidently, Rorty
considers an interpretation theory which is grounded in intentionalist terminology and which
understands validity in its terms as this kind of obsolete theory. Mirror or no mirror, by setting
definite boundaries on interpretations, intentionalist theories become incapable of responding
to those challenges Rorty sees literary theory and literature face in a postmetaphysical culture.
The author’s intentions have to be discarded so that literature’s capacity to provide novel
descriptions for addressing moral and societal questions can come to its fullest. This is what
353 Rorty (1999, xviii).
354 Rorty (1993, 457).
355 Rorty (1991, 110).
356 Ibid. (154)
357 Rorty (1989, 55).
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Rorty’s Postmetaphysical Critique ultimately amounts to, and it provides a novel viewpoint
on some of the central topics in philosophy of interpretation.
4. Interpretation and Imagination: Does Rorty’s Ironist need to be a
Bloomian?
There is an issue that provides an interesting framework for considering Rorty’s challenge,
namely imagination. There are basically three reasons why I think the phenomenon of
imagination provides an interesting perspective on Rorty’s Postmetaphysical Critique. First,
imagination is a capacity which is in many ways connected with the central values and
virtues of Rorty’s liberalism, such as openmindedness and the ability to weigh different
options. Both capacities require the use of imagination, at least to a certain degree. Second,
the importance of imagination for Rorty’s liberalism is due to the place that faculty may be
seen to hold in the liberal ironist’s activity. That is, the more refined her imagination, the
more refined redescriptions she is presumably able to produce, her activities thus becoming
more profitable in regard to Rorty’s postmetaphysical needs the more her imagination
functions improve.358
The third and most important reason why I have decided to take up the issue of
imagination here is that some pragmatist-inspired moral philosophers have recently argued
that imagination should, in fact, hold a vital role in moral reflection. Their approach to ethics
shares motivations and goals with Rorty’s postmetaphysical view of moral theory. For
example, echoing Rorty’s wish to construct moral theory on a more narrative foundation,
Steven Fesmire argues that moral philosophy should no longer take as its goal a search for
universal principles, but it should, instead, pay more attention to the “situational exigencies”
moral  situations  involve  and  the  way  people  are  capable  of  making  sense  of  them.   For
Fesmire, this development requires “a shift in the centre of gravity of ethics from
foundational principles to imagination….”359 Moral situations may, and often do involve
different, possibly conflicting interests and ambiguities, which cannot be resolved in a
straightforward manner by, for example, relying on a rule whose force everybody of
relevance acknowledges. Consequently, reflective moral deliberation must be accompanied
by a faculty which manages to take hold of the complexities a particular situation may
exhibit. Fesmire believes imagination is precisely such a capacity. Fesmire follows John
Dewey in regarding imagination as a capacity that allows one to creatively tap a situation’s
possibilities.360 This aspect of imagination is precisely that feature of it which explains the
prospects Fesmire believes it to possess for moral reflection. That is, imagination enables
358 See especially the interview with Rorty in Ragg (2002, 372-373).
359 Fesmire (2003, 3).
360 Ibid. (65).
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one to “engage the present”  in a way that attention is expanded “beyond what is immediately
experienced so that the lessons of the past, embodied in habits, and as-yet-unrealized
potentialities ‘come home to us and have the power to stir us.’”361
Rorty’s and Fesmire’s approaches are also similar in that they both emphasize the
possibility for improving people’s capacity to engage in moral situations. While for Rorty,
this development is related to the role redescriptions have in enhancing the presence of
solidarity, Fesmire connects the issue more specifically with imagination, that is, “the more
refined one’s imagination (a function of relevant habits), the richer the fund of germane
possibilities and the more reliable one’s valuations.”362
Fesmire’s and Rorty’s accounts of ethics do not merely share the above assumptions with
each other. Fesmire’s approach is able to make a more detailed contribution to Rorty’s goals
and ambitions as well. In particular, the role Fesmire ascribes to imagination in moral
reflection sheds light on the ways in which the realization of the values Rorty’s liberalism is
founded on can be secured and made more widespread. By enlarging the resources from
which to draw material for one’s evaluation of the situation at hand, and by developing the
capacity to entertain the elements of a complex whole, as well as the capacity to see how the
elements that whole consists of might be put together, imagination is connected with those
capacities Rorty sees the enhancement of solidarity requires, such as the capacity to provide
adequate descriptions for the needs of a particular situation and to create novel ones once
new, perhaps unforeseeable situations emerge. Consequently, one way in which the culture
Rorty outlines may promote the realization of its central values is to find ways of developing
and enlarging the imagination of its inhabitants. Rorty should, in other words, find the same
capacities desirable whose importance for moral reflection Fesmire emphasizes.
Given that Rorty’s postmetaphysical view of ethical theory shares these underlying
assumptions and goals with the tradition of pragmatist  ethics which emphasizes the role of
imagination in moral reflection, it is not surprising that in some later works of his Rorty
emphasizes the cultural and social importance of imagination more explicitly than before,
Rorty,  for  example  claiming  that  one  of  the  significant  implications  of  the  kind  of
pragmatism he advocates is that the progress which has happened in various fields of human
life in past centuries should be taken as a sign of peoples’  capacity to expand their
imaginations, rather than of their “increased ability to represent reality accurately.”363
361 Ibid. (67).
362 Ibid. (71).
363 Rorty (2007, 117).
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The Place of Imagination in Davidsonian Intentionalism
The connections between Fesmire’s and Rorty’s approaches to ethics specified in the previous
section give a possibility for reformulating Rorty’s Postmetaphysical Critique of
intentionalism in terms of the role Fesmire ascribes to imagination in moral reflection. The
question that now becomes relevant is whether an intentionalist theory can embrace those
factors which explain the importance Fesmire attaches to imagination, as well as the ways he
believes that faculty can be refined. If this is the case, Rorty’s Postmetaphysical Critique is
undermined, for it shows that literature’s capacity to play a role in promoting the central
values of Rorty’s postmetaphysical culture need not be supported by the kind of pragmatist
account of interpretation Rorty himself supports. In fact, Bryan Vescio, one of the few who
have considered the relationship between Rorty’s and Davidson’s views of literary
interpretation, resolves the disagreement apparent in them in favour of Rorty’s position
precisely because he believes it is better equipped to highlight those aspects of literature
which make them important instruments for refining the kinds of capacities in question here.
In Vescio’s opinion, this is a result from Rorty’s emphasis “that our interpretation of
literature… [is] constrained only by our purposes and ingenuity, and not by entities called
‘meanings’  or ‘intentions,’”  this kind of view, thus, showing more tolerance towards
“imaginative interpretations”  than those theories which ask us to constrain our interpretations
by the author’s intentions, such as Davidson’s.364 However, the problem with Vescio’s
account is that it overlooks certain crucial aspects of Davidson’s thinking on interpretation,
such as the role imagination can be seen to ultimately occupy in it. Once the full implications
of these aspects have been drawn, Davidson’s theory of literary interpretation appears far
more compelling than Vescio’s assessment assumes. This conclusion simultaneously forms an
illuminating basis for a more detailed critical examination of Rorty’s Postmetaphysical
Critique of intentionalism.
At this point, the reading of Davidson’s later texts on philosophy of language offered in
chapter two becomes highly relevant. This is because it provides initial indication of the
position of imagination in Davidsonian intentionalism. That imagination acquires an
important position in Davidson’s views on interpretation follows directly from the critique of
conventionalist theories of meaning which forms the unifying thread of his late philosophy of
language. In Davidson’s opinion, conventionalist approaches to communication, such as
Kripkenstein’s, have neglected the fact that in many cases the success of communication is
based on individual and passing elements which the interlocutors may not have encountered
before, and for which they have, thus, not had the possibility of preparing for in advance. That
is, if there really is no saying what elements, ultimately, make successful communication
364 Vescio (1998, 209).
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possible, but that this may depend on such factors as “knowledge of the character, dress, role,
sex of the speaker,”365 and which may change radically with regard to different contexts and,
even, from speaker to speaker, then in many cases linguistic interaction must be accompanied
by a faculty that manages to pick out those individual features of the communication situation
that are relevant for understanding in the case at hand. In chapter two, following Davidson’s
own choice of terminology, I named this capacity “imagination.”
Davidson’s  example  of  the  prose  of  James  Joyce  serves  as  an  illuminating  example  of
how significant a role imagination may ultimately occupy in interpretation. This is because it
points out the multifarious nature of those factors which serve to make communication
possible, Joyce, for example, drawing on such resources as “knowledge of history, geography,
past writers, and styles.”366 These features of Joyce’s prose also explain the difference
Davidson draws between Humpty Dumpty and Joyce. In his view, Humpty failed to mean
what he intended precisely because he did not give the appropriate clues to his interlocutor to
gear her passing theory so that it could provide the meaning Humpty intended his utterance to
possess. While dense and nonsensical seeming at first, the case is, in Davidson’s opinion,
different with Joyce’s prose. That is, unlike Joyce, Humpty’s linguistic behavior left his
interpreter “entangled.”367
The example of Joyce shows that in the Davidsonian picture, the operation of imagination
involves two closely related layers. That is, the interpretation of Joyce not only requires a
capacity to identify the resources Joyce is drawing on in his works, namely, history,
geography, past writers, and styles, but also an ability to grasp the effect they are intended to
have on the context where Joyce inserts them. This process requires drawing connections
between different elements and understanding how they fuse together similar to that involved
in the use of imagination. However, since the clues which serve as a fuel for imagination are
hard  to  dig  up,  “as  much  is  demanded  from  the  reader  as  of  the  author.”  That  is,  “by
fragmentating familiar languages and recycling the raw material Joyce provokes the reader
into involuntary collaboration…. The center of creative energy is thus moved from the artist
to a point between the writer and his audience.”368
The Imaginative, Aesthetic Experience, and Intentionalism
The specific role which Davidson’s views attribute to imagination in interpretation implies
that Vescio’s assessment of the prospects of Davidson’s intentionalism introduced above is
overhasty. A more detailed account of the ways in which that account may be connected with
365 Davidson (2005/1986, 100).
366 Davidson (2005/1989, 147).
367 Ibid. (153).
368 Ibid. (156-157).
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the pragmatist view of ethics emphasizing the role of imagination in moral reflection is,
however, required so that a final assessment of Rorty’s Postmetaphysical Critique can be
provided.
Observing another factor that Rorty’s and Fesmire’s approaches to ethics share allows a
deeper investigation of the kind of role imagination obtains in an intentionalist view of
interpretation built upon Davidson’s views. While Rorty believes that the sort of position
literature acquires in his postmetaphysical culture puts a sharp distinction between “the
moral and the ‘merely’  aesthetic”  in doubt,369 Fesmire, in turn, thinks that certain elements of
John Dewey’s aesthetic theory become important for the kind of imagination-centered moral
philosophy he outlines.370
As is well known, Dewey’s texts on aesthetics primarily deal with aesthetic experience.
For Dewey, aesthetic experience involves an interaction between the viewer and the object of
experience which is not stable but involves an “ordered change”  and “participation.”  It is by
nature “cumulative,”  proceeding from “suspense”  to “fulfillment.”371 It is, therefore,
essentially an experience that stands out from the stream of experiences that the world
constantly impinges on us as a demarcated unity. Pragmatist ethics does not see an
experience of this form as alien to the field of ethics. Rather, it maintains that “moral conduct
is helpfully conceived on the model of aesthetic perception.”372
Now, the way in which Fesmire appropriates Dewey’s notion of aesthetic experience for
his purposes brings out features of Dewey’s understanding of that form of experience which
have not always been observed in the literature. It is a quite customary feature of Dewey’s
reception within different disciplines, from philosophy of music education to everyday
aesthetics,  to  be  inspired  by  those  sides  of  Dewey’s  work  in  which  the  holistic  and  anti-
dualistic features of aesthetic experience are highlighted. These appropriations of Dewey’s
thinking thus give the impression that Dewey would not be willing to introduce definitive
factors on which aesthetic experience could be demarcated from other kinds of
experiences.373 This sort of understanding of Dewey’s notion of aesthetic experience,
however, overlooks the fact that Dewey does introduce features that, in his opinion, are, if
not definitive, at least distinctive of experiences that he regards as aesthetic. Perhaps the
most  important  among  these  is  the  position  that  Dewey  reserves  within  his  account  of
aesthetic experience for the vital role played by imagination.
Imagination is, of course, a highly-loaded word in philosophy, and the faculty denoted by
that word has been understood in different ways in the course of its history. With the term
369 Rorty (1989, 82).
370 Fesmire (2003, 4).
371 Dewey (1980, 3-4; 16-17; 35-37).
372 Fesmire (2003, 4).
373 For example, Heidi Westerlund, a Dewey-inspired theorist in the philosophy of music education, writes that
“Dewey’s aesthetic is not something we can separate from other experiences and experience as such”
(Westerlund 2003, 54).
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“imagination,”  however, Dewey denotes not so much a capacity of spontaneously imagining
things, as a capacity to collect and compose individual things into a complex whole, and to
build different relationships between the individual parts that make up the whole. Or to put it
in Dewey’s own words:
If we judge [imagination’s] nature from the creation of works of art,
it designates a quality that animates and pervades all processes of
making  and  observation.  It  is  a way of seeing and feeling things as
they compose an integral whole. It is the large and generous blending
of interests at the point where the mind comes in contact with the
world. When old and familiar things are made new in experience,
there is imagination.374
For Dewey, imagination, in other words, is not so much a mental power consisting of
imagining things that a person can switch on and off at will, as something that needs external
input to be triggered.
Now,  what  is  important  to  note  is  the  distinction  Dewey  makes  between  two  forms  of
imagination. These are the imaginative and the imaginary. The feature which distinguishes
these two forms from each other is that they involve different constraints. While in the
imaginary sense, imagination is allowed to play as freely as possible with the material serving
as its basis, imaginative uses of imagination always spring from a foundation involving
various kinds of constraints, which create boundaries for the course it can ultimately take. In
this respect, in the imaginative case there is a more determinate connection between where
imagination starts and what it ends up producing than is the case with the imaginary.375
This particular difference between the two senses of imagination, however, brings out
those  reasons  why Fesmire  only  stresses  the  importance  of  the  form of  imagination  Dewey
denotes with the term “imaginative.”  This is precisely because it involves the kinds of
constraints the imaginary sense lacks, moral reflection guided by the imaginative sense thus
being more rigorous by nature than a discourse where the imaginary sense would occupy an
essential position. If anything, the imaginary sense becomes an unwanted component in moral
reflection, for by being allowed to fly as freely as possible, moral deliberation guided by the
imaginary sense of imagination is, in Fesmire’s opinion, in danger of transforming this mode
of discourse into mere “moral fantasy,”  thus possibly removing reflection from everyday,
social concerns to a level where a firm enough connection to them is no longer sustained. The
imaginative, on the other hand, is “imbued with sociocultural meanings and rooted in the
problematic conditions.”376
The important point is that it is precisely the imaginative sense of imagination that Dewey
thinks underpins aesthetic experience, Dewey, in fact, explicitly stating that “esthetic
374 Dewey (1980, 267). Italics Dewey.
375 Ibid. (269).
376 Fesmire (2003, 66).
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experience is imaginative.”377 The claim that in Dewey’s conception of aesthetic experience
the imaginative has an important role does not merely rest on referring to this quotation.
Observing the characteristic features Dewey believes this form of experience to possess also
indicates this. That is, a kind of structured intensity which extends for a certain period of time,
and which is demarcated from the stream of experiences surrounding it. It seems that for an
experience to acquire these qualities requires an active contribution from the subject of
experience which holds the different parts of the experience together and molds them into a
structured unity. Given Dewey’s description of imagination as the making of old and familiar
things new, it is arguable that Dewey would find the activity involved in this experience
imagination. Moreover, it seems that there must be specific limits on how this underlying
activity may function in aesthetic experience, for without some sort of boundaries, there
would be nothing against which the experience could acquire the character that, in Dewey’s
opinion, is typical of aesthetic experience. That is, without “elements of resistance,”  as Dewey
himself puts it, aesthetic experience could not possess the kind of intense, developmental
structure, which Dewey regards it as possessing.378
The important upshot of this discussion is that it calls into question a view of imagination
which connects its value to the freedom that has usually been considered its essential feature.
That  is,  imagination  becomes  more  productive  the  more  freely  it  is  allowed  to  fly.  The
reformulation  of  Rorty’s  Postmetaphysical  Critique  seems  to  involve  precisely  this  kind  of
assumption. If that indeed is the case, then the above account of Dewey’s imaginative sense of
imagination and the way Fesmire appropriates it for his concerns may be used to undermine
Rorty’s critique, for that account indicates that the value of imagination is by no means
enhanced fewer the boundaries on its functioning are set. Rather, it seems that the structure of
imagination implied by the role ascribed to it in interpretation in the intentionalist theory built
upon Davidson’s ideas reveals some striking similarities with Dewey’s imaginative sense of
imagination. The imaginative sense of imagination implies that aesthetic experience does not
necessarily become more complex and intensive fewer the restrictions on imagination are set.
Rather Dewey’s description of aesthetic experience as imaginative indicates the way in which
constraints, in fact, serve as prerequisites for complexity and intensity. In other words,
without some sorts of limits the experience could not possess the kind of unifying
developmental character that both complexity and intensity seem to require.
Now, this description of aesthetic experience not only points to those factors that enable
intentionalist theories of interpretation to accommodate Dewey’s aesthetic views within their
approach,  but  also  how  that  approach  may  ultimately  account  for  the  value  attached  to
literature in Rorty’s postmetaphysical culture. Given the connection Dewey draws between
the imaginative sense of imagination and aesthetic experience, engaging with one’s
environment and artworks in a way that Dewey would regard as aesthetic becomes an
377 Dewey (1980, 272).
378 Ibid. (262).
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important source of developing those capacities proper moral reflection, in Fesmire’s opinion,
involves. This is because the realization of aesthetic experience requires an active contribution
from the imagination of the subject of experience. Since the activity involved in the use of
imagination of tying different elements into new unities is an important element in molding
the structure of aesthetic experience into the kind of structured, unified, complexity Dewey
thinks it possesses, environments which afford aesthetic experiences, as well as engagements
with artworks which are marked by the characteristic features of Dewey’s concept of aesthetic
experience, are important means of triggering, sustaining, and ultimately refining our
imaginative capacities.
At this point, it is important to observe that there are distinctive similarities between
Dewey’s description of the imaginative sense of imagination and the role imagination
occupies in the Davidsonian intentionalism outlined above. In both cases, the core of
imagination is understood in a similar way, that is, as a capacity to collect and compose
individual things into a complex whole, and to build different relationships between the
individual parts that make up the whole. In the Davidsonian intentionalism outlined above,
imagination is, in other words, intended to aid interpretation in tying different elements into
complex unities in a sense similar to the way imagination in its imaginative sense is meant to
enlarge one’s perception in the case of moral reflection. Given this structural overlap between
these domains, Davidsonian intentionalism proves to be a fruitful approach in regard to those
factors which make engagements with literary works important ways of developing
imagination precisely in the imaginative sense. One can easily find from Dewey a description
of an experience which corresponds to the structure that Davidson sees the interpretation of
Joyce’s works involves, as well as the experience that this sort of engagement gives rise to.
For instance, Dewey maintains that “the spontaneity of art is not one of opposition to
anything, but marks complete absorption in an orderly development. This absorption is
characteristic of esthetic experience; but it is an ideal for all experience….”379 Dewey
considers that the experience he describes in this quotation possesses an orderly developing
character. The form of imagination which holds the elements of the experience together and
makes the absorption possible is imaginative in character. In this respect, Davidson’s example
of Joyce indicates that to follow intentionalist principles in interpretation does not inevitably
minimize the role of the interpreter’s imagination in interpretation. It also suggests that if it is
indeed possible to cultivate one’s imaginative capacities by engaging with one’s environment
and with artworks in a way regarded as aesthetic by Dewey, as Fesmire following Dewey
assumes,380 then intentionalist theories may even be argued to be better equipped to embrace
those features in our interactions with artworks which make these encounters an important
source for cultivating our capacity for moral reflection than the approach Rorty favors.
379 Ibid. (280). My italics.
380 More on how Dewey considered imagination to contribute to the well-being of human life see Chamblis
(1991).
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Furthermore, Davidson’s example of Joyce suggests that, in many cases, an approach to
the artwork guided by an understanding of what the author meant serves as a precondition for
the  experience  elicited  by  the  work  to  acquire  the  unity  and  orderly  developing  character
Dewey thinks aesthetic experience possesses. The different parts of the work are united into
an organic unity by this understanding. Without the elements of resistance following from the
author’s intentions, as Dewey might put it in this context, the experience could lack unity and
order, and would thus not be an aesthetic one, as this notion is defined by Dewey. A lack of
understanding of the structure of the work may even hinder our imaginative engagement with
it.
This investigation of the connections between Davidsonian intentionalism and the role of
imagination in pragmatist approaches to ethics illuminates the problems involved in Rorty’s
Postmetaphysical Critique of intentionalism. The fundamental point of Rorty’s critique is that
intentionalist theories of interpretation should be discarded because they are incapable of
accounting for those features of literary works which make them important with regard to the
social goals and values central to the postmetaphysical, liberal society Rorty outlines. A
central element of my argument against Rorty’s critique was the observation that the
realization of those values Rorty’s culture is founded on requires refining the same human
capacities  whose  role  in  moral  reflection  Fesmire  highlights.  Now,  if  engagements  with
artworks are important means of developing the capacities which both Rorty and Fesmire
value, and if the Davidsonian intentionalism formulated in this essay is able to give
imagination a location in interpretation which ultimately proves profitable in regard to its
refinement, then intentionalist theories are not as impoverished as Rorty’s Postmetaphysical
Critique assumes. The theory of literary interpretation drawn on Davidson’s views shows that
an intentionalist approach to interpretation can, after all, embrace those factors of literary
works which make them important for Rorty’s liberal culture. Rorty’s liberal ironist thus need
not be a Bloomian interpreter who forsakes the author’s intentions for her creative interpretive
plays,  and  who  sees  the  author’s  intentions  only  as  obstacles  for  the  full  realization  of  the
aesthetic potentials of the work under interpretation. There is no essential connection between
holding a view of interpretation expressed in Rorty’s writings on the liberal ironist and
satisfying those demands Rorty sets for literature, for the intentionalist view of interpretation
developed upon Davidson’s views in this essay is able to meet them as well. For this reason,
Rorty’s Postmetaphysical Critique of intentionalism fails.
In the next section, I shall illuminate with an example of my own the structure the use of
imagination takes in interpretation in Davidsonian intentionalism. The case will lend further
support for the view that it is precisely the imaginative sense of imagination singled out by
Dewey which acquires an important position in Davidson’s outlook on interpretation.
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The Example: Leitmotifs in the First Act of Wagner’s The Valkyrie
If  you  are  like  me,  that  is,  a  person  who  has  started  to  read  Joyce’s Ulysses on numerous
occasions, but has given up the attempt of finishing it after the first ten pages or so, the sort of
support I drew from Davidson’s example of Joyce for my defense of intentionalism might not
strike you as convincing. Let me therefore use another example with which to illuminate the
role of imagination in interpretation, and the kind of position an intentionalist approach is able
to reserve for it.
This is a musical example concerning the way in which the leitmotif technique developed
by Richard Wagner functions in the first act of his music drama The Valkyrie. Roger
Scruton’s account of leitmotifs serves as a good touchstone for exploring the role of
imagination in their interpretation and understanding. One of the primary goals of his analysis
is to challenge the widespread assumption that leitmotifs are similar in character to other signs
populating our environment in that they are primarily intended to refer to something which
lies outside them. However, as Scruton points out, this understanding gives a highly
impoverished  account  of  their  character  which  fails  to  embrace  the  full  complexity  of  this
musical device. Rather than seeing them on a par with words they should, in Scruton’s
opinion, be described as “musical magnet[s] around which meaning slowly accumulates,”  and
which, ultimately, create an “expressive link between dramatic contexts, which compels the
listener to bring one situation to bear on another, so that their atmospheres fuse.”381 In other
words, leitmotifs are musical devices with a memory, so to speak, and by possessing this kind
of  quality  they  color  events  which  are  being  carried  out  on  stage  at  the  time  of  their
appearance with past events. This sort of structure, in turn, means that their understanding
requires a substantial amount of imagination from the hearer. It requires that the listener is
first of all capable of identifying the events and ideas the emerging leitmotif has been
associated with before, and secondly, to grasp how the associations the leitmotif carries are
intended to color the stage actions around it.
Although Wagner employs the leitmotif technique in a number of his operas, it is most
commonly associated with Wagner’s magnum opus, the tetralogy The Ring of the Nibelung.
Here, I have decided to illuminate features which are characteristic of leitmotifs through the
first act of The Valkyrie, the second installment to Wagner’s tetralogy. This is mainly because
it forms an easily distinguishable whole.
Bryan Magee’s description of the aesthetic character of The Valkyrie’s first act provides a
good starting point for my account. Magee writes:
After  the  loveless  world  of Rhinegold,  the  emergence  of  the  most
basic and primal feeling of human love within a total order of things
that had hitherto had no place for it is not just something that the first
act of The Valkyrie depicts but something that it is. And this is
381 Scruton (1997, 136-137).
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emotionally moving beyond anything previously imagined, including
anything previously imagined by Wagner. This act is successful
artistically in every way imaginable.… The characters, the action, the
situation –  all are triumphantly achieved, both dramatically and
musically. […] There remains, permanently, something mesmeric
about it. Not only utterly abandoned love but the disconcerting
emotional nakedness and vulnerability that go with it are
uninhibitedly expressed. It is as if the living creatureliness of these
emotional beings has been skinned: the intensity of their experience
borders on the intolerable. It is the first time in Wagner’s output that
the most deeply protected and (in this case) forbidden emotions are
given open voice, so that what reaches us in the audience is
something that has never found expression in art.382
My reason for selecting this quotation is  that  it  may be used to indicate how essential  a
role the leitmotifs have in the first act of The Valkyrie. It is my belief that only through an
understanding of the leitmotif technique employed in the first act is it possible for the listener
to grasp those aesthetic features Magee finds characteristic in that act. That is, if the hearer’s
experience were not guided by this understanding, she would miss much of what makes the
act exceptional.
Two leitmotifs in particular have an important position in the first act of The Valkyrie, i.e.,
the Walhalla motif and the Notung motif. Both receive their initial appearances in The
Rhinegold, the first opera of the tetralogy. Their importance for the act’s identity is based on
their capacity to bring past elements to the act. By doing so, these leitmotifs open up a new
level in which the drama of the first act of The Valkyrie takes place. However, this level
remains closed to a listener who does not grasp how the leitmotifs are intended to function in
the act. Imagination comes into play in understanding the act, for it essentially consists of the
capacity to grasp what past  elements the leitmotifs bring to the act  and how they situate the
actions of the first act of The Valkyrie within the total structure of The Ring.
The level of drama that these two leitmotifs bring to the act is a theme of The Ring which
Philip Kitcher and Richard Schacht have named “Project Siegmund.”383 This is related to the
puzzled situation that Wotan, the ruler of the gods, faces at the end of The Rhinegold. After
having agreed with the giants Fafner and Fasolt to give up the gold, together with the ring
Wotan has cunningly managed to snatch from Alberich, Wotan is left in a problematic
situation regarding his attempt to establish order in the world. That he is not in possession of
the  ring  by  means  of  which  its  owner  can  rule  the  world  poses  a  substantial  threat  to  his
authority.  However,  because  Wotan’s  rule  rests  on  a  commitment  to  laws  and  contracts,  he
cannot simply steal the ring back from Fafner without undermining the foundations of his
own authority. This is the dilemma that Wotan arrives at in the end of The Rhinegold.
382 Magee (2001, 132).
383 Kitcher & Schacht (2004).
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Here is where Project Siegmund enters the picture. At the end of the opera, Wotan is
“seized by a great idea,”  as the stage directions say, that he must in some way give rise to a
hero who is able to get the ring back from Fafner, while simultaneously being free of his will.
In other words, Project Siegmund is intended to solve the dilemma into which Wotan has
drifted. It enables him, or so he thinks, to both sustain the status of those elements on which
his authority rests, that is, rules and laws, and to get hold of the ring.
In between the end of The Rhinegold and the beginning of The Valkyrie, Wotan has two
children Siegmund and Sieglinde with an earthly woman. One day their home is attacked by a
group of brutes, who kill the siblings’  mother and kidnap Sieglinde. For a while after this
incident, Wotan lives with Siegmund in the woods. Eventually, however, he leaves Siegmund
to mature by himself in order for him to grow into the kind of hero who can resolve Wotan’s
dilemma. That is, since Wotan believes that by abandoning Siegmund his son would be
independent  of  his  will  and  actions,  Siegmund  can  return  him  the  ring  without  in  any  way
compromising the foundations of his authority.
The first act of The Valkyrie sees the initial stages of the project planned by Wotan. He
has plunged a sword into the tree trunk around which the hut Hunding inhabits has been built,
and where he now lives with his wife, Sieglinde, whom Hunding forced into marriage. With
the help of this sword Siegmund should kill Fafner, who now, transformed into a dragon,
guards his treasure.
Wotan’s Project Siegmund acquires a position in the first act of The Valkyrie precisely
through the appearance of the above-mentioned leitmotifs. The past elements which they
bring to the act derive from the contexts in which they initially appeared in The Rhinegold.
The Walhalla motif receives its first appearance at the beginning of the second scene of The
Rhinegold, accompanying Wotan’s welcome to his newly-built fortress, while The Notung
motif,  in  turn,  appears  for  the  first  time at  the  end  of The Rhinegold, precisely at the point
where Wotan is seized by his great idea. In this respect, this motif does not merely serve as a
signifier for the sword, but its sense, ultimately, covers the whole master plan in which that
sword has a role, i.e., Project Siegmund.
In each appearance these leitmotifs bring with them elements from the past, and by doing
so, ultimately connect the course of events of the first act of The Valkyrie to the whole of The
Ring. The episode in which the magnetic character of these leitmotifs has the most profound
effect is the love relationship which gradually develops between the siblings during the course
of the act. Magee characterizes that relationship as involving an “emotional nakedness”  and
“vulnerability.”  In my view, the fact that the act possesses these qualities is dependent on how
the leitmotifs function in the act, that is, on the kind of light they cast over the drama.
While it seems to be the case that each leitmotif possesses a magnetic character to at least
some degree, some appearances are more strongly magnetic than others. In my view five
leitmotif appearances in the first act of The Valkyrie in particular possess an intensely
magnetic character. The first appearance of relevance is the Walhalla motif, which is heard
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for the first time immediately after Siegmund has finished a story about his past which he has
told to Sieglinde and Hunding. The reason why this appearance is of special relevance is that
it appears at a point in the story where Siegmund tells that after having gone into battle with
his father, he could no longer find him again, the leitmotif thus indicating the connection
between Wotan and Siegmund.
The second motif to appear, in turn, connects Sieglinde to the ultimate scheme of things.
In this case, it is the Notung Motif played by the trumpet, which is heard when Sieglinde casts
a glance at the tree trunk where Wotan had plunged the sword, the appearance in this context
thus perhaps also indicating Sieglinde’s craving to be freed from her unhappy condition.
Significantly, as the drama of the first act of The Valkyrie begins to develop, the leitmotifs
gradually acquire a more essential position in the act. That is, to use Scruton’s description,
more meanings and associations slowly begin to accumulate around them, their magnetic
character simultaneously becoming more complex.
An illuminating example of how leitmotifs contribute to this development where different
dramatic contexts fuse is provided by the third leitmotif appearance which I find to be of
relevance. This is the scene where Siegmund has been left alone, after having been challenged
by Hunding to a duel to be carried out in the morning. At this point in Siegmund’s lines a
reference is made to his father, Siegmund suddenly remembering that his father promised him
a sword during his deepest distress. Siegmund now finds himself in such a situation.
However, no sword appears to be in sight.  At this point, Siegmund screams “Wälse”
(Wotan’s mortal name), almost as if he would be cursing his father. These screams and
Siegmund’s irritated question “wo ist dein Schwert”  is followed by an orchestral climax at the
height of which the Notung motif is heard played by the trumpet.
In this context, the magnetic character of the Notung motif begins to evolve, that is, it
does not merely serve the purpose of signifying that there is a sword somewhere on stage, but
through this reappearance and the memory the leitmotif possesses the elements of Project
Siegmund begin to color the actions of the first act of The Valkyrie more strongly. The
leitmotif opens another level for the drama, so to speak. In particular, through the associations
which link the Notung motif with Project Siegmund the appearance of the Notung leitmotif in
this  context  suggests  that  Wälse/Wotan  did  not  sink  the  sword  in  the  tree  primarily  to  help
Siegmund’s rescue, as he thinks, but on account of the task Wotan has planned for Siegmund
which Siegmund is, of course, totally unaware of. Through this particular interplay between
different  elements,  the  full  complexity  of  the  act  starts  to  reveal  itself.  That  is,  it  gradually
becomes apparent that the factors which are involved in constituting the identity of the act do
not merely consist of what is immediately present on stage and is audible in the music, but it
is based on how immediately present elements interplay with those elements that the
leitmotifs bring to the act, that is, how the dramatic contexts associated with the leitmotifs and
what is currently acted out on stage fuse.
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The fourth appearance I find to be of importance is particularly effective. It occurs in
Sieglinde’s recital following Siegmund’s lamentation. In this case, the motifs vital for this act,
i.e., Walhalla and Notung, appear immediately after each other. Both are connected to the
figure  of  Wotan  and  to  his  plans.  In  her  story,  Sieglinde  tells  about  a  strange  incident  that
happened at her wedding. All of a sudden the festivities were interrupted by a strange man
wearing a brimmed hat and an eye patch. This stranger struck a sword into the tree around
which Hunding’s hut is built, declaring that the sword would belong to anyone who could pull
it out. Sieglinde tells that she immediately recognized from the look the strange man gave her
that he was, in fact, her father, and that the sword was intended for the hero who would rescue
her.
Now, although these motifs do establish a relationship primarily to Wotan, the way in
which they interplay with each other, as well as with present stage actions, a host of
relationships are opened up. That is, while the reappearance of the Walhalla motif does indeed
indicate that Sieglinde and Siegmund have the same father, since the same theme appears in
Sieglinde’s story as in Siegmund’s, it is, rather, Wotan’s Project Siegmund which begins to
occupy an even more essential position in the act through these appearances. The interplay
between the level opened up by the leitmotifs and the one currently acted out on stage no
longer involves a relationship between Wotan’s plans and Siegmund, for now the character of
Sieglinde becomes part of this web as well. The interaction between these two levels of drama
especially affects the character that the gradually developing love relationship between
Siegmund and Sieglinde begins to acquire. Magee’s description of the first act of The Valkyrie
contains an insightful description of the features it involves. In the love of Siegmund and
Sieglinde, the audience truly witnesses “the emergence of the most basic and primal feeling of
human love within a total order of things,”  which expresses an unparalleled “emotional
nakedness and vulnerability.”
Now, to my mind, the fact that the first act of The Valkyrie possesses these characteristic
features is based on the way in which the levels of meaning delivered by the leitmotifs color
the relationship between Siegmund and Sieglinde. That is, the vulnerable character of their
love emerges once the relationship between the siblings is immersed in the “total order of
things,”  a stance that allows the melancholy helplessness characteristic of their relationship to
properly unfold. In other words, their relationship exhibits a specific helplessness not only
because their respective situations at the beginning of the act are as miserable as they are, but
also because those means that enable their salvation, and which they now think will make the
flourishing of their love possible, are not really intended for those purposes they think they
are, but for some ulterior motives of which Siegmund and Sieglinde are both totally ignorant.
The feeling of vulnerability their relationship elicits in the viewer is enhanced by their
ignorance of the true state of affairs. Now, because the leitmotifs provide the listener with an
insight into those elements of which the siblings are both unaware, the particular complexity
their love acquires is a result of these leitmotifs.
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The magnetic character of leitmotifs is at its most effective in the scene where the siblings
gaze at each other’s features. This is the fifth leitmotif I find to be of relevance. Sieglinde is
struck by the fact that Siegmund’s appearance brings something to her mind –  “though I first
saw  you  today,  I’ve  set  eyes  on  you  before.”  This  amazement  between  the  two  is
accompanied by both motifs which have been examined above. Gradually, Siegmund and
Sieglinde begin to fall in love with each other. However, this developing relationship arouses
complex, even mixed feelings in the spectator, and this is precisely because she knows more
than they do. The leitmotifs convey that the siblings have the same father, their relationship
thus being a form of incest, and that even though the sword may make Sieglinde’s rescue
possible, it really is not meant for the purpose the siblings think.
In these respects, the leitmotifs reveal the accidental nature of the love between Sieglinde
and Siegmund. This is because the associations which they bring to the act suggest that their
love is ultimately something which should not be happening, not only because the relationship
is a form of incest, but because it is not part of Wotan’s master plan. Siegmund and Sieglinde
aren’t  free  beings  at  all,  but,  in  a  certain  sense,  only  puppets  in  Wotan’s  scheme  to  gain
possession of the ring. It is precisely this kind of outlook on their relationship that the level
opened up by the leitmotifs provides, and because that kind of understanding brings various
new elements to the experience the act elicits, that experience would be significantly less
complex if the hearer’s engagement with the act were not guided by a proper understanding of
how  the  leitmotifs  I  have  picked  out  are  intended  to  function  in  the  act.  Without  a  proper
grasp of the way in which the leitmotif technique functions in the first act of The Valkyrie, the
experience could not develop in relation to those qualities Magee believes characterize the
act. That is, even though the tonally moving forms which the act contains make up a striking
piece of music in their own right, the experience would, nevertheless, be much simpler in the
case where the engagement with the act is not guided by an understanding of how meaning
accumulates around the leitmotifs as the act proceeds. So, perhaps Mark Twain was, after all,
right when he claimed that Wagner’s music is “better than it sounds.”
The Role of Imagination in Understanding the First Act of The Valkyrie
So, what relevance could such a bizarre piece of music as Wagner’s The Ring, filled with
gods, dwarfs, and immature heroes, have for such down to earth issues as Rorty’s
postmetaphysical culture and pragmatist ethics. Anyone with only a superficial knowledge of
Wagner’s texts knows that postmetaphysicality is an ill-suited epithet to describe their tone.
My reason for taking up this example does not, however, so much relate to the actual plot of
The Ring as to the leitmotif technique Wagner employs in the tetralogy. The discussion of the
first act of The Valkyrie shows  that  its  understanding  rests  in  a  capacity  to  grasp  how  the
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appearance of a given leitmotif is intended to color those stage actions during which it occurs.
That this is central to the understanding of the act indicates the way in which imagination
acquires an important role in its fuller comprehension. That is, imagination is precisely the
faculty which picks out and unites the different elements which make up that coloring and
grasps the way the different dramatic contexts fuse together.
Now, what is of special relevance is that the character the use of imagination takes in the
case of the first act of Valkyrie shares some crucial elements with the form of imagination
Dewey regards as imaginative. Unlike in imaginary exercises of imagination where “the mind
stays aloof and toys with material rather than boldly grasping it,”384 as Dewey at one point
describes the imaginary sense of imagination, an engagement guided by an appropriate
understanding of the leitmotif technique gives the engagement a structure which involves
features similar to those which Dewey considers characterize the imaginative. That is, the
ideas, plans, and characters associated with a particular leitmotif, as well as how a leitmotif is
intended to function in the context where it appears, creates a demarcated space for
imagination to function, imagination thus being unable to run as freely as it is allowed in the
imaginary sense. The past elements delivered by the leitmotifs provide the elements of
resistance which Dewey finds essential for imaginative forms of imagination. Only by being
guided  by  the  imaginative  sense  of  imagination  does  the  experience  of  the  first  act  of The
Valkyrie achieve the kind of intensity, unity and complexity that, in Dewey’s opinion, is
typical of aesthetic experience.
The fact that the imaginative form of imagination has an essential role in understanding
leitmotifs indicates the reasons why this sort of engagement could prove a fruitful way of
developing those capacities Fesmire sees proper moral reflection to require. Fesmire in one
place formulates the core of that reflection as the capacity to see “the near in terms of the
remote.”385 Fesmire’s  description  of  one  of  the  essential  features  of  moral  reflection  brings
out the connection which I believe to obtain between the capacities that that form of discourse
requires on the one hand and the conditions of understanding leitmotifs on the other. The
leitmotifs deliver elements from the past to color those events acted out on stage during their
appearance, their magnetic character thus requiring an enlarging of perception from the hearer
similar to the sense in which imagination is intended to enlarge one’s resources for moral
reflection. Now, if through learning to engage with the first act of The Valkyrie with the kind
of understanding outlined above, which assuredly is not an easy task, one is able to cultivate
those abilities which moral reflection also involves, then this example serves to further
indicate the way engagements with art and aesthetic experience can develop people’s capacity
to engage in moral situations.
Above, it was emphasized that Fesmire’s approach to ethics which highlights the vital role
of imagination in moral reflection, and Rorty’s narrative postmetaphysical approach overlap
384 Dewey (1980, 268).
385 Fesmire (2003, 76).
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in significant ways. In particular, Fesmire’s account of what proper moral reflection requires
draws attention to capacities similar to those that Rorty wishes literature and literary theory
dominated by the liberal ironic attitude should provide for the inhabitants of his
postmetaphysical culture. That literature, and why not art in general, holds this sort of
position in Rorty’s liberal culture forms the core of Rorty’s Postmetaphysical Critique, i.e.,
assessing the strength of a theory of interpretation should be based on how it is able to meet
those challenges Rorty outlines for literature in his postmetaphysical culture.
Now, given the similarities between Rorty’s and Fesmire’s approaches to ethics, the above
account of The Valkyrie should also be found a fruitful one concerning the sort of
postmetaphysical terms Rorty outlines. However, the fact that it manages to evolve into such
an example reveals problems in Rorty’s Postmetaphysical Critique. This is because the
approach to the first act of The Valkyrie above by no means embodies the kind of attitude that
Rorty finds typical for the liberal ironist’s method of approaching art. That is, the outlook on
the leitmotif technique provided above does not call for an abolishment of Wagner’s
intentions, for the outlook is, in fact, highly compatible with intentionalist principles. The sort
of role which is attributed to leitmotifs in the first act of The Valkyrie by the above account,
by and large corresponds to the way in which I believe Wagner intended that technique to be
understood.
Support for this view may yet again be found in Scruton’s approach to leitmotifs. In his
opinion, their magnetic character is not the only feature they possess which serves to set
leitmotifs  apart  from  words.  Another  factor  separating  the  two  is  the  different  role
conventions play in the conditions of their understanding. That is, Scruton argues that while
words acquire their meanings as a result of the roles they occupy in our convention-governed
linguistic practices, this is not the case with leitmotifs.386 Rather, the conditions that Scruton
considers  the  understanding  of  leitmotifs  involve  draws  attention  to  factors  similar  to  those
that were highlighted in Davidson’s example of Joyce. That is, like Joyce, Wagner too may be
said  to  “draw  on  every  resource  his  readers  command  (or  that  he  hopes  they  command,  or
thinks they should command),”  understanding thus requiring in both cases an ability to grasp
how those resources the author is drawing on are intended to function in the context in which
the  author  utilizes  them  anew.  In  the  case  of  leitmotifs,  this  requires  a  grasp  of  what  past
events the leitmotif delivers to the present and how that motif colors those events which are
currently  acted  on  stage.  Now,  I  cannot  see  how  an  acquaintance  with  the  relevant
conventions, whatever in this case they might be, could have a significant role to play in this
process, that is, in the hearer’s coming to an understanding of the role which a given leitmotif
is  intended  to  play  in  a  given  context.  Rather,  in  many  respects  that  activity  resembles
Davidson’s description of communication as the interplay between passing and prior theories
and the particular reflexive interaction it was seen to involve.
386 Scruton (2003, 150).
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The second important similarity between the account of the first act of The Valkyrie
offered by me and Davidson’s reading of Joyce is that they both suggest that an approach to
artworks which stays faithful to the author’s intentions in no way diminishes the role played
by imagination in that process. Rather, as the case of the first act of The Valkyrie indicates,
sometimes it is only through an understanding of the author’s intentions that the work’s full
complexity reveals itself. In this kind of case “the center of creative energy”  is “moved from
the artist to a point between the writer and his audience,”  as was the case with Joyce’s prose
in Davidson’s opinion. That imagination can acquire an important position in an approach to
art which is guided by intentionalist principles was taken to imply that that approach can also
accommodate Dewey’s understanding of aesthetic experience within it. We have now
received further support for this assumption. To engage with the first act of The Valkyrie with
an  understanding  of  how  the  leitmotif  technique  functions  in  it  elicits  an  experience  in  the
viewer which corresponds to Dewey’s description of aesthetic experience. That is, “we have
an experience when the material experienced runs its course to fulfillment. Then and only
then is it integrated within and demarcated in the general stream of experience from other
experiences.”387 In other words, the reappearance of certain leitmotifs the hearer already
recognizes from The Rhinegold raises the question regarding their purpose in the first act of
The Valkyrie and what effect they are intended to have on the act, if any. Only after the hearer
has achieved a sufficient answer to these questions does her listening experience acquire the
kind of complex fulfillment which Dewey considers an essential feature of aesthetic
experience.
Given that the above account of The Valkyrie both manages to embrace those features of
our engagements with art that Rorty values and is also simultaneously faithful to intentionalist
principles, it suffices to show problems in Rorty’s Postmetaphysical Critique. That criticism
essentially consisted of an insistence that intentionalist approaches cannot meet those
challenges Rorty’s postmetaphysical culture sets for literature, and that if one acknowledges
the actuality of that challenge, one should discard intentionalist forms of interpretation.
However, since the upshot of the previous discussion on imagination’s role in ethics and the
possible contribution engagements with artworks may have on our capacity to engage in
moral reflection is precisely that intentionalist theories can, ultimately, account for the factors
that make literary works important for Rorty’s postmetaphysical culture, Rorty’s
Postmetaphysical Critique fails.
Yet, while providing a novel defense of intentionalism, this conclusion might still not
appear that substantial. This is because it basically just establishes that intentionalism can
meet a challenge Rorty poses for it, but this still does not provide sufficient grounds for
favoring that view of interpretation over the account Rorty supports. This conclusion thus
does not manage to acquire the kind of strength the general aims of this thesis require.
387 Dewey (1980, 35).
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However, the ability of Davidsonian intentionalism to successfully account for the
position that Rorty sets for literature has some substantial effects on the status of Rorty’s own
pragmatist approach to interpretation. That this is so becomes apparent by recalling the way in
which Rorty draws support for his postmetaphysical approach to literature. That approach
raised the specter of relativism, a specter which has continuously lurked behind Rorty’s
views. It was argued that, at least in the context of interpretation, Rorty could overcome the
problem of relativism by insisting on the need to reconsider the terms with which the
adequacy of theories of interpretation is to be assessed. That is, the way in which a theory
manages to provide resources for accommodating those elements Rorty’s postmetaphysical
approach  to  literature  requires  outweighs  how  it  manages  to  cope  with  the  problem  of
relativism.
Now, what I take this form of argument to imply, together with the fact that an
intentionalist  theory  of  interpretation  is  able  to  meet  the  challenge  arising  from  Rorty’s
postmetaphysical ambitions, is that any problems that Rorty’s views may now be seen to face,
but which a form of intentionalism is able to overcome, provides reasons for supporting an
intentionalist approach to interpretation over Rorty’s pragmatist theory.  In other words, if an
intentionalist theory is able to meet Rorty’s Postmetaphysical Critique, as well as overcome
certain problems Rorty’s own pragmatist theory encounters, the strength of Rorty’s pragmatist
theory is severely undermined. This is because in that kind of case it is in danger of becoming
a recommendation which can be discarded without losing anything particular. In the next
section, I shall draw attention to an issue which I believe intentionalist theories have no
problems in accommodating, but which raises problems for the kind of view of interpretation
Rorty supports. After that, I shall present the conclusions of this chapter.
5. The Conditions of Solidarity and the Ethics of Interpretation
There is another discussion located in the intersection of ethics and aesthetics in relation to
which the strength of Rorty’s interpretive position may be assessed. As noted, Rorty’s
approach to literature may be seen as part of the tradition in ethics which explores the ways in
which literary works can function as modes of moral investigation. While this has been the
primary question with regard to which the relationship between ethics and aesthetics has been
considered, there is another issue in which that very same relationship comes into play as
well.
In this case, moral questions are extended to concern an issue which is of the utmost
importance for this study as a whole, i.e., the nature of valid interpretation. This discussion
has provided a deeper insight into what the assessment of validity involves. It has been argued
that interpretations should be constrained by the author’s intentions not only because they
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determine what the work means, but because we have a particular kind of moral responsibility
to approach artworks in a way that takes them into account.388
Now, the description of Rorty’s theory given in this chapter suggests that the respective
ethical questions concerning the position of literature in Rorty’s postmetaphysical culture and
the nature of valid interpretation not only meet in Rorty’s views in an interesting way but that
they, in fact, appear to be irreconcilable. For Rorty’s pragmatist account of interpretation,
which is meant to establish his specific approach to literature, runs noticeably counter to
recent accounts that see moral considerations as restricting the scope of valid approaches to
works of art. The moral considerations these views raise are aimed precisely against the sort
of account of interpretation Rorty supports.
The importance of moral considerations for interpretation is drawn from a particular
conception regarding the construction of an artist’s identity. According to this view her
identity is not separable from her artistic activity and the character of her works, but it is, in
fact, expressed through them. In other words, the themes a given artist has decided to consider
in her works, the way she approaches them, together with the way in which her works relate
to the history of art, all contribute to the formation of her identity, i.e., what kind of an artist
and, eventually, what kind of a person she is. This sort of connection means that when we
encounter an artwork, we are reflecting on an object that is tightly connected to its creator’s
identity. Because of this, it is argued that it is morally reprehensible to approach artworks in
any way we please.389
Since Rorty explicitly states that the pragmatist-oriented interpreter does not care about
the author’s intentions, but only about what he can get out of the work at hand, his theory of
interpretation is clearly in risk of violating those moral principles that have been seen to hold
an important position in interpretive activity. Thus, if one accepts the primacy of these
principles, one should reject Rorty’s theory. However, the issue is not as straightforward as
this. For the problem with the present formulations is that almost all of them are underpinned
by a Kantian normative view of ethics, that is, an approach to moral issues whose very
foundations Rorty seeks to undermine. This background is most explicitly present in E.D.
Hirsch’s views, for he thinks that the interpreter should be guided by “a fundamental ethical
maxim,”  according to which the interpreter has a “basic moral imperative… to respect an
author’s intention.”390 As Hirsch notes, this formulation maintains the spirit of Kant’s
categorial imperative.391 However,  because  of  Rorty’s  skeptical  attitude  towards  Kantian
moral philosophy, it would seem to bias the case against Rorty to rely on principles derived
from  it  in  this  specific  context.  Yet,  a  question  worth  considering  is  whether  the  values  on
388 See especially, Hirsch (1976), Haapala (1999, 2003), Irwin (1999). I believe that Danto’s notion of deep
interpretation can also be seen to entail moral considerations for interpretation (Danto 1986). See especially
Danto’s brief discussion of deep interpretation in Danto (1993, 201-203).
389 See especially, Haapala (1999, 172-173).
390 Hirsch (1976, 90-92).
391 Haapala (1999, 2003) also acknowledges the Kantian background of his views.
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which Rorty’s liberal society is founded, in fact, entail moral principles for interpretation. If
they do, and if Rorty’s theory of interpretation is in conflict with them, its ultimate validity
must be reassessed.
Rorty, in fact, develops his idea of solidarity as the foundation of a liberal culture in direct
confrontation with the main tenets of Kant’s moral philosophy. Rorty’s main point against
Kant is that moral judgments need not make a claim to universal validity in the way Kant
maintains. That is, beliefs can still regulate action and be “thought worth dying for”  even if it
is acknowledged that they are “caused by nothing deeper than contingent historical
circumstances.”392 Rorty argues that although one possesses a skeptical attitude towards the
existence of a common human nature, this does not, in his opinion, remove the fact that we
have a particular kind of “moral obligation to feel a sense of solidarity with all other human
beings.”393 This is an important principle for Rorty in particular, because the liberal society
outlined by him rests on its wide-ranging recognition.
The significant position of solidarity, in turn, entails that certain maxims and values
should guide the attitudes with which the members of a liberal society relate to their fellow
inhabitants. Thus, while Rorty’s liberalism is not established in such universalist terms, in
which the strength of certain principles is explained in terms of a relationship to a common
human nature people share, it must still endorse particular principles as more acceptable and
desirable than others. To assess values in these terms, actually, goes well with the
philosophical holism that different parts of Rorty’s work involve. According to this kind of
holism theories and belief systems do not contain foundational bedrock premises, but certain
beliefs are considered more crucial than others, because they inhabit a more essential position
in  the  total  web  of  beliefs.  That  is,  in  the  case  of  Rorty’s  liberalism,  those  values  which
constitute the idea of liberalism such as, say, various forms freedom, the possibility for self-
development, and openmindedness, should be considered superior to less crucial and
constitutive principles, which are located farther away from the core.394 The former sorts of
values are primary in the sense that they cannot be eradicated without destroying the very idea
of liberalism.
As we saw, Rorty raises a person he calls “the liberal ironist”  to an important position in
his liberal culture, defining him or her as an individual “who faces up to the contingency of
his  or  her  own  most  central  beliefs  and  desires….”395 Such a person does not justify her
actions by relating them to ahistorical, universal or theological principles. This type of person,
thus, embodies those values which are important for Rorty’s liberalism. Rorty also sketches
an active role for the liberal ironist, and as became apparent he regards “literary critic”  to be
392 Rorty (1989, 189).
393 Ibid. (190).
394 Ibid. (51-52).
395 Ibid. (xv).
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an alternative name for this type of person. This connection he draws is not surprising, for
redescriptions inhabit a similar position in their respective activities.
However, once approached through the short account of liberalism given above, the
ideality of the liberal ironist and the pragmatist critic turns out to be a more complex matter
than Rorty seems to realize. The ironist seeks to create new descriptions in order to free those
around her from old prejudices and outworn conceptions that she finds pose obstacles for the
functioning of her community. While this kind of process should be considered valuable, it
seems that redescriptive activities cannot in fact be carried out as unconditionally as this
positive description concerning their role may imply. For when all the possible outcomes of
this activity are drawn Rorty’s trust in the power of redescription becomes, as Jean Bethke
Elhstain also maintains, a “genuinely troubling [claim] –  ethically and politically.”396
Although Rorty wishes to create an arena for the activity of the ironist and the literary critic
which is as unbounded as possible, the creation of new descriptions must, ultimately, have
certain boundaries, because, otherwise, the very foundations of Rorty’s liberal society are, in
fact, in danger of being destroyed. For this very reason, Rorty, too, must accept that
interpretations should have particular constraints.
The holistic way in which Rorty’s liberalism is grounded implies that such a course of
action must be found deplorable when its outcomes can obstruct the realization of its central
values. Now, the problem faced by Rorty is that the loose methods given to the liberal ironist
and the pragmatist-minded literary critic for achieving their goals, i.e., redescriptions, are, in
fact, in danger of turning their vocation into such an activity. Rorty overlooks the possibility
that certain redescriptions and approaches can ultimately lead to unjustifiable humiliation and
subjection. If redescription truly is the kind of powerful medium Rorty maintains, these sorts
of negative outcomes are possible. Redescriptions may not only lead to an awareness of
unnoticed similarities, they can be a powerful tool for pursuing completely opposite goals as
well. Processes, which have these outcomes, do not enhance solidarity, but, rather, shrink the
breeding ground of solidarity. Thus, Rorty’s liberal culture must reject the very doctrine that
makes these sorts of redescriptions possible. In other words, if a particular process of
redescribing is in conflict with the high value that a liberal society attaches, say, to various
forms of freedom, not only must the description itself be rejected, but also the very scheme on
which the justification of the process is grounded. Given the lack of restrictions which Rorty’s
pragmatist theory of interpretation provides for the literary critic, it may possibly turn out to
be precisely such a scheme.
Rorty maintains that “all we can do is to work with the final vocabulary we have, while
keeping our ears open for hints about how it might be expanded or revised.”397 However, this
principle alone implies that certain ways of redescribing cannot be accepted, for our ears are
not properly open if we choose to describe a person’s actions and its outcomes in terms that
396 Elhstain (2003, 146).
397 Rorty (1989, 197).
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distort  them  too  much.  The  importance  of  lending  an  ear  follows  from  one  of  the  central
values of Rorty’s liberal society, the freedom to be heard. While redescription can be a source
of freedom and discovery of important, unnoticed similarities, it can also be a powerful
medium for suppression, and, hence, a possible source for the obstruction of those values
found central by Rorty. Therefore, the very foundations of liberal culture entail that Rorty
must ultimately accept certain boundaries for any type of redescribing activity, including
interpretation.
Now, to get back to the issue of interpretation more specifically, if Rorty’s pragmatist
theory of interpretation truly provides the literary critic with such unrestrained tools for
approaching literary works as is expressed in his writings on interpretation, it seems to
ultimately run counter to Rorty’s idea of liberalism, this incompatibility thus providing strong
grounds for rejecting Rorty’s account of interpretation. However, the more interesting
implication of the previous discussion is that to see moral concerns as constraining the
assessment  of  validity  of  interpretations  need  not  be  formulated  in  terms  of  Kantian  moral
philosophy, as they currently are, but the claim can be established on principles whose force
Rorty must, in the end, accept as well. Not only does it follow from Kant’s account of
personhood that it is morally reprehensible to subject the artist’s work to “our whimsies”  or to
treat the specific creation only as a means for satisfying our purposes and desires,398 but the
importance of this position also follows from Rorty’s account of liberalism. Yet, this
conclusion precisely means that the ultimate validity of Rorty’s pragmatist account of
interpretation must be reassessed even on Rorty’s own terms.
6. Conclusions
Now, if it indeed is the case that Rorty’s approach to interpretation is incompatible with the
idea that interpretations should be constrained by the sorts of moral considerations specified
above, we have finally arrived at a conclusion which provides support for favoring an
intentionalist approach over the kind of view of interpretation Rorty’s pragmatism involves.
That is, if one acknowledges that the discussion revolving around the ethics of interpretation
raises factors which should be taken into account when considering the validity of
interpretations, and this is something Rorty was shown to be compelled to concede to as well,
then intentionalist theories begin to look the stronger position on interpretation of the two.
This is because they are able to accommodate the factors which are seen to pose restrictions
on interpretation in that discussion much more effortlessly than the view of interpretation
involved in Rorty’s sketch of the liberal ironist.
398 Hirsch (1976, 90-92), Haapala (1999, 172).
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Rorty initially drew support for his theory by insisting that the strength of theories of
interpretation should not be assessed on the basis of how they manage to track the ultimate
structure  of  reality,  but  rather,  whether  they  give  ample  resources  for  meeting  those
challenges that literature and literary theory face in Rorty’s postmetaphysical society. The
reading of Davidson’s views implied that Rorty’s pragmatist theory of interpretation is no
better equipped to meet them than an intentionalist one, but that such an approach can
ultimately account for the features which make literary works important for the
postmetaphysical culture sketched by Rorty. So, after a successful reply to this criticism,
which I dubbed The Postmetaphysical Critique, intentionalism managed to overcome a severe
obstacle. Yet, the question which of the theories should be favored over the other remained.
After  the  previous  discussion  of  the  ethical  considerations  related  to  interpretation  the
situation is no longer so, and the intentionalist has finally won game, set, and match. This is
because while Rorty is compelled to accept that interpretations should be constrained by such
factors as those raised above, of the two approaches only the one stressing the importance of
the author’s intentions is able to embrace them.
In his essay “Solidarity or Objectivity?,”  Rorty formulates the attitude which, in his
opinion, should guide people and societies as follows:
If we could ever be moved solely by the desire for solidarity, setting
aside the desire for objectivity altogether, then we should think of human
progress as making it possible for human beings to do more interesting
things and be more interesting people, not as heading towards a place
which has somehow been prepared for humanity in advance.399
That intentionalist theories of interpretation are capable of accounting for Rorty’s
postmetaphysical  approach  to  ethics  and  the  kind  of  position  the  enhancement  of  solidarity
occupies in it implies that, at least in the context of interpretation, there isn’t any kind of
incongruence between the goal Rorty wants us to pursue and the goal he wants us to give up.
That  is,  we  can  keep  our  desire  for  objectivity,  at  least  as  this  attitude  is  expressed  in
intentionalism, without this in any way compromising the conditions for enhancing the
feeling of solidarity.
One of the features that separate Rorty’s way of practicing philosophy from some
traditional ways is its insistence on reconsidering those terms with which philosophical views
may be challenged. Rorty emphasizes that besides traditional reliance on revealing logical
inconsistencies in one’s opponent’s arguments and presenting knockdown counterexamples
against them, one may also support one’s own views by trying to make the claim one is
opposing “look bad.”  In this chapter, I hope to have managed to put Rorty’s theory in just that
kind of light. If I have succeeded in this, Rorty’s theory is then, yet again, undermined on its
own terms as well.
399 Rorty (1991, 27-28).
153
Marschallin
Philosophier' Er nicht, Herr Schatz, und komm Er her.
Jetzt wird gefrühstuckt. Jedes Ding hat seine Zeit.
Richard Strauss, Der Rosenkavalier, act one, libretto Hugo von Hofmannsthall
V Conclusions: How to be a Pluralist without Being a
Relativist?
Parts of contemporary philosophy have been characterized by an attempt to go “beyond
objectivism and relativism,”  to borrow the title of Richard Bernstein’s book, which is one of
the most systematic investigations of the factors motivating this attempt, as well as of the
direction towards which it strives to steer philosophical reflection.400 In Bernstein’s view,
some philosophers among whom he includes, for example, both Gadamer and Rorty, have
tried to formulate an approach to inquiry in which rejecting the idea of foundationalism as the
requirement of meaningful discourse does not imply the impossibility of building a
foundation for assessing the comparative strength of competing values and conceptions.
Commitment to the view that there is no privileged viewpoint on the world does not, in other
words, imply that one is compelled to regard any viewpoint as good as any other.
The attempt to formulate an approach to inquiry which is not dominated by the dualism of
foundationalism and relativism is connected with the strand in contemporary philosophy
which insists on the need to give relativism a new hearing. As noted in the introduction,
support for granting relativism this kind of opportunity is drawn from the assumption that an
attitude dominated by some form of foundationalism is no longer a compelling stance to have
on the world, given the fractured nature of our contemporary condition, populated by
seemingly irresolvable conflicts. The problem has been how to balance between these two
ends, that is, how does one do justice to the plurality of world views, cultures, and religions
our world contains, and which we are becoming increasingly aware of, without falling to the
view that comparative judgments could not be made between the values and conceptions they
embody.
This study as a whole acknowledges the importance of those factors which have served as
a motivation for philosophers, such as Bernstein, to formulate an approach to inquiry in which
relinquishing the idea of a privileged viewpoint on the world does not imply slipping into
undesirable relativism. All of the three figures whose views I have focused on in this study
(Margolis, Gadamer, and Rorty) may be seen to have made significant contributions to this
development. I have acknowledged the importance of those factors lying in the background of
the work of these three major figures of contemporary philosophy. However, as I noted in the
400 Bernstein (1991/1983).
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introduction, another claim this study as a whole tries to defend is that a philosophical account
of interpretation can embrace these factors without committing itself to the kind of view of
interpretation these three philosophers support. Having now reached the end of my study I
think  we  are  in  a  position  to  achieve  a  more  detailed  picture  of  why  the  approach  to
interpretation developed in this study manages to evolve into such an account.
The way in which this study is connected to the line of thinking whose essential features
Bernstein tries to track in his work may be indicated by an observation made by E.D. Hirsch.
In the midst of his criticism of Gadamer, Hirsch remarks that the disagreement between him
and Gadamer should not really be seen to concern the more general motivations lying behind
Gadamer’s hermeneutics, the core of which Hirsch sums up as an insistence that “a vital,
contemporary understanding of the past is the only understanding worth having.”  Rather,
what is  at  stake in their  disagreement is  the question what sorts of theoretical  commitments
does one need to hold so that one is able to accommodate that kind of attitude within one’s
approach to interpretation and understanding. By relying on the distinction between meaning
and significance, Hirsch thinks that it is possible to explain certain kinds of phenomena, such
as the fact that our relationship to past events and artworks can undergo significant
transformations, without committing oneself to the account of understanding and
interpretation Gadamer’s hermeneutics involves, and to the “logical inconsistencies”  which,
in Hirsch’s opinion, it ultimately falls into.401
Hirsch’s distinction between meaning and significance allows one to embrace the kind of
pluralistic attitude the three philosophers mentioned above have found vital in our
contemporary  world.  It  does  this  because  it  reveals  the  possibility  that  two  claims  are  not
necessarily  as  opposed  to  each  other  as  might  initially  seem  to  be  the  case,  the  opposition
apparent in these conceptions, thus, not being in need of resolution either. On closer
inspection,  it  might  in  fact  turn  out  that  from  two  claims  made  about  a  given  artwork  one
concerns its meaning, while the other seeks to illuminate the work’s significance. To
accommodate Hirsch’s distinction within one’s approach to interpretation, in other words,
allows  one  to  embrace  the  kind  of  pluralistic  attitude  resisting  the  possibility  of  closure  in
inquiry the group of philosophers mentioned above have found significant for our
contemporary condition. Indeed, as was noted in chapter three, significance is essentially
boundless for Hirsch, changing as different kinds of relationships to the meaning of the work
are formed. In chapter three, I argued with the help of the investigation of the case of Thomas
Adés’ America: A Prophecy offered there that the distinction vital for Hirsch’s literary theory
is much more warranted than some hermeneutic criticisms have presumed. As a result,
Hirsch’s claim concerning the neglect of the distinction between meaning and significance as
the source of enormous confusion within Gadamer’s hermeneutics seems, after all, accurate.
401 Hirsch (1967, 255).
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Interestingly, certain critical remarks Davidson has addressed to Gadamer’s views suggest
that he believes them to be plagued by drawbacks similar to those Hirsch tries to uncover in
Gadamer’s work with the help of his distinction. While discussing Gadamer’s views,
Davidson remarks in the somewhat hazy and apparently offhand manner so typical of his
writings as a whole that “should we then agree with Gadamer when he says that what the text
means changes as the audience changes: ‘A text is understood only if it is understood in a
different way every time?’”  Davidson replies, “I think not,”  then continues, “there are
incompatible interpretations, as Freud suggests, because there is no reason to say that one
rules out others…. It is true that every person, every age, every culture will make what it can
of a text; and persons, periods, and cultures differ. But how can a significant relativism follow
from a truism?”402
The answer Hirsch’s analysis of the distinction between meaning and significance implies
to this question posed by Davidson is that we can avoid the conclusion by simply paying more
attention to what we are actually doing. That is, there is no reason to say that a claim made
about an artwork rules out another one, since it might be the case that the claims have
different objects. In this respect, assessing the validity of individual claims about artworks, as
well as how they relate to each other requires that we are clear on, whether a given claim is
intended to reveal the meaning of the work, or whether it is intended to illuminate the possible
significance the work in question may have for us. These two activities do not stand in any
kind of opposition with one another. Therefore, the distinction between meaning and
significance gives a possibility for holding on to the view that the author’s intentions do,
indeed, pose the kinds of constraints on interpretation both Hirsch and Davidson think they
do, while simultaneously embracing the view that artworks are also entities which contain
aspects resisting closure.
The  critical  account  of  Rorty’s  pragmatist  view  of  interpretation  and  of  the  position
sketched for literature in Rorty’s work presented in chapter four points to another way of
uniting pluralism with a more robust view of justification than the relativistic position
involves. In this case, the possibility for this kind of unification does not so much follow from
the  possible  significance  that  may  be  drawn  from  a  given  artwork,  as  to  the  productive
consequences which the interpretation process itself may engender. For example, in chapter
four I tried to illuminate one possible structure the process of interpretation may take. In the
first act of Wagner’s The Valkyrie the content of the interpretation was significant. But,
moreover, the locus of the cognitive significance related to interpretation can be located in the
actual process through which one comes to understand that content. In this investigation, the
distinction between imaginative and imaginary forms of imagination drawn by Dewey proved
highly relevant. In chapter four, I argued that due to the important position that the leitmotifs
used by Wagner occupy in the first act of his opera, as well as the specific magnetic character
402 Davidson (2005/1993, 181).
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they possess, the successful interpretation of this piece of music requires the employment of
capacities similar to those that are essential for some other important aspects of human life,
such as proper moral reflection. The critical investigation of Rorty’s views presented in
chapter four evolves into an account of interpretation which embraces the kind of pluralistic
attitude that Rorty, among others, finds important for our postmetaphysical condition.
Simultaneously, it retains a stronger foundation for justification than Rorty’s pragmatist view
would like to allow. The implication that follows from this is that a commitment to
intentionalist principles in interpretation in no way compromises the artwork’s potential for
realizing those capacities which are connected to the essential values of Rorty’s
postmetaphysical culture, such as the enhancement of solidarity.
In the introduction, I noted that the issue of relativism is connected to the anti-
intentionalist undercurrents which have dominated recent art research. Art researchers have in
many cases abandoned the idea of the author’s intentions for reasons similar to those that have
motivated philosophers to find a way of forming a pluralistic attitude towards the world that
can avoid a slippage into relativism. I also noted that it is one of the most important
suppositions of this study as a whole that the intentionalist theory of interpretation developed
in it on the basis of Davidson’s views on meaning, intention, and the holistic constitution of
the mind allows one to embrace those aspects of artworks which make them important, for
example, to Gadamer and Rorty. Simultaneously, my study attempted to overcome certain
problematic features their views have been seen to face, such as to provide a rigorous enough
account of validity. The account I offer does, I hope, manage to overcome the relativistic
consequences Rorty’s and Gadamer’s views have been seen to be in danger of falling into.
That is, the Davidsonian form of intentionalism shows that we lose very little, even though we
commit ourselves to the view that interpretation involves constraints. On the other hand, what
we gain is a more rigorous sense of what validity of interpretation ultimately amounts to, and
simultaneously, if figures such as Danto and Hirsch are right, we have managed to sustain the
intellectual credibility of the interpretive sciences.
This study has investigated other paths, namely Hirsch’s distinction between meaning and
significance, to unite a pluralistic attitude with a strong account of validity. That distinction is
important because it raises a question that I believe needs to be more carefully examined
within philosophy of interpretation, namely, what is interpretation anyway, and is
interpretation really the most important element through which our relationship to artworks is
formed? Hirsch’s distinction, in fact, seems to suggest that interpretation is only one factor
among others in this process. For example, Hirsch himself considers an activity to be
“interpretation”  which seeks to illuminate the meaning of the work, Hirsch reserving the term
“criticism”  to  denote  the  process  whose  goal  it  is  to  probe  the  possible  significance  of  the
work.403
403 Hirsch (1967, 57).
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Some have already argued that there is a need for a more detailed examination of the role
of  interpretation  in  our  interaction  with  the  world  and  how  that  activity  is  connected  to  its
neighboring notions, such as understanding. Drawing on pragmatist conceptions of experience
and human action Richard Shusterman has, for example, called into question the relationship
that is assumed to hold between understanding and interpretation in a tenet which often
appears in the hermeneutic literature, “all understanding involves interpretation.”  In place of
this kind of view, Shusterman offers an account where interpretation is seen as a smaller
category compared to understanding, and that there are cases of understanding in which
interpretation does not have any role. In Shusterman’s opinion, particularly in cases where
understanding is achieved immediately and without conscious reflection, it does not seem
meaningful to consider understanding to be a product of interpretation. Rather, in these kinds
of cases,  understanding is best  explained in terms of such factors as habits and customs. To
ascribe a role to interpretation in cases of understanding such as these runs the danger of
depriving that concept from any kind of clear content, that is, if everything is interpretation,
there does not seem to remain a distinct activity for that notion to denote.
Shusterman does not deny that interpretation could have a role in achieving
understanding. Rather, the core of his criticism is that only by drawing a distinction between
understanding and interpretation does interpretation acquire an appropriate “contrast class”
for probing the nature of this activity further, as well as the role it ultimately plays in our
lives. One feature which, in Shusterman’s opinion, serves to distinguish understanding from
interpretation is that interpretation is a much more conscious activity compared to
understanding, this difference between the two activities indicating for Shusterman that
interpretation should, in fact, be regarded as a form of “problem solving.”404
Investigations like Shusterman’s probe the ultimate role that interpretation has in our
lives. What I think has not been considered thoroughly enough is the effect that such
investigations have concerning the question how does one reconcile pluralism with a rigid
account of validity in interpretation. Together with Hirsch’s distinction between meaning and
significance  Shusterman’s  account  of  the  role  of  interpretation  provides  another  way  of
accommodating a pluralist attitude within an intentionalist theory of interpretation. This is
because both Hirsch and Shusterman point out a way for the kind of intentionalist theory
developed in this study on the basis of Davidson’s views to accept that there are, indeed,
differences in the character that people’s relationship to artworks take as well as in the factors
through which they are formed, without giving up on the idea that interpretations are
constrained by the author’s intentions. That is, intentionalism does not rule out the possibility
that two people may legitimately build relationships to artworks which are different from one
another, for example in the sense that they experience a given work differently or attribute a
different  kind  of  significance  to  it.  What  Hirsch’s  distinction  also  points  out  is  that  certain
404 Shusterman (2000, 129-133).
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changes and transformations in the experience a work elicits in oneself and the kind of
significance one attributes to it is not, necessarily, a result of a change in one’s interpretation.
Consequently, it may also be the case that two people hold identical interpretations of a given
work  but,  nevertheless,  attribute  a  different  significance  to  it  and  experience  the  work
differently. This is because the interpretation one holds of a given work alone does not
determine the significance one sees that work to possess, for other factors come into play in
determining that aspect of the work, some of which include precisely those factors that have
molded us into the kinds of people we are.
This is where Shusterman’s and Hirsch’s views supplement each another and this
exposition also points out why they may both be said to insist on the need for a more detailed
examination of the role of interpretation in our interaction not only with artworks, but with the
world at large. Simultaneously, by pointing out how multifarious those factors can be through
which our relationship to artworks are formed, and how interpretation is only one factor,
though in some cases the most essential one, Shusterman’s and Hirsch’s approaches to
philosophy of interpretation also contribute to the attempt to reconcile pluralism with a rigid
account of validity in interpretation. That is, to posit constraints on interpretations deriving
from the author’s intentions does not necessarily mean that one simultaneously introduces
definitive constraints on the character that people’s relationship to artworks can take. As
Hirsch’s and Shusterman’s views show, interpretation is only one of the ingredients molding
that relationship to its ultimate form. Moreover, those other ingredients are not necessarily
constrained by the author’s intentions in a manner similar to the way interpretations have been
considered to be constrained in this study.
In chapter three, I introduced some criticisms that Gadamer’s followers and commentators
have addressed to the distinction offered by Hirsch, which all tried to show from different
angles how the meaning of the work cannot be divorced as razor sharply from the significance
the work has for a particular group of people as Hirsch assumes. I presented some remarks in
support of the distinction, but I think we are now in a position not only to see why the
distinction is warranted, but also how ably it, in fact, manages to capture the different aspects
involved in our interactions with artworks.
It is surely the case that when encountering “a great work of art, we bring what we have
experienced and who we are into play,”  as Richard Palmer claims. However, Hirsch’s
distinction and Shusterman’s analysis of interpretation’s connection to understanding raises
the question why should the effect of the factors which have molded us into the kinds of
persons we in actual fact are be extended to concern the way we interpret and understand a
given work as straightforwardly as Palmer, for example, assumes?405 For Hirsch, who we are
does, indeed, have an effect on how we interact with artworks, but that primarily concerns the
significance we end up seeing in the work, not how we come to interpret it.
405 Palmer (1969, 168).
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Let me use two examples to extend the point at work here. First, sometimes it seems that
interpretation does not play any kind of role in forming the character of our encounter with a
particular artwork. For example, my own experience of the first bars of Wagner’s Tristan and
Isolde is formed through the fact that the so-called Tristan Chord has been widely considered
to signify a point in the history of Western classical music in which music broke with the past.
My experience, thus, is perhaps infused by a more intense and inconsolable sense of loss than
a hearer’s in whose experience this historical fact has no kind of role, perhaps because he is
unaware of the historical significance of this particular chord developed by Wagner. In this
respect, my experience of the piece’s beginning is surely different from the way its premiere
audience experienced it. But why should this difference in our experiences be explained in
terms of differences in the way we interpret and understand the chord in question, whatever
that might, ultimately, involve? Is it not, rather, so that due to the place that Wagner’s Tristan
and Isolde came to occupy in the history of music, the significance of that chord took on a
certain character, which, in turn, partly, explains the differences in the character of my
experience on the one hand, and that of the audience’s attending its premiere on the other.
Another observation that, in my opinion, supports a more modest view of interpretation’s
role is that there are cases where our experience does not seem to reflect our understanding of
a piece. That is, while those factors raised in hermeneutics do, indeed, have an effect on how
we experience a particular work, that experience does not necessarily serve as an indication of
our understanding, namely, the kind of interpretation we hold of the piece. Shostakovich’s
seventh symphony serves as a good case in point. While I think Ian MacDonald is right in
drawing attention to the ironic aspects of this symphony,406 what is interesting is that although
I possess this kind of understanding of the work, it is nevertheless nowadays extremely hard
for my experience of the work to embody the ironic features the work contains. This is mainly
because of the associations and reputation that Shostakovich’s work carries which heavily
influence the character our relationship to that work nowadays takes. The symphony became a
symbol for Soviet defiance during the German siege of Leningrad, an appropriation of the
work that was later completely rejected by Shostakovich himself in the controversial work
Testimony. In that work the composer claims that the symphony did not depict the siege of
Leningrad,  and  that  the  famous  march  section  of  the  first  movement  was  not  intended  as  a
depiction of the German attack.
Now, despite my experience being heavily colored by these associations, why should the
influence resulting from their effect be thought to condition my understanding of the piece in
a way that it could no longer be described as being ironic in nature. That is, why should the
experience Shostakovich’s seventh symphony nowadays elicits in me be thought to serve as a
reflection  of  the  content  of  my  understanding  of  that  piece?  After  all,  other  features  of  the
work could be pointed out, such as its key being C-major, the similarities obtaining between
406 MacDonald (1990, 158).
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the symphony’s march theme and Ravel’s Bolero, and certain quotations Shostakovich
employs  in  the  piece,  which  I  think  explains  the  work’s  ironic  character.  Shouldn’t  the
accuracy of my conception of the work rather be assessed on the basis of whether these
factors indeed manage to lend support for the view of the work I hold as opposed to what
sorts of features my experience of the work is characterized by?
Be that as it may, in both cases we are left with a kind of pluralism, that is, we can
acknowledge that there are differences in the ways people relate to artworks, such as in the
significance they attribute to a given work, without giving up on the idea that interpretations
are constrained by the author’s intentions. This is because the elaboration of Hirsch’s
distinction offered allows us to say that those differences do not concern differences in
interpretation. In this respect, I think Maria Baghramian is absolutely right in insisting that
“relativism should be distinguished from pluralism.”407
I’m gradually beginning to drift away from the original aims and purposes of this study,
but, then again, it is not inappropriate to end a study by sketching a new set of questions
which writing the study at hand has evoked. It is, of course, somewhat strange to end a study
in philosophy of interpretation on a note claiming that interpretation is not necessarily as vital
an element in our interaction with art as has been assumed and that we still have not managed
to grasp the ultimate content of this concept. However, it seems hard to think otherwise in the
face of these observations. Attempting to unravel the logic of the different concepts with
which our relationship with artworks can be captured will extend the main topic of this thesis,
i.e., the role of the author’s intentions in interpretation. It is my belief that that exposition will
simultaneously reveal why, in fact, there is nothing to be afraid of in the suggestion that
interpretations  should  be  constrained  by  the  author’s  intentions,  for  it  will  indicate  how our
engagements  with  artworks  are  formed  through  a  host  of  other  factors  than  the  process  of
interpretation.
There is a time for everything, as the Countess notes in Der Rosenkavalier, and it would
require  much  more  analysis  of  the  complex  threads  which  make  up  our  social  and  cultural
lives, for example the role such factors as customs and habits occupy in them, than I have the
possibility of embarking on here before we are in a position to give a more extensive answer
to the question when is it time to interpret and when is it time to do something else? When is
our successful interaction with the world based on interpretation and when on some other
capacities we possess? Time is irreversible, an aspect of our lives Der Rosenkavalier portrays
in such a heartfelt manner, but, fortunately, the irreversibility of time does not mean that we
are nearing the end of time, so unraveling the various threads of the conceptual web our
interaction with artworks involves can be left aside for the time being. The time for that
investigation will surely come. Now it seems a more rewarding option to take our cue from
the Countess again who urges her beloved young lover Octavian to cease philosophizing
407 Baghramian (2004, 9).
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about the agonies of our lives, such as the inevitable aging of men, and to do something more
lighthearted instead, something which requires neither philosophizing nor interpretation.
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